Gulick v. Linn

• Decision Date: 19 June 1923
• Docket Number: Case Number: 14428
• Citation: 90 Okla. 201,1923 OK 393,216 P. 460
• Parties: GULICK et al. v. LINN et al.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1923 OK 393

216 P. 460

90 Okla. 201

GULICK et al. v. LINN et al.

Case Number: 14428

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: June 19, 1923

Syllabus

¶0 1. Counties--Formation of New Counties--Original Jurisdiction of Supreme Court--Matters Arising Prior to Election.

Sections 13 and 14, chapter 40, Session Laws of Oklahoma, 1910-11 (sections 5690 and 5691, Compiled Laws 1921), do not confer exclusive original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in matters touching the holding of an election, provided for in said chapter, and which arise prior to the time the election is held.

2. Same--Injunction Against Election--Jurisdiction.

Rarely will equity enjoin the holding of any kind of an election: but where the election is called for the purpose of the electors voting on whether certain parts of a county shall be detached therefrom and formed into a new county and it is alleged that the detachment of the territory described is prohibited by express law, and the same would involve an expenditure of public funds, chancery has jurisdiction. Chancery will not interfere where the purpose and object of the election finds sanction in apparent law, or is not prohibited by law.

3. Same--Prohibition Against Court Issuing Injunction.

A petition was filed in the name of the state, on the relation of the county attorney of Caddo county, against the members of the county election board, to restrain them from holding an election in certain townships and precincts in said county, on the question of whether certain townships should be detached from Caddo county and erected, with other territory, into a proposed new county to be known as Walton county. It alleged in part that the Governor had issued his proclamation calling an election in about 15 townships of Caddo county, describing them specifically, and setting out the proclamation in full, that the electors thereof might vote on whether such territory should be detached from Caddo county: that the proclamation was void, and called for an election on the formation of a new county in a manner not sanctioned by law, and in violation of law--in that the territory described, if detached from Caddo county, would bring the boundary of said county within less than 15 miles of the county seat of Caddo county, which is prohibited by law, and that the officers sought to be enjoined were about to unlawfully and illegally expend public funds therefor. Held, that the matters pleaded draw in question rights not purely political, and that the petition raises questions the determination of which is within the jurisdiction of the district court. The writ of prohibition sought against the district court is denied.

Application for writ of prohibition by W. F. Gulick and J. W. Savage against Will Linn and M. W. Pugh, District Judges, and Sam L. Wilhite, County Attorney. Writ denied.

Lydick & Wilson, for plaintiffs.

A. J. Morris, for defendants.

BRANSON, J.

¶1 Plaintiffs ask a writ of prohibition against the district court of the Fifteenth judicial district, and the judges thereof, to prevent the enforcement of an injunction judgment entered therein on the 1st day of June, 1923, in a cause then pending in said court, entitled, "The State of Oklahoma on the Relation of Sam L. Wilhite, County Attorney of Caddo county, Oklahoma, Plaintiffs, v. Perry M. Gotham and others, Members of the County Election Board of Caddo County, Oklahoma, Defendants,"' enjoining said board and its members from holding on June 26, 1923, an election called by the Governor, and intended to be held in approximately 16 townships of said county of Caddo, the purpose and object of which was to permit the qualified electors of that part of said county designated in the petition to pass upon whether or not the territory therein described should be detached from Caddo county and become, with other territory of Canadian county, a new, separate, and distinct subdivision to be known as "Walton county."

¶2 To secure this writ, the plaintiffs make a preliminary contention that under and by reason of sections 13 and 14, chapter 40, Session Laws of Oklahoma, 1910-11 (sections 5690-5691, Compiled Laws Okla. 1921), exclusive original jurisdiction is conferred upon the Supreme Court in all matters touching the formation of new counties, as herein involved. A proper reading of the sections cited does not lead to the result contended for, and does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to hear a controversy as there involved, and said court had such jurisdiction, unless it be for other reasons deprived thereof.

¶3 The petition in said injunction cause alleged in part that the Governor had issued his proclamation calling an election to be held in those parts of Caddo and Canadian counties as described in the proclamation, sought to be detached for the purpose of forming a new county; that said proclamation is void, and the call for said election was for a purpose in excess of, and not sanctioned by law, in that, among numerous other reasons set out in the petition, to take the territory specified in the proclamation from the said county of Caddo would bring the boundary of said county within eleven miles of the city of Anadarko, the county seat of said county, in violation of the provisions of chapter 120 of the Session Laws of 1917, and that the officers were about to expend public funds therefor illegally.

¶4 The petition pleaded further the proclamation of the Governor which recites as to the county line of said county: "And the change sought to be made in creating said new county of Walton, will not bring the county line of the county of Caddo nearer than ten miles to the county seat of said county of Caddo, * * *" And, as further alleged, that said statute provides that territory cannot be served for such purpose from an organized county which would bring the boundary of the old county within less than 15 miles from the county seat thereof.

¶5 Objection made to the jurisdiction of the district court for the reason the suit sought injunctive relief against the exercise of purely political rights, was overruled, and the allegations of the petition were heard on their merit, and the injunction judgment sought here to be prohibited was entered.

¶6 As in the district court, it is urged here by the plaintiffs that the writ sought against the judgment should be granted, for the reason that equity will not assume jurisdiction to grant relief against the exercise of purely political rights, and that the judgment complained of is for that reason void, as in excess of the jurisdiction of the court.

¶7 Many cases are cited by the plaintiffs in support of this contention. While it is impracticable to discuss any considerable number of the cases cited, or to go into them to an extent that might show the reasons for the rule, and the apparent exceptions thereto, we are convinced the opinions are read with resultant confusion, unless the facts in each case are clearly in mind. We find no reason to be averse to the declaration of the general rule as found in the first case cited by the plaintiffs (City Council, etc., v. Milwee et al., 31 Okla. 620, 122 P. 173), to the effect that "Courts of equity are only conversant with matters of property and the maintenance of civil rights, and will not interfere to enforce or protect purely political rights." An election to recall the mayor of the city of McAlester, under the provisions of apparent law, was sought there to be prohibited by injunction.

¶8 Davis, Supt. of Public Instruction, v. Whitehead, 86 Okla. 273, 208 P. 216, is urged as authority from this court on the question involved. This case sought injunctive relief against an election for the consolidation of school districts. The decision turned upon the right of appeal given by statute. In the language used in the case:

"* * * The rule is announced to the effect that courts will not interfere with the action of school officers in forming or altering school districts, except in cases of fraud, corruption, oppression, or where gross injustice is clearly shown. Where an appeal may be taken from the action of an official forming or altering school districts, the weight of authority appears to support the rule that the remedy by appeal is exclusive."

¶9 Write much about the varying opinions of the courts, discussing the sacredness of political rights, the exercise of which chancery will not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to regulate or defeat by injunction, can it be said there is an invasion of any right, political or otherwise, for equity to assert its power to prevent an intended election, accompanied by a large expenditure of public funds, which, if the vote is favorable, would have for its purpose dismembering a political subdivision without sanction or basis in apparent law, but in violation of the law of the state? Political rights is a misnomer if the alleged rights sought to be exercised have not only no sanction in law, but are for a purpose in excess of and in violation of apparent law.

¶10 In the case of Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co. v. Village of Kinney, 262 F. 980, the Supreme Court of the United States, in discussing a case involving a question similar to the one here, said:

"All of the cases cited by plaintiff in which injunctions were granted

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