Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hospital
| Decision Date | 18 July 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 11958--PR,11958--PR |
| Citation | 537 P.2d 1329,112 Ariz. 104 |
| Parties | Saul GUERRERO and Maria de Lourdes Guerrero, minors, by their guardian ad litem, Teodoro Guerrero, Appellants, v. COPPER QUEEN HOSPITAL, a division of Phelps Dodge Corporation, a New York Corporation, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Ramon R. Alvarez and Arthur C. Atonna, Douglas, for appellants.
Evans, Kitchel & Jenckes P.C. by Leon D. Bess and David L. Beaugureau, Phoenix, for appellees.
Saul and Maria de Lourdes Guerrero, minors, appealed by their guardian ad litem, Teodoro Guerrero, to the court of appeals from a superior court judgment dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim of which relief could be granted. The complaint was filed to recover damages for aggravated injury and suffering allegedly arising from the failure of the personnel of the Copper Queen Hospital to render emergency aid to the children. They were burned when a stove in their home in Naco, Sonora, Mexico, exploded. The Copper Queen Hospital is a private hospital located in Bisbee, Arizona, and a division of the Phelps Dodge Corporation, incorporated in New York. The court of appeals reversed the decision of the superior court and denied a subsequent motion for rehearing. We accepted the petition for review. The opinion of the court of appeals is vacated. Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hospital, 22 Ariz.App. 611, 529 P.2d 1205 (1974); Reh. denied, 23 Ariz.App. 172, 531 P.2d 548 (1975).
The issue before us is whether a privately owned hospital is under a duty to provide emergency care to All persons presenting themselves for such aid, including nonresident aliens who enter the country solely for the purpose of treatment.
The appellant concede that the Copper Queen Hospital is a private institution and that, as a general rule, a private hospital is under no obligation to accept any individual who applies as a patient. They argue that a private hospital is under no legal duty to maintain an emergency ward, but, if a hospital does maintain such a ward for the public, it must provide the service when a situation exists which reasonably could be termed an emergency. Appellants urge us to follow the opinion of the Supreme Court of Delaware in Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove, 54 Del. 10, 174 A.2d 135 (1961):
'. . . If a person, seriously hurt, applies for such aid at an emergency ward, relying on the established custom to render it, is it still the right of the hospital to turn him away without any reason? In such a case, it seems to us, such a refusal might well result in worsening the condition of the injured person, because of the time lost in a useless attempt to obtain medical aid.
The appellees argue that the Manlove case sets forth a minority rule which is contrary to the common-law rule that a private hospital is under no duty to accept a patient. For cases supporting the common-law rule and those supporting the minority rule see 35 A.L.R.3rd 841 et seq. The reliance by the parties on either rule is misplaced. A private hospital has no duty to accept a patient or serve everyone unless a different public policy has been declared by statute or otherwise. 40 Am.Jur.2d Hospitals and Asylums § 12.
The character of private hospitals in Arizona has been changed by statute and regulations. Private hospitals must be licensed to operate in this state. For the year in question the applicable statute was A.R.S. § 36--407, but for a number of years prior to 1972, former statutes required that a corporation obtain a license to conduct a hospital.
To implement the purposes of the statutes, authority was given to the state department of health, and later to the state board of health, to adopt rules and regulations governing the licensing of hospitals. A.R.S. § 36--405. Among the purposes of the regulations was to 'provide minimum requirements of such institutions (hospitals) for types and extent of services to be provided . . ..' A.R.S. § 36--405(A).
Since 1964 the regulations of the state health department have required a General Hospital to maintain emergency room services. 1 In the revision of the rules in 1972 the same requirement for providing facilities for emergency care was continued and expanded. 2
From the statutes and regulations it appears clear that the public policy of this state is that a General Hospital must maintain facilities to provide emergency care. From this policy we conclude that such a hospital may not deny emergency care to any patient without cause.
The actual facts in this case are unknown because the action was dismissed at the complaint stage. The appellee hospital is referred to simply as a hospital. There is no specific allegation of its class as a General or Special Hospital. These are matters which can be developed in the case. For pleading purposes the allegation is sufficient to put the opposing party on notice of the nature and type of institution in question.
The appellees argue that A.R.S. § 32--1471 concerning individuals gratuitously rendering emergency care relieves such persons of liability for civil or other damages unless they are guilty of gross negligence. The apparent purpose of this statute is to relieve the burden of liability on individuals who choose to or not to render aid to others in emergency situations. We are not dealing with the same problem in this instance. An individual may in good faith help another in a crisis with untoward results for which he should not be penalized or the same person may not help, perhaps knowing that he lacks the necessary expertise to be of aid. The medical expertise of a hospital staff is assumed. The statute is not applicable to emergency medical treatment in a hospital.
The appellees have raised other contentions concerning the wording of the claim for relief. In testing a complaint for a failure to state a claim, the question is whether enough is stated which would entitle the plaintiff to relief upon some theory to be...
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...based on the reasonable expectations doctrine or that his complaint is necessarily insufficient. See Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hosp., 112 Ariz. 104, 106, 537 P.2d 1329, 1331 (1975) ("In testing a complaint for a failure to state a claim, the question is whether enough is stated which would e......
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...technicalities and give the other party notice of the basis for the claim and its general nature. Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hosp., 112 Ariz. 104, 106-07, 537 P.2d 1329, 1331-32 (1975). ¶ 10 Kinetico urges this court to afford greater deference to the dismissal, claiming that actions for libe......
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