Guiel v. Barnes

• Decision Date: 02 June 1924
• Citation: 125 A. 91,100 Conn. 737
• Parties: GUIEL v. BARNES.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

125 A. 91

100 Conn. 737

GUIEL v. BARNES.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 2, 1924

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; George E. Hinman Judge.

Action by Louis Guiel, administrator, against Harold H. Barnes, for death of plaintiff's intestate by negligence of defendant. From judgment on verdict for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Error, and new trial ordered.

Charles S. Hamilton, of New Haven, and I. Henry Mag, of Meriden, for appellant.

Joseph F. Berry and Austin D. Barney, both of Hartford, for appellee.

KEELER, J.

It is admitted in the case that the defendant was on the date alleged the owner of a farm of about 600 acres, and plaintiff's intestate resided with his family in a house upon the premises, and that the intestate came to his death by means of falling in a well upon the premises while engaged in an attempt to draw water from the same. It is alleged that his death was due to the unsafe condition of the appliances for drawing water, due to negligence on the part of the defendant in not properly inspecting and repairing such appliances.

The first paragraph of the complaint is as follows:

" On and prior to the 31st day of July, 1921, the defendant was the owner and in possession of a certain piece or parcel of land situated in said town of Wallingford, and used by the defendant as a farm, and upon which was a large quantity of stock, also a large amount of produce, and upon which the defendant carried on the operations of farming, and on said 31st day of July, and for some time prior thereto, the said Antonio Guiel was engaged by the defendant to work and labor on said premises and look after the stock and produce thereon, and was to receive, and did receive, as compensation therefor the sum of $75 per month in cash, and in addition thereto, received the right to use and the use and occupation of seven rooms in the house upon said premises for the occupation of himself and his family, and in addition thereto received and had as a part of said compensation all the milk, wood, and water which were necessary for the said Antonio Guiel to use for himself and his family."

This paragraph is admitted in defendant's answer. The answer puts in issue the remaining paragraphs which set up the disrepair of the machinery used in connection with the well, the attempt of the intestate to operate the machinery, its breaking, and his death by being precipitated into the well, and charging the death to the negligence of defendant.

It is an admitted fact in the case that the well above referred to was located approximately 10 feet from the back door of the house, and that it was the only source of supply to the intestate and his family.

The plaintiff in his first request for an instruction to the jury repeated substantially the allegations of the first paragraph of the complaint above quoted, and then added the following:

" These allegations of the complaint contained in the first paragraph are all admitted by the defendant to be true; so that in your deliberations you may assume that all the allegations of paragraph 1 are true, and, being true, it admitted that the defendant was in the use, possession, and control of the farm in question, and that all the plaintiff had was the right to use the rooms in the house and the right to obtain water from the well. This, being admitted, left the general possession, management, and control of the well in the hands of the defendant, and the plaintiff had the mere right to take water from the well for his use. The plaintiff was not the tenant of the well, and was not given any exclusive right to use or control the same, or in any way bound to keep the apparatus in repair under the admissions that are contained in the answer."

The allegations of the first paragraph of the complaint and the above request to charge founded thereon raise the question of the nature of the contract between defendant and the intestate, and embody the claim that the use of the house, and the supply of milk, wood, and, water to the latter were in the nature of compensation for services, in addition to the cash wages of $75, that is, formed a part of his whole compensation.

In the leading case of Bowman v. Bradley, 151 Pa. 351, 24 A. 1062, 17 L.R.A. 213, a state of facts similar to that obtaining in the instant case was considered by the court, after an argument wherein all available authorities seem to have been cited and discussed. Defendant hired plaintiff for one year as a farm laborer, and his service was to include certain services by his wife and son. He was to be paid $1 per day and the use of a house for himself and family. Held, that the relation created was that of master and servant, and not of landlord and tenant. The court says:

" The subject of this contract was labor. Labor was what Bradley needed and undertook to pay for. It was what Bowman offered to furnish him at an agreed price. The labor was to be performed upon the land in its cultivation, in the care of the cows, and the delivery of the milk. * * * The house was a convenient place for the residence of the laborer. * * * His possession was that of the owner whom he represented, and for whom he labored for hire. * * * His right under the contract of hiring was like that of the porter to the possession of the porter's lodge; like that of the coachman to his apartments over the stable; like that of the teacher to the rooms he or she may have occupied in the school buildings; like that of the domestic servants to the rooms in which they lodge in the house of their employers. In all these cases and others that might be enumerated the occupancy of the room or house is incidental to the employment. * * * It is not necessary that occupation of a house, or apartments, should be a necessary incident to the service to be performed in order that the right to continue in possession should end with the service. It is enough if such occupation is convenient for the purposes of the service and was obtained by reason of the contract of hiring."

In People ex rel., etc., v. Annis, 45 Barb. (N. Y.) 304, it appeared that defendant hired relator for one year, for $270, to work on his farm, and was to furnish him a house for himself and family, a garden, and pasture for a cow. It was held that the contract was not a lease creating the relation of landlord and tenant; that the relation was simply that of employer and employee, or master and servant; and that the house, garden, and pasture were parts merely of a contract of service, and a part of the consideration for the agreement. In Mead v. Owen, 80 Vt. 273, 67 A. 722, 12 L.R.A. (N. S.) 655, 13 Ann.Cas. 231, an agreement was made for defendant to operate a farm on shares for a term of years, and as a part of the agreement to occupy a house on a farm. It was held that he was not a tenant. In State v. Curtis, 20 N.C. 363, the same doctrine was applied in a case where a steward was furnished lodging in a house upon the employer's estate. In another leading case, Kerrains v. People, 60 N.Y. 221, 19 Am.Rep. 158, in which it appeared that plaintiff in error worked for S. in his mill at 13 shillings per day, and was to have also use of a house on the mill property, the court held that the plaintiff in error (the employee) occupied as a servant and not as a tenant, and S., the owner, had legal possession. In Haffelfinger v. Fulton, 25 Ind.App. 33, 56 N.E. 688, plaintiff, a farm hand, as a part of his contract with defendant for services occupied a house with garden and truck patches appurtenant thereto, and it was held that the relation of landlord and tenant did not exist.

The same doctrine is sustained in numerous cases presenting facts similar to the present case, among which are Edgar v Jewell, 34 N.J.Law, 259; Haywood v. Miller, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 90; Davis v. Williams, 130 Ala. 330, 30 So. 488, 54 L.R.A. 749, 89 Am.St.Rep. 55; Mead v. Pollock, 99 Ill.App. 151, 156; McQuade v. Emmons, 38 N.J.Law, 397; School District v. Batsche, 106 Mich. 330, 64 N.W. 196, 29 L.R.A. 576; East Norway, etc., Church v. Froislie, 37 Minn. 447, 35 N.W. 260; Mackenzie v. Minis, 132 Ga. 323, 63 S.E. 900, 23 L.R.A. (N. S.) 1003, 16 Ann.Cas. 723. The uniformity of decision throughout the country is decisive, and the English cases exhibit great unanimity to the same effect. So also the text-writers reach from a consideration of the cases the same conclusion. 1 Wood, L. & T. (2d Ed.) 75 and following; 1 Underhill, L. & T. § 210 and following; Jones, L. & ...