Gulf Ins. Co. v. GFA Group, Inc.
Decision Date | 13 September 2001 |
Docket Number | No. A01A1075.,A01A1075. |
Parties | GULF INSURANCE COMPANY v. GFA GROUP, INC. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Thompson & Slagle, Jefferson B. Slagle, Alfred A. Malena, Jr., Norcross, for appellant.
J. Hatcher Graham, Warner Robins, for appellee.
The issue in this appeal is whether a payroll services company, which pays the wages of the employees of a contractor of a public works project, is a qualified claimant under a payment bond furnished by the contractor under Georgia's "Little Miller Act."1
The record shows that in April 1996, QRC, Inc. (the "Contractor"), was engaged by the Washington County Board of Education to re-roof a number of schools. Pursuant to an earlier contract, GFA Group, Inc. had agreed to provide payroll services and workers' compensation insurance to the Contractor. Under their arrangement, GFA would issue payroll checks on its own account, remit the withheld taxes to the appropriate authorities, pay the workers' compensation premiums, and submit its invoice to the Contractor weekly for immediate repayment. GFA and the Contractor later modified their contract on the Washington County project to provide that GFA would be compensated through a third-party disbursing agent. Evidence indicates that it was the practice of the disbursing agent to pay GFA's invoices monthly.
The Contractor arranged for a payment bond to be issued by Gulf Insurance Company in connection with the roofing project. An eligible claimant under the bond was defined "as one having a direct contract with the [Contractor] or with a Subcontractor of the [Contractor] for labor, material, or both, used or reasonably required for use in the performance of the Contract." The Contractor was subsequently removed from the roofing project, and GFA was not reimbursed for approximately $70,000 which the Contractor owed GFA under their payroll services arrangement. GFA sued the Contractor, its principal shareholder, and Gulf to recover the delinquent balance.
GFA and Gulf filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted GFA's motion on the issue of Gulf's liability to GFA under the payment bond. Gulf appeals. We reverse because GFA did not provide labor or material to the public works project and so was not an eligible claimant under Gulf's payment bond.
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the undisputed facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, warrant judgment as a matter of law.2
Gulf issued its payment bond as required by OCGA § 13-10-1, the Little Miller Act, which provides, in part:
The statutory bond requirement is intended to protect subcontractors and materialmen because they cannot secure a mechanic's lien on a public building.3 However, a bond given under the statute may also extend protection beyond those who would have a lien if the project were private property.4 In interpreting Georgia's statutory bond requirement, we may look to decisions of the federal courts construing the bond requirements under the federal Miller Act.5
The trial court held that GFA was a proper claimant under Gulf's payment bond because it provided labor to the project by paying the wages of the project laborers. Gulf claims the trial court erred in ruling that GFA was a proper claimant under the payment bond because GFA was a lender rather than a supplier of labor or materials.
It has been established that a contractor's lender will not qualify as a claimant under a public works payment bond.6 For example, a statutory bond will not "have application to a debt owing by the subcontractors for money merely loaned or advanced to them by a third person to meet a pay-roll."7 GFA claims that it is not a lender because it is paid a fee for services rather than interest. GFA further argues that this service is applied to the public works project because it pays the project laborers.
GFA's relationship with the Contractor has elements of both a lender and a service provider. We find the lender analogy to be persuasive insofar as GFA advanced money on behalf of the Contractor for which it expected to be repaid. It would also be accurate to describe GFA as providing a service, although it is an administrative service the Contractor would otherwise be required to perform on its own behalf. But regardless of whether GFA is best described as performing the function of a lender or a service provider, the fundamental question for purposes of its status as a claimant under the bond is whether GFA can be said to provide labor to the project. For that purpose, the agreement between GFA and the Contractor is as meaningful for what GFA expressly will not do as what it will do. This agreement provides:
The record shows that GFA was not locating the project laborers, placing them under contract, and then providing them to the Contractor. In their joint statement of undisputed material facts, GFA and Gulf stipulate that:
[Contractor] was solely responsible for hiring, setting rate of pay, supervising and firing of all personnel used by [Contractor] on the Project. [GFA's] role was limited to providing payroll services, and issuing checks in payment of the payroll and the workers compensation insurance premiums for [Contractor] personnel used on the Project.
Although GFA argues that it is a statutory employer under OCGA § 34-8-46, there is no evidence that GFA is a temporary help contracting firm because it is not shown that "[a] separate employment contract exists between the temporary help contracting firm and each individual it hires as an employee."8 What the record does show is that GFA performed an administrative function on behalf of the Contractor. To the extent that GFA is seen as providing a service, it is an administrative service provided for the benefit of the Contractor and cannot be fairly seen as providing labor to the school roofing project. We also note that while the laborers themselves were certainly protected by the bond, as ...
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