Gulf, W. T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Fromme

• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Brown
• Citation: Gulf, W. T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Fromme, 84 S.W. 1054, 12 Tex. Ct. Rep. 112 (Tex. 1905)
• Decision Date: 20 February 1905
• Parties: GULF, W. T. & P. RY. CO. v. FROMME.

84 S.W. 1054

GULF, W. T. & P. RY. CO. v. FROMME.

Supreme Court of Texas.

February 20, 1905.

Certified Questions from Court of Civil Appeals of First Supreme Judicial District.

Action by William L. Fromme against the Gulf, West Texas & Pacific Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. On certified questions. Questions answered.

Proctors, for appellant.

BROWN, J.

Certified questions from the Court of Civil Appeals of the First Supreme Judicial District, as follows:

"The appellee brought this suit in the county court of Goliad county to recover of appellant damages for injury to certain cattle of appellee, resulting from the alleged negligent failure of appellant to furnish cars for their shipment to market on the day agreed on. The damages are laid at $75 for depreciation in the value of the cattle, and $20 for extra expense incurred in caring for and maintaining them between December 11th, when the cars should have been furnished, and December 15th, when they were furnished. These are the only sums stated in the petition, but there is a general prayer for the recovery of interest from the date of the damage to the trial; no aggregate sum as interest being stated, and the uncertain date of the prospective trial not being alleged. The prayer for judgment is in the following language: `Plaintiff says that, on account of defendant's default as hereinbefore set out, he has been damaged in the sum of $95, and, though often requested so to do, defendant has failed to pay the same or any part thereof. Wherefore plaintiff prays that defendant be cited to answer this petition, and that upon final trial he have judgment for his damages, interest, and costs of suit, and for such other and further relief to which he may be entitled either in law or equity.' There was judgment for plaintiff for $28.04, from which defendant appealed to this court.

"We dismissed the appeal on the ground that the amount in controversy was below the jurisdiction of this court. As our views upon the question were fully stated in Western Union Telegraph Company v. Garner, 83 S. W. 433, 11 Tex. Ct. Rep. 219, in which a like question arose, we filed no opinion in this case. We are now confronted with a motion to reinstate the appeal, in which it is contended that this court has jurisdiction of the appeal, first, because the suit originated in the county court, which in Goliad county had, under the act of 1895 (Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1897, p. 1929), concurrent jurisdiction with the justice court; second, that by reason of the prayer for interest the amount in controversy exceeded $100. We refused to take cognizance of the appeal on the first ground, because the act of 1895 which clothed the county court of Goliad county with jurisdiction concurrent with the justice court also forbade an appeal where the amount in controversy was less than $100. In the motion now under consideration the point is made that the portion of the act of 1895 limiting the right of appeal from judgments in causes originating in the county court is unconstitutional and void because not one of the objects expressed in the title of the act, nor germane to the objects therein stated. For the convenience of the court, we copy here the title of the bill. It is as follows: `An act to increase the civil jurisdiction of the county court of Goliad county.' Gammel's Laws Tex. vol. 10, p. 787. When we decided Garner's Case, supra, we followed Railway Company v. Addison, 96 Tex. 61, 70 S. W. 200, which we regarded as decisive of the exact question. In view of the rules announced in Schulz v. Tessman, 92 Tex. 488, 49 S. W. 1031, and Railway v. Addison, supra, and of the fact that both Garner's Case, supra, and the case before us were brought in courts of limited jurisdiction, we have thought proper to certify for your decision the following questions:

"First. Does the pleading of plaintiff state an amount within the appellate jurisdiction of this court?

"Second. Is section 3 of the act of 1895, supra, unconstitutional?

"Third. If the second question is answered in the affirmative, does it render the entire act void?"

The statement which accompanies the certified questions in this case fails to show when the cause of action accrued, or the date of the trial in the county court; hence we are unable to answer the first question categorically, but reply thereto that if, at the date of the trial in the county cou...