Guinn v. Millard Truck Lines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 April 1965
• Docket Number: No. 51645,51645
• Citation: 134 N.W.2d 549,257 Iowa 671
• Parties: Mildred GUINN, Shirley Guinn, a minor by her next friend Douglas Guinn, and Douglas Guinn, Appellees, v. MILLARD TRUCK LINES, INC., and Jack Coleman, Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 549

134 N.W.2d 549

257 Iowa 671

Mildred GUINN, Shirley Guinn, a minor by her next friend Douglas Guinn, and Douglas Guinn, Appellees, v. MILLARD TRUCK LINES, INC., and Jack Coleman, Appellants.

No. 51645.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 6, 1965.

Steward, Crouch & Hopkins, Des Moines, for appellants.

Mitchell & Beving, Des Moines, for appellees.

LARSON, Justice.

In an action for damages arising out of an intersection-collision between an automobile operated by the plaintiff Mildred Guinn and a truck-tractor operated by the defendant Jack Coleman and owned by Millard Truck Lines, Inc., in separate counts Mildred Guinn and Shirley Guinn, age 11, years, her passenger, each sought compensation for personal injuries, and the plaintiff-husband Douglas Guinn sought compensation for property damage, medical and hospital expenses of his wife and daughter, and loss of consortium.

Defendants' motions for directed verdict, duly made, were overruled, and the trial court submitted the issues of defendants' negligence, plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence, and proximate cause and damages on each count. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mildred Guinn in the amount of $4,000.00, in favor of Shirley Guinn in the amount of $6,000.00, and in favor of defendants on the $4,950.00 claim of Douglas Guinn.

When the trial court overruled defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Mildred Guinn and Shirley Guinn, and denied their motion for a new trial as to those causes, defendants appealed. Mr. Guinn does not appeal. We find no error in the court's ruling on defendants' motions.

This accident occurred about 4:30 P.M. September 20, 1962, in the intersection of East 14th and Cleveland Streets in Des Moines, Iowa. East 14th Street is a fourlane thoroughfare with two northbound and two southbound 12-foot lanes of traffic. Cleveland Street is an east-west street with one traffic lane in each direction. There are fixed stop signs on Cleveland Street and pedestrian lights to control traffic on East 14th Street.

Mrs. Guinn, driving a 1951 Ford automobile, stopped at the sign located on Cleveland Street about 18 feet from the east curb line of East 14th Street. She testified that she observed a child press the button controlling the pedestrian light on the west side of East 14th Street and come across the street on the north side, that she looked toward the south where her view was unobstructed for 180 feet and saw no vehicle approaching, that she looked toward the north and then proceeded through the intersection at about 12 miles per hour. As her car reached the center of the intersection it was struck on the left side center by defendants' tractor and was pushed northwesterly some 25 to 30 feet into the west curb of East 14th Street and totally wrcked.

The defendant Jack Coleman was alone in his vehicle. He testified he was driving north on East 14th Street in the east or curb lane as he approached this intersection. He said he saw the plaintiff's vehicle on his right stop at the stop sign, and estimated he was then about 65 feet from the middle of Cleveland Street traveling about 25 miles per hour. He later observed the Guinn auto entering the intersection some 20 or 25 feet away. He said he tried to 'hit the brakes' but could not do so until after the impact, but he did jerk the wheel to the left. The impact knocked him from his seat and he coudl not stop his tractor until it had pushed the Guinn car into the west curb of East 14th Street. He testified he had slowed for the red pedestrian light as he approached this intersection and then increased his speed to about 28 miles per hour when the green light came on. He did not see the Anderson child pass over the street and did not sound his horn.

Benjamin Shaw testified he had stopped two or three car lengths north of this intersection intending to turn left onto Cleveland, and witnessed the collision. He did not see the plaintiff's car before the collision, but did see the defendants' vehicle approaching about a half block away and thought from its manner that it intended to turn left on Cleveland. Later he observed the action of the tractor's brakes and said they were not working properly on one side.

Christine Eloise Anderson, age 11, testified she had pushed the button and passed over East 14th Street just before the accident. She said she was stepping on the east curb as the Guinn car started to cross the intersection, and had gone only four or five steps when the collision occurred.

John Ashley testified he was following defendants' tractor in an automobile at the speed related by Coleman, and said that when the Guinn car entered the intersection Coleman's tractor was only 'five or ten feet' from this intersection.

The serious injuries suffered by Mrs. Guinn are not disputed, nor was the reasonableness of the $905.65 medical and hospital expenses incurred by Mr. Guinn for the care and treatment of Mrs. Guinn and his daughter Shirley. Mrs. Guinn's injuries consisted of a broken pelvis, lacerations, a chest bone displacement, and two cracked ribs. She was confined to the hospital for about three weeks, and her permanent disability was estimated at 20 per cent. Shirley received lacerations on the head, arm and leg, all of which will produce permanent scars. The property damage to the jointly-owned automobile was established at $125.00.

In each count in the petition plaintiffs alleged defendants were negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout, in failing to have their vehicle under control, and in proceeding at a speed greater than was proper and reasonable under the conditions and circumstances there existing, alleged freedom from contributory negligence, and set out the items of damages claimed.

I. For reasons which will be apparent we shall discuss the assigned errors in a little different order than argued. In assigned errors 3, 4, 5 and 6 of appellants' Division III they complain of the trial court's instructions and its statement of the issues relating to lookout, control, and excessive speed, for the reason that there was insufficient evidence to send these or any specifications of negligence to the jury. We cannot agree.

Under this record there was substantial evidence from which the jury could find the defendant driver Jack Coleman negligent under the specifications of lookout, speed and control. That issue and the question of whether Mildred Guinn has by substance evidence shown herself free from contributory negligence, are the primary or basic issues involved. Youngs v. Fort, 252 Iowa 939, 944, 109 N.W.2d 230. 'We are not concerned here with the burden of proof on either (negligence or freedom from contributory negligence) * * *, but only with the sufficiency of the evidence to raise a jury question upon one or both.' Paulsen v. Haker, 250 Iowa 532, 536, 95 N.W.2d 47, 50.

Certain familiar maxims applicable here need no citation of authority. In considering the propriety of the court's ruling upon the motions for directed verdict, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff. It is the rule that one traveling on the highway or street has a right to assume that others will proceed with due care and according to law, until, in the exercise of reasonable care, he knows, or should know, otherwise. Ordinarily, disputed questions of fact from which reasonable minds might draw various conclusions are for the determination of the jury. Hackman v. Beckwith, 245 Iowa 791, 795, 64 N.W.2d 275, 278. Most of these rules were discussed and applied in finding the evidence of defendants' negligence sufficient to raise a jury question in the Paulsen v. Haker and Youngs v. Fort cases, supra, involving intersection-accidents. We consider therein the duties of a vehicle operator and the reasonable care required for his own safety and that of others, and need not repeat those discussions here. In connection with the duty to keep a proper lookout, we said that it is an operator's duty to make reasonable observation of all surrounding circumstances, including intersections and other traffic which may be in fair view on intersecting roads, and to use such care as an ordinarily prudent man would do in light of everything disclosed by such observations. Paulsen v. Haker, supra, page 537 of 250 Iowa, page 50 of 95 N.W.2d.

For at least 180 feet there were no obstructions to prevent clear vision of a driver approaching this intersection from the south, so Mr. Coleman should have seen the Guinn car on his right as it proceeded to cross in front of him. Indeed he admitted that he saw the plaintiff's automobile at the stop sign when he was 65 feet from the intersection, but did not observe its movements thereafter until too late to avoid the collision. The fact that he was on a protected street did not absolve him of the duty to be watchful of the movement of others in his vicinity. The right of way of a motorist on a street protected by stop signs is a qualified right and not an absolute one. It did not relieve Mr. Coleman from the duty to exercise due care. At least it was a jury question as to whether Coleman, charged with seeing what was in plain sight, as a reasonably prudent man, would expect plaintiff's automobile to remain at the stop sign and not enter the intersection after he first saw it. Under these circumstances the jury could well find, as it apparently did, that Coleman did not keep a proper lookout and was negligent in failing to do so. Paulsen v. Haker, supra; Ehrhardt v. Ruan Transport Corp., 245 Iowa 193, 199, 61 N.W.2d 696, and citations.

II. Plaintiffs' evidence as to excessive speed was largely circumstantial as no one directly testified Coleman was exceeding the posted 30 miles per hour speed limit. However, Mrs. Guinn testified defendants' vehicle was not within 180 feet of the intersection when she started to cross the street at 12 miles per hour. She had traveled about 45 feet...