Gunderson v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 08 December 1933 |
| Docket Number | No. 29517.,29517. |
| Citation | 190 Minn. 245,251 N.W. 515 |
| Parties | GUNDERSON et al. v. ANDERSON. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Douglas County; D. M. Cameron, Judge.
Suit by Helma Gunderson and others against Carl V. Anderson. From an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the findings or for a new trial, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Leach & Swore, of Alexandria, and Kyle & Kyle, of St. Paul, for appellant.
Constant Larson, of Alexandria, and Roger L. Dell, of Fergus Falls, for respondents.
This was a suit by seven of the property owners in the residential part of the city of Alexandria to restrain the defendant from maintaining and operating a funeral home in the vicinity of their residences. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the findings or for a new trial and has appealed from the order denying that motion. The order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the findings and decision is not appealable, and we review only the motion for a new trial.
The defendant for many years prior to the commencement of this action had been engaged in the furniture and undertaking business in Alexandria with his place of business located at Broadway and Fourth avenue in that city. For certain business reasons he thought it advisable to separate his undertaking business from his furniture business and locate the undertaking business away from the principal business street of the city which is Broadway. He acquired lots 5 and 6 of block 28 of the original town site of Alexandria, which is about three blocks and a half west of Broadway. He remodeled the dwelling house which was upon these lots in order to make it suitable for his funeral home and undertaking establishment and commenced the operation thereof about the first of June, 1929. It is claimed by some of the plaintiffs that they warned him prior to the purchase and improvement of the premises that they would contest his right to establish and operate a funeral home upon these lots. However that may be, he sought and obtained from the city council a permit to operate the funeral home. This action was commenced about the 20th of January, 1930, and resulted in findings that the home was established in a residential district and that it was a nuisance.
Chapter 176, Laws 1929, approved April 12 of that year, authorized cities of the second, third, and fourth class to adopt zoning ordinances if so authorized at an election held for that purpose. Such an election was held in the city of Alexandria, and pursuant thereto the city council adopted a zoning ordinance May 18, 1931. It was approved by the defendant as mayor on the 25th of that month. This ordinance provided for residential districts, commercial districts, restricted commercial districts, and industrial districts. The defendant's funeral home was placed in a restricted commercial district by the terms of the ordinance, which classed such homes as permissible in such districts. In order to so place this home it was necessary to extend this restricted commercial district in a sort of corridor running westerly from Broadway for a distance of five blocks and including therein the high school, which is one block west of Broadway, the courthouse and appurtenant jail which are two blocks west, a residence on lots 11 and 12 of block 28 where boarders were sometimes taken, the defendant's funeral home, and to the west thereof a hospital which had originally been a private dwelling but had been enlarged by its proprietor, a doctor, for the purposes of his profession, and which is now classed as a public hospital. South of the courthouse there were two lots included in the restricted commercial district or corridor above mentioned.
The first street west of Broadway is Filmore street, and substantially all of the property west thereof including that of these plaintiffs is classified by the ordinance as residential property with the exception, of course, of the restricted commercial district above described. Remote from this but in the western part of the city are some blocks classified as restricted commercial and industrial territory. Plaintiffs' residences are from 65 to 230 feet from defendant's property. After the passage of this ordinance, this case was reopened and resubmitted to the court, which found that in so far as the ordinance related to and permitted the defendant's funeral home at the described location it was arbitrary and unreasonable and consequently void. The court again found that the home was established in a district which was in fact residential in character and that it constituted a nuisance as to the plaintiffs and enjoined the defendant from operating the home.
The defendant earnestly contends that the zoning ordinance is valid and that it is at least debatable whether or not the defendant's property was properly classified thereby and that the legislative discretion of the city council is therefore not to be overturned by the courts. He also contends that the defendant's funeral home is not in fact a nuisance. Counsel for both sides have been diligent in examining and briefing the authorities involving funeral homes and undertaking establishments and so far as we have been able to observe have overlooked no case in the United States relating to the propositions for which they contend.
1. The justification for a zoning ordinance lies in the police power exerted in the public interest, and the Legislature may not unreasonably and arbitrarily restrict the use of private property. Washington v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116, 49 S. Ct. 50, 73 L. Ed. 210, 86 A. L. R. 654; Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 311, 54 A. L. R. 1016. In our opinion it is obvious that it may not permit a use which unreasonably and arbitrarily infringes the rights of others, as by the creation of a nuisance. Appeal of Perrin, 305 Pa. 42, 156 A. 305, 79 A. L. R. 912. It "must not invade the fundamental liberties of the citizen." State ex rel. Larson v. City of Minneapolis (Minn.) 251 N. W. 121, filed November 17, 1933.
2. It is the position of the defendant that, if the reasonableness of the ordinance is debatable, the courts may not interfere with a discretion which is primarily the Legislature's. He cites Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 311, 54 A. L. R. 1016; State ex rel. v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146, 204 N. W. 569, 54 A. L. R. 1012; and other cases. We find no difficulty with that rule; but if the facts are in dispute, or if different inferences may be drawn from undisputed facts, we hold that the court is free to determine those facts as in other cases. If then, upon the facts so found, the question of reasonableness is debatable, we have a case for the application of the rule contended for. But if, as in the case at bar, the court finds that the ordinance permits a nuisance as respects the plaintiffs, the facts are against the defendant and there is no room for debate. As a matter of law, the ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary, and beyond the proper legislative exercise of the police power. St. Paul v. Kessler, 146 Minn. 124. 178 N. W. 171. It violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the...
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