Guinn v. Sumpter Valley Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 December 1912
• Citation: 63 Or. 368,127 P. 987
• Parties: GUINN v. SUMPTER VALLEY RY. CO. et al.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

127 P. 987

63 Or. 368

GUINN v. SUMPTER VALLEY RY. CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Oregon

December 3, 1912

Appeal from Circuit Court, Baker County; William Smith, Judge.

Suit by Eva G. Guinn against the Sumpter Valley Railway Company, a corporation, and others, for cancellation of certain instruments. From decree for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

This is a suit in equity for the cancellation of two deeds to certain lots. From a decree in favor of defendants, plaintiff appeals.

The plaintiff asserts that the conveyances were made solely by reason of fear, coercion, and restraint, contrary to her will, and upon the demand of the defendants, in order to save her husband, Louis A. Guinn, an employé of the defendant corporation, from being prosecuted and imprisoned for larceny as threatened by officers of the corporation. The gist of the allegations is denied by the defendants.

The facts in the case are substantially as follows: David Eccles was president of the Sumpter Valley Railway Company, and Grant Geddes, now deceased, an officer of such defendant corporation. Plaintiff was the owner in fee in her own right as her separate property, and in possession of lots 1 and 2 in block 38, of Jackson's addition to the city of Baker county of Baker, state of Oregon. On the 28th day of June 1907, David Eccles accused Louis Guinn of having converted personal property of the Sumpter Valley Railway Company to his own use to the amount of $705.38, while purchasing and disbursing agent of the company, by charging the defendant corporation with brasses, for use upon the axles of the cars which the company did not receive, the value of scrap iron sold by him, and 20 sacks of coal valued at $25, and also upon the joint liability of Guinn and one Swinger in certain matters, aggregating some $392, half of which was deemed to be the liability of Guinn, making the sum total of the misappropriations $705.38. Eccles caused Guinn to come to his home and accused him of the above peculations, in which Guinn denied any participation. The two men met again on the evening of the 29th, when Eccles demanded that Guinn pay the $705.38. Guinn expressed a desire to pay the same, and interviewed his wife, telling her the circumstances and stating, that in order to avoid arrest and criminal prosecution, as they had no other property, it would be necessary to deed the above-described real estate to the Sumpter Valley Railway Company or its representatives. Plaintiff was shocked and overcome by the circumstances, and dreaded to lose the only home that she had ever had; but, in order to avoid the prosecution of her husband, they deeded to the company lots 1 and 2 in block 38 as security for the payment and restitution of the $705.38. On the 29th day of August, 1907, plaintiff and her husband quitclaimed unto Grant Geddes, as trustee for the railway company, lots 1 and 2 in block 38, and at the same time, and for the consideration of $195, conveyed to Geddes, as such trustee lot 3 in block 38, the property of Louis A. Guinn. The value of the three lots was about $900.

This suit was commenced on the 19th day of February, 1910. Guinn's unlawful conversion of the property had continued from time to time from February, 1906, to June, 1907. The trial court found that the two conveyances of lots 1 and 2 were executed under duress, but held that, by reason of the plaintiff's inexcusable delay in the commencement of the suit for an unreasonable length of time, she was guilty of laches and precluded from relief.

Gustav Anderson, of Baker, for appellant.

A.A. Smith, of Baker (John L. Rand, of Baker, on the brief), for respondents.

BEAN, J. (after stating the facts as above).

It should be stated that this complaint does not allege that the conveyances in question were executed for the purpose of compounding a felony. Neither does it allege any felony to have been committed by Louis A. Guinn, but on the other hand avers that he was unjustly accused. Neither of the officers of the company made any statement to Mrs. Guinn as to the circumstances. Her information was obtained from her husband.

David Eccles testified, in effect, that, after making an investigation and finding the discrepancies, he called Guinn to his house and asked him how many brasses had been charged to the company which were not received. At first Guinn denied the charge, but afterwards told him the different dates and the number of instances when 20 brasses would be received, and invoiced at the Baker Iron & Supply Company's office at 30 or 40. Eccles stated that he told Guinn to go home and think up the other items, and that it would be all right with him if he told the truth. On the next evening Guinn told him of more instances, and they agreed upon the number and weight of the brasses, and settled as to their value, at the purchase price, making the amount $705.38, after deducting $196, one-half of the amount, which Guinn had divided with Swinger, Eccles' brother-in-law, who was equally concerned in the transaction. Guinn said thathe would like to pay if he could, and would try and sell his house, and wanted to know if the company would take it. Eccles said that he told Guinn that they did not want his house, and that the best thing for him to do would be to pay the money, for he did not want to make any stir or hurt either his or Swinger's name. Guinn proposed to give them a deed of the house, like a mortgage, until he could sell it, and the company gave him 90 days in which to make the transaction and get all he could. It appears from Eccles' testimony that he did not want to expose Guinn or anybody else, and that nothing more was said about prosecuting Guinn; and that Swinger paid his half.

The testimony does not show that the prosecution of the offense, committed by Guinn, was restrained in consideration of the conveyances, but rather in order to save any publicity of the matter as to Swinger. It would seem that Guinn must have understood this, and that his conversation with Eccles did not wholly warrant the statement he made to his wife that Eccles would send him to the penitentiary. Whatever coercion of Mrs. Guinn, in the execution of the conveyances, is chargeable to the defendants is due to their adopting the transaction by accepting the deed which her husband had procured her to execute. This is indicated by the statement of Geddes, who was cognizant of the transaction, at the time the deed was delivered, that "this is in your wife's name."

A comprehensive definition of duress is expressed by Mr Justice Cooley in Hackley v. Headley, 45 Mich. 569, at page 574, 8 N.W. 511, 512: "Duress exists when one by the unlawful act of another is induced to make a contract or perform some act under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will." See 10 Am. & Eng.Ency. (2d Ed.) 321. Duress per minas exists when a person is induced to perform an act to avoid a threatened and impending calamity. 10 Amer. & Eng.Ency. (2d Ed.) 324. It is said that the fear of imprisonment is sufficient to constitute duress, "for the law has a special regard for the safety and liberty of a man." To constitute duress by a threat of imprisonment for a supposed crime, there must be a threat importing an illegal wrongful imprisonment, or a resort to a criminal prosecution for an improper purpose or from a...