Guest-White v. Checker Leasing, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 February 2016
• Docket Number: CAUSE NO.: 1:14CV172-SA-DAS
• Parties: TAMRA RENEE GUEST-WHITE PLAINTIFF v. CHECKER LEASING, INC., and JOEL G. SHORES, in his individual capacity DEFENDANTS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

TAMRA RENEE GUEST-WHITE PLAINTIFF v. CHECKER LEASING, INC.,and JOEL G. SHORES, in his individual capacity DEFENDANTS

CAUSE NO.: 1:14CV172-SA-DAS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI ABERDEEN DIVISION

February 11, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants filed a motion [72] seeking summary adjudication of Plaintiff's claims for sex-based wage discrimination, punitive damages, and all other remaining claims. After reviewing the motion, responses, rules and authorities, the Court finds as follows:

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff was a long-time employee of Checker Leasing, a vehicle leasing business operating under the name Avis Rent A Car System, LLC, and Capital Budget Rent A Car System, Inc. At the time of her discharge, Plaintiff was a regional manager over facilities in Mississippi and Kentucky - Greenville, Starkville, Meridian, Columbus, and Paducah, Kentucky.

Plaintiff contends that because she complained about Defendants' falsification of tax records, and repeatedly opposed terminating the black manager of the Meridian facility, she was demoted then discharged.

Plaintiff filed a Charge with the EEOC and received her right to sue letter. She brings this cause of action against Checker Leasing for the following:

a. Violation of the Equal Pay Act;

b. Retaliation because she opposed race discrimination; and

c. Discharge in violation of Mississippi public policy.

Plaintiff additionally brings suit individually against Joel Shores for malicious interference with employment "since he caused Plaintiff's wages to be decreased so as to force her out of the company, and because of her opposition to race discrimination."

Defendants seek summary judgment on all claims.

Summary Judgment Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs summary judgment. Summary judgment is warranted when the evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The rule "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).

The moving party "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party must then "go beyond the pleadings" and "designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (citation omitted). In reviewing the evidence, factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the non-movant, "but only when . . . both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). When such contradictory facts exist, the Court may "not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000). Conclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments are not an adequate substitutefor specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1997); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

Discussion and Analysis

1. Equal Pay Act

The Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), was enacted by Congress as an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq, and requires that all persons performing equal work must receive equal pay, unless a difference in pay is justified by a consideration other than gender. To establish a prima facie case under the EPA, White must show: "1. [that Checker Leasing] is subject to the Act; 2. [White] performed work in a position requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions; and 3. [White] was paid less than the employee of the opposite sex providing the basis of comparison." Chance v. Rice Univ., 984 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 722-23 (5th Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted)). White must show that any pay disparity is a result of sex and cannot be attributed to any other factor, and she must also show that her male comparator held a position that required virtually identical skills, effort, and responsibilities. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 238 (5th Cir. 1973).

"If the plaintiff meets this burden, the burden of proof 'shifts to the employer to show that the differential is justified under one of the Act's four exceptions.'" Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1136 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196, 94 S. Ct. 2223, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1974)) (unequal pay under EPA and Title VII). These exceptions are: the pay differential is based on (1) a seniority system, (2) a merit system, (3) a system that measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or (4) a differentialbased on any factor other than sex. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1); Schulte v. Wilson Indus., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 324, 338-39 (S.D. Tex. 1982). "The exceptions are affirmative defenses on which the employer has the burden both of production and of persuasion." Plemer, 713 F.2d at 1136 (quoting Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 197, 94 S. Ct. 2223). Although EPA claims are subject to a burden-shifting framework that is similar to the one used in Title VII claims, there is one critical difference. "In a Title VII case, the burden of persuasion always remains with the plaintiff." Plemer, 713 F.2d at 1136. In an EPA case, however, the defendant has the burden of persuasion if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. Id.

There is no dispute that Checker Leasing is subject to the Equal Pay Act. Additionally, Plaintiff has shown that her position required equal skill, effort, and responsibility to the other Regional Managers. The third element requires Plaintiff to name a comparator that she was paid less than. To satisfy the third element of her prima facie case, it is not necessary for White to prove that she was paid less than her comparator, Mike Evans, at the same time. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1049 (5th Cir. 1973) ("[T]he Equal Pay Act applies to jobs held in immediate succession, as well as simultaneously."); see also, e.g., Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425, 1431 (5th Cir. 1984) ("The analysis [under a Title VII wage discrimination case] is the same even where the two employees whose salaries are being compared are employed at different times in the same position." (citing Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981); Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 64 (5th Cir. 1980))).

The relevant comparison is between the amount White was paid in the position of Regional Manager and the amount Evans was paid when he held the position of Regional Manager. A reasonable trier of fact could find that Evans was paid more. At the time of herdischarge, White's salary was $52,000. In contrast, Mike Evans earned $62,500 as a Regional Manager.

Because a reasonable trier of fact could find that White has satisfied her obligation to establish a prima facie case, the burden of proof and production shifts to Checker Leasing to demonstrate that the pay differential is justified under one of the EPA's four exceptions. See, e.g., Plemer, 713 F.2d at 1136. Checker Leasing has cited Evans' prior experience in the industry as the reason for the differential in pay. Accordingly, the Court assumes Checker Leasing is proceeding under the fourth exception, "any other factor other than sex" as the basis for this alleged disparity.

"Any factor other than sex" is a general, catch-all exception to the application of the EPA. Wojciechowski v. Nat'l Oilwell Marco, L.P., 763 F. Supp. 2d 832, 852 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (citing Perales v. Am. Ret. Corp., 2005 WL 2367772, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2005)). "The exception has been found to apply 'when the disparity results from unique characteristics of the same job; from an individual's experience, training or ability; or from special exigent circumstances connected with the business.'" Id. (quoting Perales, 2005 WL 2367772, at *6). A pay differential based on an employer's changed financial condition can also qualify as a factor other than sex. See, e.g., Covington v. S. Ill. Univ., 816 F.2d 317, 324-25 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that district court concluded, inter alia, that plaintiff's low starting salary was the result of financial emergency that employer was experiencing at time she was hired, and stating in dicta employer's financial condition could qualify as a factor other than sex); Joyner v. Town of Elberta, 22 F. Supp. 3d. 1201, 1209 (S.D. Ala. 2014) (holding that town established that decision to pay male permanent police chief more than it paid female interim police chief was based onfactor other than sex where, inter alia, difference resulted from decline in revenue during female interim police chief's tenure).

Because a pay differential based on any other factor other than sex is an affirmative defense, Checker Leasing must meet the beyond peradventure standard to obtain summary judgment. See Brokaw, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1251 (holding concerning this affirmative defense that defendant's "burden of proof is 'heavy,' in the sense that the employer 'must demonstrate that the factor of sex provided no basis for the wage differential.'" (quoting Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1078 (11th Cir. 2003)). Checker Leasing has failed, however, to establish...