Gulf Ins. Co. v. Vela, No. 11033
| Decision Date | 07 November 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 11033 |
| Citation | 361 S.W.2d 904 |
| Parties | GULF INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Victor VELA, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Strasburger, Price, Kelton, Miller & Martin, Dallas, for appellant.
Harris, Ball & Jones, Arlington, for appellee.
Victor Vela, appellee, sued Charlie Barnes for damages for personal injuries received by him while driving his automobile which was involved in a collision with an automobile owned by Frede E. Timmons and driven at the time of the collision by Charlie Barnes with the permission of the owner. Judgment was rendered in favor of Vela and against Barnes for recovery of $15,000.
Appellee then instituted this suit against Gulf Insurance Company, appellant, alleging that at the time of the accident there was in force a policy of automobile liability insurance issued by appellant to Frede E. Timmons covering the automobile driven by Barnes as a permissive user at the time of the collision which contained a policy limit of $5,000 insurance for bodily injury to any person injured in an accident arising out of the ownership of the automobile in question. Appellee sought a recovery against appellant for $5,000 based upon the terms of the insurance policy.
Appellant answered alleging that the policy of insurance issued to Timmons did not inure to the benefit of Barnes since the automobile covered by the policy had been sold to Barnes prior to the time of the accident, and that no recovery could be had against appellant on the policy since there had been no 'actual trial' in the case of 'Vela v. Barnes' as required by the terms of the insurance policy. The case was tried before a jury which found in answer to the only special issue submitted that Barnes on the date of the accident was not the owner of the automobile involved.
Appellant presented motion for an instructed verdict and motion non obstante veredicto, both of which were overruled. The Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of appellee against appellant for $5,000.00 together with interest and costs. Appellant thereupon filed motion for new trial, which was overruled and this appeal was perfected.
Appellant's first four points of error are directed to the error of the Trial Court in submitting to the jury, at the request of appellee over appellant's objections, the instruction defining the term 'owner' in connection with Special Issue No. 1 which was:
'Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Barnes on January 16, 1960, at the time of the collision with Plaintiff Vela, was the owner of the automobile in question?'
to which the jury answered 'No.'
The instruction complained of is as follows:
'You are instructed that the term 'owner' as used in this charge is one who has the immediate right to the use and possession of the automobile and who is in possession of said automobile under a specific agreement of purchase as distinguished from a mere borrowing the automobile for temporary use.'
The errors assigned are that the Court failed to instruct the jury that: (1) there could be a purchase of an automobile by verbal agreement and that it did not have to be in writing; (2) there could be a valid purchase of an automobile even though the purchase price was to be paid at a later date; (3) there could be a valid purchase of an automobile even though the Certificate of Title was not to be delivered until the automobile had been paid for; and (4) there could be a valid purchase of an automobile even though it was not paid for in cash.
Rule 272, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, provides, in part, that the Trial Judge 'shall so frame his charge as to distinctly separate questions of law from questions of fact, and not therein comment on the weight of the evidence, and so as to instruct the jury as to the law arising on the facts, and shall only submit controverted questions of fact.' Rule 277, T.R.C.P., also provides that in submitting special issues, the Court shall submit such explanatory instructions and such definition of legal terms as shall be necessary to enable the jury to properly pass upon and render a verdict on the issues.
The testimony of appellant's witness Timmons, the insured under the insurance policy issued by appellant, and Barnes, the defendant in the first suit brought by appellee, as to whether there had been an actual agreement entered into between the parties prior to January 16, 1960, the date of the accident, for the sale of the automobile by Timmons to Barnes was conflicting. Timmons stated on cross examination that prior to January 16, 1960 he had not signed the Certificate of Title to the automobile in any form nor had Barnes on his part paid him any amount of money nor had he entered into any type of written contract with Barnes as to the car, nor did Barnes either give him any checks or sign any notes payable to him.
Appellant urges that the failure of the instruction to state that the title to the automobile could pass as a matter of law without the execution of the Certificate of Title would tend to confuse the mind of the jurors in answering the Special Issue. Neither the Trial Court nor this Court is gifted with telepathic powers to peer into the minds of the jurors to determine their mental processes in arriving at their decision.
The sufficiency of explanations and definitions as to form is largely in the discretion of the Trial Court and the test is the reasonable clearness of the definitions to enable the jurors to understand the word or phrase. Texaco Country Club v. Wade, Tex.Civ.App., 163 S.W.2d 219 (N.W.H.). The inclusion of the phrases 'immediate right to the use and possession' and 'agreement of purchase' in the instruction avoids any decision by the jury as to whether transfer of the Certificate of Title or immediate or future payment of the purchase price constitutes a prerequisite for the passing of title to the automobile. In our opinion, the Court's instruction would not tend to confuse the minds of the jurors in arriving at a decision as to who was the 'owner' of the automobile.
If in the definition of 'owner', the Trial Court had instructed the jury that there could be a purchase of an automobile by contract even though the agreement was verbal or even though the Certificate of Title was not to be delivered until the purchase price had been paid, or even though such price was not paid in cash, the instruction would have been a comment upon the weight of the evidence since the inclusion of any or all of these elements assumes the...
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