Gulf States Utilities Co. v. McMillon
| Decision Date | 05 November 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-87-021,09-87-021 |
| Citation | 740 S.W.2d 876 |
| Parties | 111 Lab.Cas. P 10,974 GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY, Appellant, v. Lemuel R. McMILLON, Jr., Appellee. CV. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Lemuel R. McMillon, Jr. brought suit against his employer, Gulf States Utilities Company (Gulf States), alleging that Gulf States breached its contract of employment with him. McMillon contended that Gulf States had unlawfully garnished a portion of his wages, in violation of TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. Art. 4099 (Vernon 1966) and TEX.CONST. Art. 16, Sec. 28 (Vernon Supp.1987).
McMillon contended that the unlawful garnishment of a portion of his wages came about when Gulf States withheld $133 per week from his paycheck in an attempt to circumvent the Texas Workers' Compensation Law. McMillon alleged he had sustained an accidental, personal injury to his left knee in the course and scope of his employment for Gulf States and that Texas Employers Insurance Association had begun paying him weekly compensation benefits in the sum of $133 for the loss of the use of his left leg. These weekly compensation benefits began on or about February 3, 1981, and continued to on or about May 9, 1983. McMillon had received 4 surgical operations on his knee.
In a bench trial, the Court found as a fact that McMillon was represented by Local Union 2286, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, a labor union certified by the National Labor Relations Board and that, at all times material hereto, there was in full force and effect a collective bargaining labor contract which was negotiated by the electrical workers' union and Gulf States. The Bench also found that Gulf States had breached the labor contract by failing to pay McMillon the contractually specified rate of pay contained in the collective bargaining agreement.
Previously, McMillon had brought a third-party action lawsuit against Southwestern Bell Telephone Company in which Gulf States was named as a third-party defendant. In this last named suit, McMillon took, basically, the same position that he had in the compensation matter. He maintained that he was unable to perform the ordinary duties of his employment and was only physically able to do certain types of light work or to perform a sedentary job. His suit against Southwestern Bell was in the federal court. It was settled for a substantial figure. At settlement, L.R. (Randy) McMillon, the Appellee, and his wife, Tana Angelina Flies McMillon, gave a full and final release and an indemnity agreement. The only exception to the release reads as follows:
Both Randy McMillon and his wife, Tana, stated that they had read the release and that the same had been fully explained to them by their attorney.
The I.B.E.W., at all material times, had been the exclusive bargaining agent for the employees of Gulf States. An integral and vital part of the labor-management agreement was a coordination plan. Generally, the coordination plan provides that an injured employee may return to a job with less strenuous duties and obligations of performance while being paid the equivalent of his salary and, also, receive full employee benefits.
Article XV (of the Labor-Management Bargaining Contract), entitled "Benefits to Employees" provides:
"The Employer agrees to continue during the term of this Agreement:
....
"(e) An employee's participation in any benefit plan shall not be reduced on account of Workmen's Compensation payments coordinated with his salary."
The coordination plan, or the policy of coordinating an injured employee's salary, was described as a situation where an employee, who was injured while working for Gulf States, and who was unable to perform the job for which he was employed at the time he was injured, had the assurance that the amount of money he was making at the time he was injured would not be reduced. The injured employee would receive his compensation plus a salary figured so that his income was not reduced. Nor would any of the employee's benefit plans, to which the wage scale was coordinated, be reduced. Such plans were the thrift plan, the life insurance plan, the retirement plan and other benefits.
We perceive Article XV(e), by reference and by necessary implication, arguably covers this coordination plan. Hence, we decide this matter is a part of the collective bargaining agreement and, in fact, is a very important part of the collective bargaining agreement as a practical matter.
It is glaringly clear that any dispute over any part of the labor agreement has to go to grievance and arbitration under the very agreement, itself.
Article VI concerns grievances and generally defines a grievance as any dispute that may arise between one or more employees or the union and the employer involving the proper application of the agreement. This same Article VI sets out the specific steps of processing grievances. Article VI, Section 5, specifically provides:
"Any grievance not presented or thereafter processed within the prescribed time limits specified above will be deemed to no longer exist...."
We deem Article VI, concerning grievances, has an important standing separate and apart from Article VII dealing with arbitration.
The Appellee says that his complaint was not subject to arbitration, since he claimed the change in his salary and wage rate was set out in "Exhibit A". He argues "Exhibit A" is excluded from arbitration. Although difficult to read in this record, this "Exhibit A" clearly demonstrates that it refers to general classifications of work, such as the rate all head firemen make, all switchboard operators make, all turbine engineers make, all equipment operators make and all second firemen make.
It is undisputed that McMillon did not take his matter to either the grievance procedure or the arbitration procedure. The said "Exhibit A" deals with salaries and wage rates by classifications and has a meaning that all personnel or employees in that classification are entitled to the rate of pay as set out in "Exhibit A". These rates of pay are contractual and they are negotiated virtually every time a new collective bargaining agreement is discussed. We decide that "Exhibit A" does not apply to the individual situation of McMillon.
The record reflects that there has been an understanding between the labor organization and Gulf States as to what the coordination plan means and that there has been no dispute about it and this coordination plan has been a part of the agreement for many years. The same coordination plan has been the custom and practice of Gulf States and the union, itself, for over 25 years and it is specifically referred to in the formal, written, labor management contract. In fact, the record shows that it was at the union's insistence that the coordination plan was included by reference in the collective bargaining contract. This practice and custom had been put in effect in 1941 or 1942 and had been followed ever since. It had been reaffirmed in 1966 or 1968 and the following years. The record also reflects that Article XV, paragraph (e), was bargained-for language and a bargained-for provision by and between the I.B.E.W. and Gulf States. That language and provision were the result of negotiations taking place across the bargaining table.
It is undisputed that McMillon did not enter into the grievance procedures required by the contract, nor did the I.B.E.W. There was no attempt made at following the grievance procedures. Further, neither the I.B.E.W. nor McMillon brought the matter to arbitration.
In construing and interpreting a management-labor collective bargaining agreement, it becomes necessary, frequently, to go beyond the four corners of the contract, itself, and examine the agreement history in order to ascertain the intent of the entire agreement and to determine, from the entire agreement, the rights and duties of the various parties. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) v. White Motor Corporation, 505 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir.1974). The rules of contract law, governing ordinary agreements, do not necessarily apply here. It is not only proper, but frequently necessary, to consider the historical practices, usages and customs pertaining to collective bargaining agreements. Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 385 U.S. 157, 87 S.Ct. 369, 17 L.Ed.2d 264 (1966).
We conclude that the coordination plan was an important and integral part of the entire collective bargaining agreement and was made a part of the detailed, written, collective bargaining agreement by reference as well as by long, historical, custom, usage and practice. We determine that the coordination plan was specifically and specially referred to in XV(e) of the labor contract. We further conclude that...
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