Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Mannewitz

• Decision Date: 21 February 1888
• Citation: 8 S.W. 66
• Parties: GULF, C. & S. F. RY. CO. v. MANNEWITZ.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

8 S.W. 66

GULF, C. & S. F. RY. CO. v. MANNEWITZ.

Supreme Court of Texas.

February 21, 1888.

Appeal from district court, Galveston county; WILLIAM H. STEWART. Judge.

Action by A. N. M. Mannewitz against the Gulf, Colorado & Sante Fe Railroad Company for personal injuries. Plaintiff recovered judgment, and defendant appeals. The third assignment of error is the refusal of the court below to give the following instruction: "It not being alleged in the petition that the heart disease, if any, or the aneurism of the heart or of the aorta, if any, were caused by the railroad accident, you cannot regard the same, and shall allow plaintiff no damages on account of the same."

Gresham, Jones & Spencer, for appellee.

GAINES, J.

This was an action for personal injuries brought by appellee against appellant. Appellant's statement concedes that the evidence was sufficient to warrant the verdict, but it is complained that the court erred in refusing instructions asked on behalf of the defendant in reference to the amount of damages plaintiff was entitled to recover. It is insisted, under the first assignment of error, that the court's charge upon the burden of proof as to the extent of plaintiff's injuries was incomplete, and that therefore the court erred in refusing a special instruction asked for defendant to the effect that the burden was upon plaintiff to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the disorders with which he was afflicted were the result of the railroad accident. The theory of the plaintiff was that he was suffering from "spinal concussion" caused by the accident; but that of defendant was that his sufferings proceeded mainly, if not wholly, from a disease of the heart or blood vessels which had their origin in some other source. Upon this question the evidence was very conflicting. Such being the issue made by the testimony, the court in its general charge gave the following instruction: "The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, Mannewitz, to show the extent of his injuries which were caused by the turning over of the car. If you believe, from the evidence, that the plaintiff, Mannewitz, had heart disease, or other complaint, at the time of the turning over of the coach, then he would not be entitled to recover damages for such heart disease, or other complaint, but would be confined to damages only for his injuries which were caused by the upsetting of the coach. If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff, Mannewitz, is suffering from any disease in the head or back, yet unless you believe, from the evidence, that such disease of the head or back was caused by the overturning of the coach, the plaintiff, Mannewitz, would not be entitled to damages for the disease of the head or back. The plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for whatever injuries you believe, from the evidence, he has sustained by the overturning of the coach, if you believe, from the evidence, that the overturning of the coach was caused by the negligence of the defendant company or its employes." It is contended that this instruction is calculated to lead the jury to believe that if the plaintiff showed, by the evidence of his own witnesses, that his condition was the result of injuries received in the railroad accident, they should find accordingly, without taking into consideration the evidence of defendant, and weighing all the testimony together. But we do not so consider it. The jury were told that the burden was upon the plaintiff "to show the extent of his injuries;" that he was entitled to recover only for such injuries as the jury "believed, from the evidence, he had sustained by the overturning of the coach;" and, in effect, that he was not entitled to recover for any disease that proceeded from...