Guild v. State
| Decision Date | 26 October 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. A98A2111., No. A98A2110 |
| Citation | 234 Ga. App. 862,508 S.E.2d 231 |
| Parties | GUILD v. The STATE (Two Cases). |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Russell R. Guild, pro se.
Stanley C. House, Augusta, for appellant.
Daniel J. Craig, District Attorney, Charles R. Sheppard, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
This is an appeal from two separate criminal convictions arising from the following set of interconnected facts.
On December 8, 1995, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Robert Dunagan was driving his white Porsche 924S in the far right lane of Broad Street in Augusta, Richmond County, Georgia. At the intersection of Broad Street and Crawford Avenue, he stopped for a red light. A car pulled up beside him in the left lane and then pulled forward in front of Dunagan's Porsche, effectively blocking it.
Appellant Robert Russell Guild jumped out of the back door on the passenger side of the car and pointed a pistol at Dunagan through the Porsche's partially opened window. He demanded money and "was very nervous and yelling[.]" As the victim was fumbling for his wallet, Guild opened the unlocked driver's side door of the Porsche, put the gun to the victim's head, and ordered the victim to "slide over." The victim
As the victim slid over, Guild reached his gun hand down toward the gear shift of the Porsche. The victim used that opportunity to open the passenger side of the car and roll out. The victim
Guild chased the victim down Broad Street, screaming "you're not getting away from me; I'm going to get you; I'm going to get you, motherfucker[.]" The victim
Guild gained rapidly on the victim. The victim
Guild took the victim's wallet and some money from the victim's pocket. Then Guild replaced the gun against the victim's forehead. The victim "was pleading with him, don't do it, please don't do it, don't shoot me, don't shoot me." In response, Guild
As a result of intensive police investigation, on December 15, 1995, at 11:15 p.m., a car matching the description of the one involved in the car jacking was stopped by law enforcement. Guild was in the back seat. Immediately to Guild's right was a plastic bag containing 1.4 grams of crack cocaine. Robert Dunagan positively identified Guild as the person who perpetrated the crimes against him.
On May 28, 1996, a Richmond County jury found Guild guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. On June 11, 1996, a second Richmond County jury found Guild guilty of armed robbery, aggravated assault, car jacking, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Held:
Case No. A98A2110—Armed robbery; aggravated assault; car jacking; possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime
1. Guild contends that, even absent a request, the trial court's failure to also give a limiting instruction contemporaneously with the introduction of similar transaction evidence is reversible error pursuant to our decisions in Hinson v. State, 229 Ga.App. 840, 842(3), 494 S.E.2d 693 (1997) and Belt v. State, 227 Ga.App. 425(1), 489 S.E.2d 157 (1997).
This issue recently has been decided adversely to Guild. See State v. Belt, 269 Ga. 763, 505 S.E.2d 1 (1998) (). "In passing, we note that, although a trial judge is not required in the absence of a request to give a limiting instruction when similar transaction evidence is admitted, it would be better for the trial judge to do so." Id. at 765, 505 S.E.2d 1 Accordingly, there was no error in this case.
2. In the court below, Guild raised an objection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Here, he challenges the trial court's step-three Batson determination overruling his objection. Guild argues that the State's explanations for the exercise of its peremptory strikes were not race-neutral.1 We do not agree.
In the trial court, a Batson analysis consists of a now familiar—although much debated—three part progression: (a) the opponent of the strikes makes a prima facie showing of discrimination; (b) the proponent offers race-neutral explanations for the use of the strikes; and (c) the trial court determines whether the otherwise race-neutral explanations are to be believed. Here, this progression went as follows:
(a) The trial court required the State to articulate its reasons for the peremptory strikes, rendering the preliminary showing of prima facie discrimination moot. Barnes v. State, 269 Ga. 345, 496 S.E.2d 674 (1998).
(b) The prosecutor offered explanations for the strikes. With regard to the first strike about which Guild complains, against juror Levonia Higgs, the prosecutor explained that he struck Ms. Higgs because she had served as a juror in a theft case with similar facts and had voted to acquit the defendant. With regard to the second strike about which Guild complains, against juror Gennie Harris, the prosecutor explained that he struck Ms. Harris for the same reason that he struck jurors William Moon (a white male) and Angela Overstreet, i.e., because of their exposure to psychological training. The prosecutor explained "we're not sure if psychology will be used as a defense on either a misidentification theory or that this defendant was acting under psychological coercion."
(c) The trial court accepted each of these otherwise race-neutral reasons and overruled the Batson challenge.
Here, the prosecutor's step-two explanations are race-neutral on their face. In step three, the trial court accepted the explanations, thereby determining that the otherwise race-neutral explanations were not pretext, which determination is the trial court's role, not ours. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). On appellate review of the trial court's step-three determination (as opposed to the prosecutor's step-two explanations), Guild has given us no reason to find as clearly erroneous the trial court's decision to accept the otherwise race-neutral reasons. There is no error.
3. We find that the evidence in this case was quite sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found Guild guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery, aggravated assault, hijack of a motor vehicle, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Barnes v. State, supra at 347, 496 S.E.2d 674.
Wholly without merit is Guild's contention that the aggravated assault charge should have merged into the armed robbery charge "because the only time such assault occurred was when the robbery took place." The indictment alleged that Guild committed aggravated assault upon the victim "by pointing a handgun at him." The evidence showed that after Guild took the victim's wallet and money, he stepped back and aimed the gun at the pleading victim. Apparently, the accomplishment of Guild's purpose was frustrated only by the fear of being caught in suddenly approaching headlights. There was no merger of offenses here.
Case No. A98A2111—Possession of cocaine with intent to distribute
4. In his first enumeration of error with regard to the above-numbered case, Guild challenges the introduction of similar transaction evidence. He contends that there were no significant similarities between the independent crime and the one for which he was tried and thus, there was nothing about the independent crime that "proved" the instant case. We disagree.
Although Guild failed to make a transcript of the similar transaction hearing a part of the record in this case, we may garner from the trial transcript that the similar transaction evidence was based upon the following set of facts:
The Gateway Motel in Augusta was known as an area with frequent illegal drug activity. On November 9, 1995, police officers placed the motel under surveillance and observed suspected drug transactions. Pursuant to their; investigation, a foot chase ensued during which the officers chased a suspected drug dealer into a Gateway Motel room. In the motel room, in plain view on a dressing table, was a plastic bag containing 17 rocks of crack cocaine. Guild was lying nearby in a bed in the motel room; another man was lying in a second bed in the room; a bag of marijuana was found under Guild's bed; $250 was recovered from Guild's person.
Approximately one month later, apparently while out on bond on the Gateway Motel charge, Guild was arrested for the instant case wherein the car in which Guild was riding was stopped. On the rear passenger seat, in plain view, was a plastic bag containing 1.4 grams of crack cocaine. Guild was sitting on the right rear passenger seat immediately beside the cocaine; another man was sitting on the...
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