Gulf Oil Corp. v. Walton

• Decision Date: 25 June 1958
• Docket Number: No. 5297,5297
• Citation: 317 S.W.2d 260
• Parties: GULF OIL CORPORATION, Appellant, v. J. B. WALTON and wife, Helen Walton, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 260

317 S.W.2d 260

GULF OIL CORPORATION, Appellant, v. J. B. WALTON and wife, Helen Walton, Appellees.

No. 5297.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, El Paso.

June 25, 1958.

David W. Stephens, Chas. J. Murray, Fort Worth, John R. Lee, Kermit, for appellant.

George Finley, A. R. Archer, Jr., J. Albert Dickie, Kermit, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

This suit was brought by J. B. Walton and wife, Helen Walton, plaintiffs below and appellees here, against Gulf Oil Corporation, defendant below and appellant here, for temporary restraining order, temporary and permanent injunctions restraining and enjoining appellant, as follows:

'* * * from, and they shall desist from building any additional road to any drill site where there is an existing road to said drill site, and from building any additional drill site where there is an existing drill site or any portion thereof that can be used for the acreage for each well, and from bulldozing or scraping away the top soil, vegetation, grass and other growing plants, except where the building of an additional road to a drill site where there is no existing road that can be used to reach such existing drill site, and except where there is no drill site that can be used for the acreage for each well, and except where it is necessary to improve any existing road or portion thereof.'

The court entered its temporary restraining order, and later, upon subsequent hearing, entered its temporary injunction.

Appellees are the owners of the surface only of Section 14, Block 26, P.S.L., Winkler County, Texas, and appellant is the mineral owner under the part of the section involved in this lawsuit.

In the trial, appellant introduced its map, or drawing, showing its proposed road system which was designed to reach and serve some 24 wells, of which 20 were to be drilled, and 4 existing wells to be utilized. This was all a part of appellant's planned program of water flooding, which testimony reveals is done by engineering programs and on certain set geometric patterns. Appellees' complaint was that appellant was not fully utilizing existing roads and drill sites.

Appellant's first point charges that appellees failed to allege and prove threatened irreparable injury, or the lack of an adequate remedy at law.

We think that this point is well taken. The appellant here holds the dominant estate, and as such has the right of going in and upon the surface of the land in order to produce, save and market the oil, and such, of course, includes the right of ingress and egress. The only limitation on this right of the holder of the dominant estate, to-wit, the mineral estate, is that such holder must not make an unreasonable use of the premises. If he does, he can be held accountable in damages. This right has often been tested and tried in the courts, and protected by injunction. 31-A Tex.Jur., Sec. 52, pp. 95-97; Joyner v. R. H. Dearing & Sons, Tex.Civ.App., 134 S.W.,2d 757; Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Wimberly, Tex.Civ.App., 181 S.W.2d 942. These rights, naturally, are inherited by any or all assignees of leases or mineral rights. Placid Oil Co. v. Lee, Tex.Civ.App., 243 S.W.2d 860.

It is generally true that the litigant must plead irreparable injury and/or that he has no adequate remedy at law, in order to entitled himself to injunctive relief. This is true because injunction is a pure application of equitable relief, and generally speaking equitable relief is available only where there is no adequate remedy at law, and/or irreparable injury is threatened. We do not believe the injury threatened here is or can be classed as irreparable, as appellant can be compelled to pay for any damages he may cause by unreasonable use of the premises--and such amounts should not be difficult to ascertain. Irreparable injury has been defined as:

'An injury of such a nature that the injured party cannot be adequately compensated therefor in damages, or that damages which may result therefrom cannot be measured by a definite, certain or usable pecuniary standard.' Lowe & Archer--Injunctions and other Extraordinary Proceedings, Sec. 314, p. 321; Broussard v. L. Cartwright Realty Co., Tex.Civ.App., 179 S.W.2d 777; Devou v. Pence, 106 S.W. 874, 32 Ky.Law Rep. 697; Hill v. Brown, Tex.Com.App.1922, 237 S.W. 252; Storey v. Central Hide & Rendering Co., 148 Tex. 509, 226 S.W.2d 615; Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Luckel, Tex.Civ.App., 154 S.W.2d 155. The above authorities and others are illustrative of the extent of pleading and proof necessary to entitle one to injunctive relief. Of course, it must be kept in mind here that appellant owns the dominant estate, with the full right of exploration, production, etc.

Appellant's second point charges that the court abused its discretion in granting the temporary injunction for the reason that there was no evidence that appellant's proposed roads and drilling sites on this property known as the Ida Hendricks A 'Lease' would use more of the surface than was reasonably necessary for the operation. We have examined the record with regard to this point, and it appears that appellees were able to show only that there were, in some areas, existing roads, or roads that had...