Gullatt v. State

• Decision Date: 11 December 1929
• Docket Number: 7263.
• Parties: GULLATT et al. v. STATE ex rel. COLLINS.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

150 S.E. 825

169 Ga. 538

GULLATT et al. v. STATE ex rel. COLLINS.

No. 7263.

Supreme Court of Georgia

December 11, 1929

Error from Superior Court, Campbell County; John B. Hutcheson Judge.

Proceedings by the State of Georgia, on the relation of one Collins and others, against C. H. Gullatt and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error. Affirmed.

Lawrence S. Camp, H. A. Allen, and W. A. Covington, all of Atlanta for plaintiffs in error.

Claude C. Smith, Sol. Gen., and Hooper & Hooper, of Atlanta, for defendant in error.

HINES J.

Gullatt constructed within the limits of Union City an inclosure containing a race track upon which dogs were run in pursuit of an imitation rabbit run by electricity. There were within the inclosure buildings, offices, and inclosures which were used in the conduct of the business of operating this race track. These dog races were carried on daily and at night. Police protection of this business was received from the city through its officers, and a daily license fee was assessed thereon by the city in an amount equal to that paid by it to these officers. Three out of the four members constituting the city council were employed in various departments in connection with the races, and daily participated in the conduct of these races. It does not appear that the mayor of the city so participated. The price of ordinary admission to the race track was 50 cents per ticket. Single tickets to the grand stand were sold for the same amount. Gullatt also issued and sold for $2 a grand stand ticket upon which there were five entrance coupons, which entitled the purchaser to five seats in the grand stand at one performance, or entitled the purchaser to admission to the grand stand upon five separate occasions. Attached to this ticket was a coupon which the holder could exchange for a profit-sharing certificate, calling for a division in profits from gate receipts in case the dog selected by him was the winner of the race. This coupon was not given to the holder of an ordinary gate ticket, nor to the holder of a single ticket to the grand stand, but only to the purchaser of five grand stand admissions all of which were upon the same card. Only the holder of one of these profit-sharing coupons, so received in exchange for the coupon attached to the five-seat ticket, was entitled to share in the profits from the races but he was not then entitled to so share unless he selected the winning dog. The person holding one of these $2 grand stand tickets, after using one of the coupons thereto attached, was not entitled to participate in the winnings of another contest until he had secured another certificate. This was done by purchasing another grand stand five-seat ticket at the price of $2. For instance, if a person desired to bet $10 on any dog, he would have to purchase five of these five-seat grand stand tickets, and exchange the coupon thereto attached for profit-sharing coupons upon the race, and he could continue this operation to as great an extent as he desired.

The present suit was instituted by the solicitor general of the Stone Mountain Circuit, on the relation of named persons, to enjoin the operation of these race tracks upon the facts hereinbefore stated. The defendant insists that he was not conducting a gaming house or carrying on any lottery scheme because he advised the public that upon personal request he would give to the one asking one of these profit-sharing coupons entitling him to his share of the profits in case he selected the winning dog in advance of the race. He further asserted that such request could be in advance of the races or at any time when he could be personally found about the race track, and the request made of him. The evidence showed that of the racing coupons turned in a very small portion were thus so given away by him, and that the very large portion of the winning tickets were held by the purchaser, who paid $2 for the privilege of hazarding their judgment upon the successful dog. In a circular setting forth rules of the operation of said business, Gullatt also reserved the right to make such division of profits as he saw fit, and give or refuse as he saw fit, a betting coupon with the five-seat grand stand ticket. No instance was shown where a betting coupon was refused on application in exchange for one of these profit-sharing coupons. Evidence was offered to show that this race track was conducted in an...