Gullatte v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc., Civ.A. 99-A-1159-E.

• Decision Date: 26 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 99-A-1159-E.,Civ.A. 99-A-1159-E.
• Citation: 100 F.Supp.2d 1315
• Parties: Wayne GULLATTE, Plaintiff, v. WESTPOINT STEVENS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

Page 1315

100 F.Supp.2d 1315

Wayne GULLATTE, Plaintiff, v. WESTPOINT STEVENS, INC., Defendant.

No. Civ.A. 99-A-1159-E.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division.

June 26, 2000.

Gregory D. Wiggins, Kyle T. Smith, Birmingham, AL, for plaintiff.

Leslie M. Allen, David R. Boyd, Montgomery, AL, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ALBRITTON, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendant, WestPoint Stevens, Inc. on April 17, 2000, and on a Motion for Extension of Time to file a Reply to the Plaintiff's Opposition filed on June 19, 2000.¹

The Plaintiff originally filed his Complaint in this case on September 29, 1999. The Plaintiff claims that he was subjected to unequal treatment because of his race, and that he was subjected to a hostile work environment.

For the reasons to be discussed, the Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing, or pointing out to, the district court that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). On the other hand, the evidence of the nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

III. FACTS

The submissions of the parties establish the following facts, construed in a light most favorable to the non-movant:

The Plaintiff, Gullatte, is an African-American male who worked for WestPoint Stevens, Inc. from 1989 until September 1997. Gullatte was terminated from his employment in September of 1997. He has brought claims of discrimination on the basis of race against his former employer.

Gullatte states that in or around 1994, he was working on the first shift and was being supervised by Harold Bryant, when, on one occasion, he stopped the machine he was working on to take a break and Bryant said, "Niggers don't need no breaks." See Gullatte Declaration ¶ 2.

Gullatte further states that he took a leave of absence in August 1995 to have teeth extracted, and that when he sought to have his leave extended, the head of his department, Ben Denham ("Denham") said, "If you don't return to work, I'll fire your ass nigger." Id. at ¶ 4.

Gullatte concedes that according to company policy, if an employee receives three written warnings within a twelve month period, the employee will be terminated, subject to review by management. Gullatte states that he received a written warning for tardiness in August 1997, which was his second written warning in a twelve month period. He was issued two miscellaneous notices in September of 1997, either of which could have been issued as a warning.

Gullatte states that after he worked his shift on September 28, 1997, Denham said, "If you are late again, nigger, I'll fire your ass." Id. at ¶ 7. Gullatte states that on September 29, he called his then-supervisor Tracey Evans ("Evans") and told him that he would be late to work. Gullatte states that there was a company policy that an employee should call an hour prior to the shift, if possible, if the employee was going to be late. Id. at ¶ 5. When Gullatte called before his shift, Evans told Gullatte to come to work as soon as he could get there. Id. at ¶ 8. When Gullatte arrived at work, he was told by the gate watchman to go home and report back the next day to Denham. Id. On September 30, 1997, Denham told Gullatte that his employment had been terminated. Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

Gullatte has brought claims for discrimination on the basis of his race under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. WestPoint Stevens has moved for summary judgment on several claims which it perceives to have been asserted by Gullatte. In his brief in response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Gullatte only contends that there is evidence which creates a question of material fact as to whether he was terminated on the basis of his race and was subjected to a racially hostile environment. Plaintiff's Brief, pages 7, 14.² The court will, therefore, examine the submissions of the parties to determine whether a question of fact precluding summary judgment exists as to Gullatte's termination and hostile environment claims.

Analysis of claims under § 1981 is the same analysis applied to claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 36 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir.1994). A plaintiff may seek to prove that he was discriminated against in his employment by relying on direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence of discrimination. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1561-62 (11th Cir.1997).

Gullatte contends that there is direct evidence that he was terminated from his employment on the basis of race. In defining direct evidence of discrimination, the Eleventh Circuit has held that "[d]irect evidence is evidence that establishes the existence of discriminatory intent behind the employment decision without any inference or presumption. Therefore, remarks by non-decisionmakers or remarks unrelated to the decision making process itself are not direct evidence of discrimination." Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir.1998) (citations omitted). "[D]irect evidence relates to actions or statements of an employer reflecting a discriminatory or retaliatory attitude correlating to the discrimination or retaliation complained of by the employee." Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 641 (11th Cir. 1998). Under this standard, "[i]f an alleged statement at best merely suggests a discriminatory motive, then it is by definition only circumstantial evidence." Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir.1999).

The evidence to which Gullatte points is that Denham used a racial epithet when he told him that if Gullatte were late again, Denham would fire him. Gullatte argues that Denham's statement does not merely suggest a discriminatory motive, it directly proves it because when discussing Gullatte's termination, Denham used the racial slur, and then one day later, fired Gullatte.

WestPoint Stevens responds that if the statement pointed to by Gullatte is direct evidence of anything, it is direct evidence that Denham intended to fire Gullatte the next time that Gullatte was late, and that the evidence is only circumstantial evidence of intent to discriminate. WestPoint Stevens asserts that the alleged comment by Denham is open to different interpretations, including that Denham was committed to enforcement of the work rules, and may have also had an inappropriate racial attitude. WestPoint Stevens also states that Denham was not the decision maker with respect to the disciplinary actions taken against Gullatte, but that Tracey Evans was the decision maker. WestPoint Stevens finally says that Denham was not the decision maker because once the third warning was issued, the termination was automatic, and that Wayne Roughton ("Roughton"), Human Resource Manager, and Greg Tarver ("Tarver"), Plant Manager, reviewed the circumstances surrounding the third warning, and determined that Gullatte should be terminated in accordance with company policy.

In Merritt v. Dillard Paper Company, 120 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir.1997), the Eleventh Circuit analyzed evidence to determine whether it constituted direct evidence of discrimination. The court took the paradigm example of direct evidence, "Fire Earley — he is too old," and substituted the statements at issue in that case in determining that the statements were direct evidence. Id. at 1190. Applying that analysis here, the statements at issue do not fit into this example of direct evidence. Denham is not alleged to have said "I will fire you n___." Instead, he is alleged to have said that he would fire Gullatte if he were late again. To conclude that Gullatte was actually fired on the basis of race rather than because he was late, because Denham also used a racial epithet, would to be to draw an inference as to Denham's motivation. Accordingly, the court concludes that this statement is not a statement of...