Guilbeaux v. Schnurr
| Decision Date | 01 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 120,458,120,458 |
| Parties | Christopher A. GUILBEAUX, Appellant, v. Dan SCHNURR, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Chris J. Pate, of Pate & Paugh, LLC, of Wichita, for appellant.
Joni Cole, legal counsel, El Dorado Correctional Facility, for appellee.
Before Green, P.J., Bruns, J., and Walker, S.J.
This K.S.A. 60-1501 action arises out of a prison disciplinary proceeding. Christopher Guilbeaux—an inmate at the El Dorado Correctional Facility—filed this action after being disciplined at the prison for causing a disruption in which he hit a corrections officer in the face. In addition, Guilbeaux was disciplined for possession of tobacco contraband in violation of prison regulations. As a result of his violations, a hearing officer imposed 90 days of restrictions and ordered him to pay $50 in fees. Guilbeaux subsequently filed a petition pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1501, alleging various due process violations. The district court summarily dismissed the petition. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the district court.
Around 1 p.m. on October 19, 2017, Guilbeaux "was behaving in a disruptive manner by yelling, cursing, making gun like gestures with his hands, pointing them at ... staff, and making gun noises like he was shooting at [them]." Although a correctional officer ordered him several times to turn around so he could be restrained, Guilbeaux refused to comply. While the officer was attempting to restrain him, Guilbeaux struck him in the face. As a result of these actions, Guilbeaux was charged with three Class I offenses—disobeying orders, disruptive behavior, and battery—in violation of prison rules.
Less than an hour later, Guilbeaux was taken to the medical unit at the prison. While searching him, officers found two batteries and a piece of paper with a brown substance inside in his right rear pocket. The paper was burnt on one end and "smell[ed] like something had been smoked out of it." Accordingly, Guilbeaux was charged with another Class I offense—possession of tobacco contraband. This charge was set forth in a separate Disciplinary Report and assigned a separate case number from the previous charges.
The disciplinary reports show, on their face, that Guilbeaux was served with a copy of each shortly after 9 p.m. on the day of the alleged infractions. However, Guilbeaux refused to sign the line acknowledging receipt of the documents. According to Guilbeaux, he did not receive hard copies of the disciplinary reports. Instead, he claims that a correctional officer read the complaints to him through the door of the medical clinic that evening.
Guilbeaux does not dispute that he received a summons and notice of hearing to be held on October 25, 2017. On the day, however, Guilbeaux asked for a continuance to prepare his defense, and the hearing officer granted his request. On November 1, 2017, the hearing resumed and Guilbeaux testified that he did not have any memory of the events in question. It is unclear why the hearing was not completed at this time.
The next day, on November 2, 2017, the hearing officer held a telephonic hearing. Guilbeaux, again, denied memory of the events, raised service and notice objections, and requested staff assistance to help him prepare his defense. The hearing officer denied this request "due to [Guilbeaux] not meeting the requirements for a [s]taff assistant." Thereafter, according to the notes from the hearing, Guilbeaux "became argumentative towards the [hearing officer] and refused to correct his behavior." As a result, Guilbeaux was removed from the hearing. However, the hearing officer assigned a staff assistant who represented that neither "he nor the offender wish to add anything." The hearing was continued until November 6, 2017.
When the hearing reconvened on November 6, 2017, Guilbeaux, again, appeared by telephone due to his placement in segregation. During the hearing, the hearing officer denied a renewed request by Guilbeaux for a staff assistant. According to the hearing notes, Guilbeaux once again "became argumentative toward this [hearing officer] and was removed from the hearing due to that behavior." At that point, the hearing officer appointed a staff assistant who represented that neither "he nor the offender wished to add anything."
The reporting officers testified under oath and stated that they stood by their written reports. After considering the evidence, the hearing officer found Guilbeaux to be in violation of prison rules by committing battery, disobeying orders, and disruptive behavior in one case. Moreover, the hearing officer found Guilbeaux to be in violation of prison rules by possessing tobacco contraband in the other case. The hearing officer assessed Guilbeaux 90 days of restrictions and fined him $45 for the battery, disobeying orders, and disruptive behavior violations. In addition, the hearing officer fined him $5 for the tobacco possession violation.
Thereafter, Guilbeaux filed an administrative appeal in the battery, disobeying orders, and disruptive behavior case but did not file an appeal in the possession of tobacco contraband case. After the Secretary of Corrections upheld the hearing officer's decision in the battery, disobeying orders, and disruptive behavior case, Guilbeaux filed a K.S.A. 60-1501 petition in district court.
On July 19, 2018, the district court entered a six-page order of summary dismissal. In the order, the district court found that Guilbeaux failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in the tobacco contraband case because he failed to appeal to the Secretary of Corrections. Regarding the battery, disobeying orders, and disruptive behavior case, the district court found that the alleged due process violations did not rise to a constitutional level. Finally, the district court found that the hearing officer did not abuse his discretion by requiring Guilbeaux to participate in the disciplinary hearing by telephone due to Guilbeaux's segregation for disruptive behavior.
On appeal, Guilbeaux first contends that the district court erred by dismissing the claim in his K.S.A. 60-1501 petition relating to the possession of tobacco contraband violation for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Whether a party is required or has failed to exhaust his or her administrative remedies is a question of law over which our review is unlimited. Corter v. Cline , 42 Kan. App. 2d 721, 722, 217 P.3d 991 (2009) ; Boyd v. Werholtz , 41 Kan. App. 2d 15, 16-17, 203 P.3d 1 (2008). Relevant to this case, K.S.A. 75-52,138 requires a petitioner to exhaust all administrative remedies "established by rules and regulations promulgated by the secretary of corrections" before seeking relief from the district court. Corter , 42 Kan. App. 2d at 722 ; Laubach v. Roberts , 32 Kan. App. 2d 863, 868-69, 90 P.3d 961 (2004).
Here, Guilbeaux does not dispute that he failed to appeal the hearing officer's determination that he violated the prison's tobacco contraband rule to the Secretary of Corrections. Instead, Guilbeaux contends that compliance with the requirement to file a separate appeal relating to the tobacco violation was unnecessary. In so arguing, Guilbeaux asserts that we should apply a judicially created equitable exception to exhaustion.
In support of his position, Guilbeaux cites State v. Chelf , 46 Kan. App. 2d 522, 263 P.3d 852 (2011). In that case, a panel of this Court found that exhaustion is not required where "the administrative remedies available are inadequate or compliance with them would serve no purpose." 46 Kan. App. 2d at 537. Here, there has been no allegation by Guilbeaux that administrative remedies were unavailable or inadequate. Instead, Guilbeaux speculates that the requirement to file a separate appeal for the tobacco violation would have served no purpose. Of course, since he failed to appeal to the Secretary of Corrections, we have no way of knowing what the outcome would have been.
Likewise, we note that Chelf involved a personal injury claim by an inmate, while the present case involves a violation of the internal disciplinary rules of the prison. We also note that the Kansas Supreme Court questioned—without deciding—the holding in Chelf in the case of Sperry v. McKune , 305 Kan. 469, 486, 384 P.3d 1003 (2016), suggesting that courts should not create judicial exceptions to the exhaustion requirement of statutes. Of course, even in Chelf , the panel recognized that "the exhaustion requirement set forth in K.S.A. 75-52,138 is a mandatory , but nonjurisdictional, prerequisite to filing suit that must be strictly enforced by the court." ( Emphasis added.) 46 Kan. App. 2d at 533.
Indeed, our Supreme Court has found that where adequate administrative remedies are available, they are to be followed. See Cole v. Mayans , 276 Kan. 866, 869, 80 P.3d 384 (2003). In other words, when an administrative remedy is provided by statute or regulation, such a remedy must ordinarily be exhausted before a party can bring the matter before the courts. K.S.A. 75-52,138 ; Cole , 276 Kan. at 869. Here, there was an administrative remedy provided by K.A.R. 44-13-703 (). Guilbeaux knew that he could appeal to the Secretary and simply chose not to follow the appeal procedure after he was found to have committed a tobacco contraband violation. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision that Guilbeaux failed to exhaust administrative remedies in regards to the tobacco contraband violation.
Guilbeaux also contends that the district court erred in summarily denying his K.S.A. 60-1501 petition. Specifically, he contends that his due process rights were violated. The question of whether due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution exists in a particular case is a question of law, subject to de...
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