Gulf & Mississippi River Transportation Co. v. BP Oil Pipeline Co.
| Decision Date | 11 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-cv-256-JJB |
| Parties | THE GULF AND MISSISSIPPI RIVER TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, LTD. v. BP OIL PIPELINE COMPANY, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
RULING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by plaintiff The Gulf and Mississippi River Transportation Company, Ltd. ("G&M") (Doc. 77) and defendant BP Oil Pipeline Company ("BP") (Doc. 72). Oppositions, reply briefs, and a sur-reply were also filed. (Docs. 76, 79, 80, 83 & 88). Oral argument is unnecessary. Jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES G&M's motion and GRANTS BP's motion.
The relevant claim for purposes of these motions is G&M's claim for accounting as a co-owner with BP of land on Grand Terre Island in Louisiana, land that contains a pumping station of disputed ownership. The following facts are undisputed.
In 1957, G&M acquired a 1/5 interest in a 5.19 acre tract on Grand Terre Island ("the Tract"). On June 24, 1960, Gulf Refining Co. ("Gulf"), a corporate predecessor of Chevron Pipeline Co., acquired a twenty-year servitude on the Tract to construct and operate a pumping station. Although that servitude expired on June 24, 1980, Gulf continued to operate the pumping station, and on September 22, 1980, it filed suit to expropriate a right-of-way to ensure its continued use of the pumping station. G&M, as a co-owner of the Tract, was named in the suit and served on September 25, 1980. Gulf, however, did not prosecute the suit to judgment.Nevertheless, though, G&M at that time had notice of Gulf's trespass on the land following the expiration of the servitude.
On September 1, 1986, during the pendency of the suit initiated by Gulf (which had since been overtaken by Chevron as its successor), Chevron sold its interest in the pumping station to Sohio Pipeline Co. ("Sohio"), BP's corporate predecessor. On October 11, 1988, Chevron purchased an undivided 1/8 of 3/25 (0.015) fee interest in the Tract, which it then sold to Sohio/BP on November 23, 1988. BP continued to operate the pumping station until June 30, 2006, when BP sold its interests in the pumping station and the Tract to Plains Pipeline, LP. Thus, BP possessed and operated the pumping station from September 1, 1986, until May 23, 2006.1
On April 15, 2010, G&M filed suit against Chevron and BP, alleging inter alia that BP owes it income, revenue, and profits during BP's ownership of the pumping station because G&M alleges it obtained co-ownership in the pumping station following the expiration of Gulf's servitude, thus making BP liable for an accounting due a fellow co-owner.2 These summary judgment motions deal with whether G&M acquired co-ownership over the pumping station and whether its remedies are limited by Louisiana's St. Julien doctrine, now codified at La. R.S. 19:14.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact." Fed. Rule Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgmentcarries the burden of demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). When the burden at trial rests on the non-moving party, the moving party need only demonstrate that the record lacks sufficient evidentiary support for the non-moving party's case. Id. The moving party may do this by showing that the evidence is insufficient to prove the existence of one or more essential elements of the non-moving party's case. Id. A party must support its summary judgment position by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" or "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute." Fed. Rule Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
Although the Court considers evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving party must show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). Conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated assertions will not satisfy the non-moving party's burden. Grimes v. Tex. Dep't of Mental Health, 102 F.3d 137, 139-40 (5th Cir. 1996). Similarly, "[u]nsworn pleadings, memoranda or the like are not, of course, competent summary judgment evidence." Larry v. White, 929 F.2d 206, 211 n.12 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1051. If, once the non-moving party has been given the opportunity to raise a genuine fact issue, no reasonable juror could find for the non-moving party, summary judgment will be granted for the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
G&M contends is that it co-owns the pump station, entitling it to a share of the fruits and revenues derived from it. When G&M granted the 1960 servitude which expressly authorized and consented to construction of the pump station at issue here (see Doc. 72-2), title to the pump station was vested in the servitude grantee, Gulf. See La. C.C. art. 493 ().
G&M argues that the terms of the servitude gave Gulf 90 days following expiration of the servitude to remove the pumping station, under penalty of losing ownership. The servitude reads:
The rights herein granted shall be for a term of 20 years from and after the date hereof, after which term, all of said rights shall cease and terminate. Grantee shall have a period of 90 days after the expiration of this grant in which to remove its property and equipment which may have been placed on the above described land.
(Doc. 72-2, Ex. A, at 1). At the relevant time in 1980 when the servitude expired, Article 493 did not provide for what happened in such a situation. In 1984, the legislature decided to fill that gap, recognizing "there was no express provision of law that determined the rights and obligations of the owner of the improvements and the rights and obligations of the owner of the ground when their legal relationship terminated." La. C.C. art. 493, comment (b) to 1984 Amendment. To that end, the legislature imposed a 90 day interval whereupon, after written demand from the landowner, the owner of the improvements forfeits ownership to the landowner if the improvements are not removed. La. C.C. art. 493, 1984 Amendment. The extinguishment of a predial servitude was specifically cited as a situation to which the 1984 Amendment could apply. Id., comment (b).
The 1984 Amendment to Article 493 does not, of course, govern the legal effect of the servitude's expiration in 1980.3 Given the gap in Article 493's coverage at the time, as laterrecognized in the 1984 Amendments, this Court must look to interpretive caselaw from 1980 and before. Of course, this puts the Court in an awkward situation of pretending to not know the answer eventually provided by the legislature in 1984 and subsequently clarified beyond peradventure by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Giorgio v. Alliance Operating Corp., 921 So.2d 58 (La. 2006) (). Nevertheless, a retrospective analysis of Louisiana law circa 1980 is what the facts and posture of this case call for, and the Court now turns to that task.4
G&M cites two pre-1980 cases that are relevant to the Court's analysis: Breaux v. Rimmer & Garrett, Inc., 320 So.2d 214 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975) and Donnell v. Gray, 34 So.2d 648 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 41 So.2d 66 (La. 1949). Both of these cases applied the law of abandonment and occupancy to the property remaining after expiration of the lease or servitude under which that property had been brought onto the subject premises.
In Donnell v. Gray, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's finding that a former lessee abandoned property relating to an oil and gas lease. Construing La. C.C. art. 3418 (), the abandonment provision, the Supreme Court found that "actual abandonment, coupled with an intent to abandon" was the standard for determining legal abandonment. Donnell, 41 So.2d at67. Then, in conjunction with La. C.C. art. 3412 (), the occupancy provision(s), the Court found the former lessee "had the right to reclaim the equipment, even if inferentially abandoned, as long as his title thereto had not been lost by virtue of [the landowner's] adverse occupancy...." 41 So.2d at 68. Because the landowner never claimed ownership in the equipment, but only held the equipment to secure the alleged damage he sustained as a result of the former lessee's operation, adverse occupancy had not been established the title to the equipment remained with the former lessee. Id.
In Breaux v. Rimmer & Garrett, Inc., the landowners gained title to a pipeline in a right-of-way that had been admittedly abandoned for 17 years prior to its removal. 320 So.2d at 216. Thus, when the State was granted a right-of-way along the same property and contracted to build a highway across it, the landowners retained ownership in the pipe. Id. at 216-17. However, the court noted that the landowners "did not become the owners of the pipe by the mere extinguishment of the servitude...." Id. at 217. Rather, the court cited Donnell for the proposition that, absent language in the servitude on the issue, lessees have a reasonable period of time after extinguishment to remove his property before a presumption of abandonment arises. Id.
A later authoritative reading of Breaux confirms this. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Guzzetta v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 485 So.2d 508, 511 n. 2 (La. 1986), found Breaux's expression of pre-1984 Amendment jurisprudence on Article 493...
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