Guevara v. State
| Decision Date | 30 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-17-00313-CR,No. 11-17-00315-CR,No. 11-17-00314-CR,11-17-00313-CR,11-17-00314-CR,11-17-00315-CR |
| Parties | ORLANDO ELEAZAR GUEVARA, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 35th District Court Brown County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. CR24084, CR24136, & CR24170
The jury convicted Orlando Eleazar Guevara of three offenses: delivery of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone (Cause No. 11-17-00313-CR, Trial Court Cause No. CR24084), possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone with the intent to deliver (Cause No. 11-17-00314-CR, Trial Court Cause No. CR24136), and engaging in organized criminal activity (Cause No. 11-17-00315-CR, Trial Court Cause No. CR24170). See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.112, 481.134 (West 2017); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02 (West Supp. 2018). The trial court sentenced Appellant to two concurrent terms of fifteen years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for the convictions for delivery of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced Appellant to confinement for a term of twenty years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for the conviction for engaging in organized criminal activity. Additionally, the trial court ordered that the sentence of twenty years in Cause No. 11-17-00315-CR is to be served consecutively to the two fifteen-year sentences.
In a "combined" brief, Appellant brings four issues in these appeals. In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his requested instruction with respect to the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity. In his second and third issues, Appellant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for engaging in organized criminal activity and possession with intent to distribute. In his fourth issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted an officer's opinion testimony. We affirm.
In May 2015, Nora Crawford worked as a confidential informant for Detective Joe Aaron Taylor of the Brownwood Police Department. Crawford arranged a controlled buy of 1.75 grams of methamphetamine from Elizabeth Willett. Crawford testified that Willett told her that Willett would get the methamphetamine from Willett's brother, Kevin Allen. Willett instructed Crawford to come to a residence located on Vincent Street in Brownwood on May 19. Before Crawford proceeded to the residence, Detective Taylor searched Crawford and equipped her with audio and video recording devices.
When Crawford arrived, Willett stated that she would "get it" and went into a bedroom. Crawford testified that both Allen and Appellant were in the bedroom. Willett returned with the methamphetamine, and Crawford gave her money. Crawford then weighed the methamphetamine and asked about purchasing more. Willett told Crawford that they would have more later. Crawford testified that she believed that Willett was referring to Allen and Appellant because Willett was going to be at work. Crawford set up with Willett another purchase of methamphetamine from Allen that would occur later that day. Crawford left the residence and met with Detective Taylor. Crawford informed Detective Taylor that she would be making another controlled purchase later that afternoon.
Before the second controlled buy, Crawford again met with Detective Taylor, and he searched her and equipped her with audio and video recording devices. Then, Crawford returned to the residence on Vincent Street. However, instead of purchasing methamphetamine from Allen, she purchased methamphetamine from Appellant because Allen did not have anymore. Again, Crawford left the residence and met with Detective Taylor.
Over the next three days, Crawford returned to the residence numerous times but stayed in contact with Officer Taylor. Crawford testified that a supply of methamphetamine was supposed to be delivered to the residence on Vincent Street on the night of May 21, 2015. Crawford waited all night for the supply to arrive, but it did not arrive. Crawford left that morning and later learned the supply was delivered after she left. She returned later that day, and Appellant, Allen, Willett, and Willett's husband were at the residence. Crawford testified that Appellant told her that he hid the methamphetamine outside because he thought the police were watching him. Appellant was the only person who knew where the methamphetamine was hidden. Crawford conducted a third controlled buy fromAppellant that day. As in the previous controlled buys, Crawford met with Detective Taylor before and after the purchase.
In addition to the drug transactions referenced above, Crawford testified that she observed Willett, Allen, and Appellant sell methamphetamine on numerous occasions to other people and cooperate with each other in making those sales. She testified that all three were doing the packaging and all three were conducting sales. Crawford observed Willett setting up drug purchases over the phone. Crawford also observed Willett "collect debts" on behalf of Appellant and Allen.
Subsequently, Detective Taylor obtained and executed a search warrant at the residence on Vincent Street. When Detective Taylor executed the warrant, Appellant fled the house and was arrested shortly thereafter. Allen surrendered 2.36 grams of methamphetamine located underneath couch cushions. Additionally, law enforcement located 17.46 grams of methamphetamine in a bathtub, as well as drug paraphernalia and packaging materials throughout the house.
Willett and Allen also testified at trial. The State called both of them as witnesses after they had pleaded guilty to offenses arising from the events related to Crawford's activities described above. Willett denied selling drugs with Appellant and Allen, and she denied knowing that Appellant and Allen were selling drugs from the house. She testified that she sold the methamphetamine to Crawford on the first occasion from her own supply without any participation with Appellant or Allen. Willett further testified that she did not know why she twice went into the bedroom where Appellant and Allen were located during the first drug transaction. Willett also denied setting up the second drug buy for Crawford to purchase methamphetamine from Appellant or Allen.
Allen acknowledged that he and Appellant sold methamphetamine from the house, including selling it to Crawford, but he denied that Willett had any knowledgeor participation in their drug sales. Allen also acknowledged that he was present in the bedroom when Willett entered it twice during the first drug transaction. However, he denied that either he or Appellant provided the methamphetamine that Willett delivered to Crawford. Allen also denied that Willett found drug customers for Allen and Appellant.
In his second and third issues, Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for engaging in organized criminal activity and possession with intent to deliver. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288-89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref'd). Under the Jackson standard, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including pieces of evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder's role as the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. This standard accounts for the factfinder's duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved theconflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for engaging in organized criminal activity. As relevant to this appeal, a person engages in organized criminal activity "if, with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination . . . , [he] commits or conspires to commit one or more [enumerated offenses]." PENAL § 71.02.(a). A combination is "three or more persons who collaborate in carrying on criminal activities." Id. § 71.01(a) (West 2011). The indictment alleged that Appellant, Allen, and Willett collaborated and conspired to commit the offense of manufacture or delivery of methamphetamine. Appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to show that three people combined to work together because Willett was not involved in a continuing course of criminal activities.
Appellant premises his evidentiary challenge on the testimony of Willett and Allen to the extent that they denied that Willett had any knowledge of or participation in Appellant's and Allen's drug transactions. Appellant acknowledges that Willett's and Allen's testimony conflicts with Crawford's testimony concerning Willett's involvement with Appellant's and Allen's drug transactions. Appellant contends that Crawford's testimony was...
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