Guiliano v. Town of Oyster Bay

Decision Date10 November 1997
Citation244 A.D.2d 408,664 N.Y.S.2d 314
Parties, 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 9498 In the Matter of Christine GUILIANO, Respondent, v. TOWN OF OYSTER BAY, Appellant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Carole A. Burns & Associates, Mineola (Sandeep Chatrath, of counsel), for appellant.

Kenneth C. Henry, Plainview (Joseph C. Andruzzi, of counsel), for respondent.

Before BRACKEN, J.P., and COPERTINO, SULLIVAN and McGINITY, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In a proceeding pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the Town of Oyster Bay appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (DiNoto, J.), dated June 3, 1996, which granted the petitioner's application for leave to serve a late notice of claim.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, as a matter of discretion, the application for leave to serve a late notice of claim is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed, with costs.

"It is well settled that the court, in its discretion, may grant an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim (see, General Municipal Law § 50-e[5] ). The key factors which the court must consider are whether the petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of its accrual or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in maintaining its defense on the merits" (Matter of Shapiro v. County of Nassau, 208 A.D.2d 545, 616 N.Y.S.2d 786).

Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the Town of Oyster Bay did not have actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within the appropriate time period. Although an accident report was completed by a Town employee on the date of the accident, it merely stated that the petitioner claimed to have tripped and fallen on a concrete walk and went to an emergency room for examination. The report did not provide the Town with actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the petitioner's present claim that the Town caused the petitioner's injury by permitting a broken, uneven, cracked, and rutted cement paving to exist at the pool deck (see, Matter of Rusiecki v. Clarkstown Cent. School Dist., 227 A.D.2d 493, 643 N.Y.S.2d 132; Matter of Hubbard v. City School Dist. of Glen Cove, 204 A.D.2d 721, 613 N.Y.S.2d 29).

Accordingly, the...

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  • Werner v. Nyack Union Free Sch. Dist.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • September 21, 2010
    ...30 A.D.3d at 595, 817 N.Y.S.2d 155; Mack v. City of New York, 265 A.D.2d 308, 309, 696 N.Y.S.2d 206; Matter of Guiliano v. Town of Oyster Bay, 244 A.D.2d 408, 409, 664 N.Y.S.2d 314; Matter of DiBella v. City of New York, 234 A.D.2d at 367, 650 N.Y.S.2d 311; Matter of Deegan v. City of New Y......
  • Alvarez v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • July 11, 2012
    ...at 148, 851 N.Y.S.2d 218;Matter of Carpenter v. City of New York, 30 A.D.3d 594, 595, 817 N.Y.S.2d 155;Matter of Guiliano v. Town of Oyster Bay, 244 A.D.2d 408, 664 N.Y.S.2d 314). In addition, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the delay in commencing this proceeding almost one year ......
  • In the Matter of Helene Schoen v. City of N.Y.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • July 12, 2011
    ...218; Matter of Yearusskaya v. New York City Tr. Auth., 279 A.D.2d 583, 719 N.Y.S.2d 282; Matter of Guiliano v. Town of Oyster Bay, 244 A.D.2d 408, 409, 664 N.Y.S.2d 314; Caselli v. City of New York, 105 A.D.2d 251, 258, 483 N.Y.S.2d 401). The mere fact that New York City Fire Department and......
  • Rabanar v. City of Yonkers
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    • January 14, 2002
    ...the defendant (see, Mack v City of New York, 265 A.D.2d 308; Matter of Gilliam v City of New York, 250 A.D.2d 680; Matter of Guiliano v Town of Oyster Bay, 244 A.D.2d 408). Furthermore, while infancy will automatically toll the one-year and 90-day Statute of Limitations for commencing an ac......
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