Gulf Oil Corp. v. Smithey
Decision Date | 01 March 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 17068,17068 |
Citation | 426 S.W.2d 262 |
Parties | GULF OIL CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Lee P. SMITHEY, Appellee. . Dallas |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
William F. Erwin, Jr., Houston, for appellant.
Clifford S. Dillard, Dallas, for appellee.
Gulf Oil Corporation appeals from the overruling of its plea of privilege in a suit brought against it by appellee Lee P. Smithey for damages for alleged trespass and conversion of his personal property. The parties will be designated as they were in the trial court.
Vernon's Ann.Civ.St., Art. 1995, in its first clause provides that a defendant is entitled to be sued in the county of his domicile, subject to the exceptions set forth in the several subdivisions of Art. 1995. Appellee relies on two such exceptions, Nos. 9 and 23. When the defendant files a proper plea of privilege, the law places the burden on the plaintiff to allege and prove that the case falls within one or more of those exceptions. Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex . 232, 88 S.W.2d 91 (1935).
The facts appear to be undisputed. Plaintiff was a tenant of defendant, having rented a service station in Dallas, Texas, from it under a written lease for a term of one year ending April 29, 1967. In a separate written agreement defendant agreed to provide a cost-free inventory of gasoline to plaintiff, and plaintiff agreed to pay therefor after he sold it.
Defendant loaned the sum of $1,240.87 to plaintiff with which he purchased certain equipment and merchandise, and covering which he gave defendant a promissory note and a Security Agreement giving to defendant a security interest in the equipment listed on a schedule attached thereto.
Plaintiff was unable to settle for gasoline he had sold and, after making demand for such settlement, defendant locked the gasoline pumps on April 18, 1967, to prevent further sales. Plaintiff was also in default, both in the payment of rent due and in the payments due on his promissory note. He had been delinquent in his rental payments on two previous occasions; defendant had locked the gasoline pumps and had unlocked them when plaintiff paid the past due rents. On April 24, 1967, defendant's agents re-entered the premises by 'picking' the lock on the building, and removed plaintiff's service station equipment to defendant's warehouse. All of this was done in Dallas County. Defendant denies plaintiff's claim that these acts constituted trespass and conversion and says it was only re-entering its own property, plaintiff's right of occupancy having terminated by his failure to pay the rent due and his abandonment of the premises. Defendant contends that its right to do what it did is secured to it by the following provisions of the lease:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Slowinski v. Valley Nat. Bank
...(Tex.Civ.App.1978) (no breach of peace where repossession occurred at night and debtor was not aware of it); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Smithey, 426 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Tex.Civ.App.1968) (unauthorized entry into Gulf Oil station was breach of the peace); Ragde v. Peoples Bank, 53 Wash.App. 173, 767 P.2......
-
General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Timbrook
...Mills Store Co., 189 S.C. 224, 200 S.E. 770, 774 (1939); Lyda v. Cooper, 169 S.C. 451, 169 S.E. 236 (1933); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Smithey, 426 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Tex.Civ.App.1968).5 We acknowledge the economic benefits to consumers that self-help repossession affords. Cook v. Lilly, 158 W.Va. 99,......
-
Berg v. Wiley
...Consistent with our conclusion that we cannot find Wiley's means of reentry peaceable under the common-law rule is Gulf Oil Corp. v. Smithey, 426 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.Civ.App.1968). In that case the Texas court, without departing from the common-law rule, held that a landlord's reentry in the te......
-
Watson v. Brown
...states have resulted in decisions condemning forceful re-entry. Kong Kee, 5 Haw. at 549; Gomes, 26 Haw. at 665; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Smithey, 426 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.Civ.App.1968). Some have even held that a provision in a lease expressly permitting a forcible re-entry would be void as contrary to......
-
Creditor Beware: from Default Through Deficiency Judgment
...§ 84-9-503, Kansas Comment, 1983. [FN52]. See Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Smithey, 426 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.Civ.App.1968). [FN53]. See Henderson v. Security Nat'l Bank, 72 Cal.App.3d 764, 140 Cal.Rptr. 388 (1977); Voltz v. General Motors Acceptance Co......