Guillory on Behalf of Guillory v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 11 March 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-3049,82-3049
• Citation: 699 F.2d 781
• Parties: Diana Deville GUILLORY, individually and on Behalf of her minor child, David P. GUILLORY, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 781

699 F.2d 781

Diana Deville GUILLORY, individually and on Behalf of her minor child, David P. GUILLORY, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 82-3049.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

March 11, 1983.

Poteet & Landry, Walter J. Landry, Lafayette, La., for plaintiff-appellant.

Claude W. Bookter, Jr., Dosite H. Perkins, Jr., Joseph S. Cage, Jr., Asst. U.S. Attys., Shreveport, La., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before JOHNSON, WILLIAMS and JOLLY, Circuit Judges.

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge:

Diana Deville Guillory, individually and on behalf of her minor son, David Guillory, Jr., initiated this action pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging that her husband, and the young boy's father, David Guillory, Sr., died as a result of the negligence of the United States through the Veterans Administration (VA) and its agents in the VA hospital in Houston, Texas. The case was tried before a federal district court in Louisiana, which applied Texas law and awarded the plaintiff $1200 for funeral expenses, noting that additional damages were not recoverable under Texas law. This court, concluding that Louisiana law bears the most significant relationship to the occurrence sub judice, reverses the district court's decision and remands the case to the district court for a new trial on the issue of damages as provided for under Louisiana law.

I. Facts

In 1975, David Guillory, Sr., a member of the armed forces, was diagnosed as suffering from acute schizophrenia, a permanent and incurable condition. Guillory, who had joined the Army while living in Louisiana, was awarded a 100% service connected disability by the Disability Determinations Office for the VA in Shreveport, Louisiana, and began receiving disability benefits.

On or about May 24, 1978, Guillory voluntarily admitted himself to the VA hospital in Houston, Texas. He was suffering from active auditory hallucinations, posturing, thought disorders, chaos, and delusions of persecution. Guillory was given Thorazine, Stelazine, Cogentin, and Prolixin, drugs he had been given since the diagnosis of his condition in 1975. ¹ Unfortunately, Guillory's condition took a turn for the worse and on August 11, 1978, his medication was increased.

On August 17, 1978, Guillory was found unconscious on the hospital floor by the nursing staff and was placed in restraints in a chair. Concluding that Guillory had suffered an oversedation attack, the doctors reduced his dosage of Prolixin. However, the expert testimony indicates that Guillory had become so saturated with Prolixin that the drug was still in his system on the date of his death, almost two days later, in quantities in excess of the reduced dosage.

Even though Guillory had suffered this loss of consciousness on August 17, the VA hospital released him on a weekend pass the following day. At the time of his release, Guillory's medical records indicated that his prescription consisted of Lithium Carbonate, 300 milligrams, four times per day, Prolixin, 25 milligrams, three times per day, and Cogentin, two milligrams, twice per day. The Thorazine had been discontinued. Although the VA personnel gave the prescriptions to Guillory's wife and instructed her to see that he took his medication, they failed to adequately warn her of the potential reaction Guillory might suffer from the drugs and, surprisingly, the VA personnel made no mention of his debilitating drug reaction the previous day. Guillory and his wife returned to Louisiana for the weekend on August 18, 1978.

On the hot, summer Saturday of August 19, 1978, in Lake Charles, Louisiana, Guillory went for a motorcycle ride with his cousin. Guillory's cousin hit a hole in the road while on his motorcycle and was involved in an accident. During the course of police investigation, it was discovered that Guillory's driver's license had been suspended; he was then arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car. Although Guillory appeared normal when placed in the patrol car, by the time it arrived at the sheriff's office, he had slumped back in the seat and could not be aroused. Guillory was transported to the hospital by ambulance, where he later died. His temperature immediately prior to death was 106 degrees.

At trial, several doctors took the stand and testified concerning the probable cause of Guillory's death. Accepting the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witnesses, the district court concluded that, in 1978, it was well known that some of the drugs given Guillory would cause sweat inhibition and a high body temperature. Thereafter, noting Guillory's extremely high temperature prior to death, the district court concluded: "Having found by a preponderance of the evidence that the decedent's death was caused by heat stroke, the court has no difficulty in finding that but for the drugs in the decedent's system, the heat stroke probably would not have occurred." This finding led the district court to the ultimate conclusion that "it was negligence on the part of the hospital and its employees in failing to advise the decedent's family that he should not be exposed to warm temperatures while under the medications prescribed, particularly Cogentin." This ultimate finding of negligence is unchallenged.

II. The Conflict of Laws Issue

The pivotal issue before this Court is whether the district court erred by concluding that Texas law was applicable to this controversy. The federal district court in Louisiana recognized the importance of this issue and noted:

The selection of which state's law shall apply is crucial. If it be Texas, there can be no recovery for loss of love and affection under its death statute. On the other hand, Louisiana allows recovery for loss of love and affection to the named beneficiaries under Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code....

The district court concluded that Texas law bore the most significant relationship to the occurrence at issue and, accordingly, the widow's and minor child's recovery was limited to $1200 in funeral expenses.

Both parties concede, as they must, that the Texas choice of law rules govern the conflict of laws issue in this case. Indeed, since this case is founded upon the FTCA, there can be no doubt that the place where the acts or omissions occurred determines which state's choice of law rules apply. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 82 S.Ct. 585, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962); Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92, 99 (5th Cir.1966). It is undisputed that the acts and omissions ultimately leading to David Guillory's death in Louisiana occurred in Houston, Texas, when the VA doctors sent the Guillorys back to Louisiana with the decedent's medication, but without the knowledge necessary to safely administer the prescribed drugs to the decedent. Hence, Texas choice of law rules determine which state's substantive law governs the rights of the litigants.

In 1979, in a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of Texas made a major change in that state's choice of law analysis. Rejecting the long-standing doctrine of lex loci delicti, the Texas court adopted "the most significant relationship test" as set forth in sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts. See Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.1979). In applying the Texas choice of law analysis, this Court and the Texas Supreme Court have emphasized that the ultimate decision does not "turn on the number of contacts the event had with each jurisdiction, but, more importantly, on the qualitative nature of those contacts as they are affected by the policies of the rule." Crim v. International Harvester Co., 646 F.2d 161, 163 (5th Cir.1981); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d at 319. Additionally, this Court has held that the district court's decision on the choice of law issue will not be reversed unless it is "against the more cogent reasoning of the best and most widespread authority." Harville v. Anchor-Wate Co., 663 F.2d 598, 601 (5th Cir.1981). Nevertheless, this Court must conclude, in light of the policy reasons set forth below, that the district court erred by concluding that Texas law bore the most significant relationship to the occurrence in question.

As the Texas Supreme Court noted in Gutierrez, section 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts sets out the general principles to be applied in determining which state's law has the most significant relationship to the occurrence in question, including: (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, ² and (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law. Furthermore, due consideration must be given to the factors set forth in section 145 as they relate to the principles set forth in section 6, which include: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship between the parties was centered.

All of these considerations merit, and have received, careful consideration by this Court. However, as most conflict of laws scholars recognize, and, indeed, as the Restatement authors emphasize, "any rule of choice of law, like any other common-law rule, represents an accommodation of conflicting values." See Restatement (Second) of Conflicts Sec. 6, comment on subsection (2), c. Rationale.

Initially, it is necessary to define the actual conflict of laws issue presented in this case. See Baird v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 491 F.Supp. 1129 (N.D.Tex.1980). The injury giving rise to the instant proceeding occurred in Louisiana. However, the conduct...