Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 29 May 1902
• Citation: 69 S.W. 89
• Parties: GULF, C. & S. F. RY. CO. v. JACKSON.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

69 S.W. 89

GULF, C. & S. F. RY. CO. v. JACKSON.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

May 29, 1902.

Appeal from Harris county court; E. H. Vasmer, Judge.

Action by Jim Jackson against the Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fé Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

J. W. Terry and Chas. K. Lee, for appellant. Stanley Thompson, for appellee.

PLEASANTS, J.

This suit originated in the justice court, and there were no written pleadings. The statement on the justice's docket shows that the suit was brought to recover "damages for breach of contract, loss of time, inconvenience, and mental and physical suffering in consequence of such breach, and loss of wages promised." The amount claimed was $200. The plaintiff recovered a judgment in the justice court for the amount sued for. The defendant appealed to the county court, and upon the trial in that court by a jury a verdict and judgment were rendered in favor of plaintiff for $100, from which judgment the defendant prosecutes this appeal.

The testimony in the case is conflicting. The evidence adduced by the appellee was, in substance, as follows: Appellee was employed by a duly authorized agent of appellant to go to Mill Creek, in Austin county, and work upon appellant's road. Said agent promised appellee that he would be paid from $1.25 to $1.50 per day for his services, and told him that the work, which consisted in relaying appellant's track, would last for a year. Appellee lived at Houston at the time he was offered said employment, and when he agreed to accept the offer he was furnished a pass over appellant's road from Houston to Mill Creek. Appellant's agent who sent appellee to Mill Creek told him that appellant would furnish him with board and lodging, and would deduct 50 cents per day from his wages to pay for same. This agent knew at the time he sent appellee to Mill Creek that the latter had no money, and was without means of obtaining board or lodging. When appellee reached Mill Creek he went to appellant's agent who was in charge of the work, gave him a note from the agent who had sent him there, and asked to be given work. He was told that there was no work for him. He then asked for something to eat, and this request was also refused. Appellee and several others who had been employed by the appellant at the time appellee was employed, and had been sent with him from Houston, then walked from Mill Creek to Sealy, another station on appellant's road, in Austin county, and requested the agent there to telegraph appellant's agent at Houston and inform him that they had been refused employment, and request him to send them a pass to enable them to get back home. This telegram was sent, but the request for a pass was refused. Appellee slept out that night, and the next day walked back to Houston. He had nothing to eat for about two days. The weather was very cold, and he suffered greatly from hunger, cold, and exposure. After his return to Houston, appellee tried to secure other employment, but was unable to do so for four or five months. On the other hand, the testimony introduced by the appellant would authorize the finding that the appellee when he reached Mill Creek was offered work by appellant's agent to whom he was directed to apply, but that he was not satisfied with the character of the work, and refused to accept the employment. Such being the state of the evidence, the trial court, at appellee's request, gave the jury the following instruction: "If you find from the evidence in this case that there was a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, and that it was a part of said contract that the plaintiff, Jim Jackson, was to be transported back to Houston at the close of his term of service, if any such term of service, or at any other time, and if you further find that the defendant railroad refused to so transport the plaintiff without any fault on his (the plaintiff's) part, and that the plaintiff, Jim Jackson, was compelled to walk, or find other means of transportation than that agreed on,...