Gundry v. Wiarda (In re Lewis' Estate)

• Decision Date: 22 December 1938
• Docket Number: No. 77.,77.
• Citation: 283 N.W. 21,287 Mich. 179
• Parties: In re LEWIS' ESTATE. GUNDRY, Auditor General, v. WIARDA.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

287 Mich. 179

283 N.W. 21

In re LEWIS' ESTATE.GUNDRY, Auditor General,

v.WIARDA.

No. 77.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 22, 1938.

Petition by Raymond W. Starr, Attorney General, in behalf of George T. Gundry, Auditor General, in the matter of the estate of Mary T. Lewis, a mentally incompetent person, for reimbursement to the state for the expense of hospitalization, opposed by Cornelius Wiarda, guardian of Mary T. Lewis. From an order of limited reimbursement, George T. Gundry, Auditor General, appeals, and from the allowance made, Cornelius Wiarda, guardian, cross-appeals.

Order reversed and proceeding remanded for entry of order in accordance with opinion.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Kent County; Leonard D. Verdier, judge.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

Raymond W. Starr, Atty. Gen., and Edmund E. Shepherd and Joseph E. Arsulowicz, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellant.

F. Roland Allaben, of Grand Rapids (Walter H. E. Scott, Chief Atty., Veterans Administration, of Detroit, of counsel), for appellee guardian.

WIEST, Chief Justice.

The attorney general, in behalf of the auditor general, petitioned the probate court for the county of Kent, in the matter of the Estate of Mary T. Lewis, a mentally diseased person, for reimbursement to the state, as provided by statute, hereinafter set forth, the expense of her continuous hospitalization from January 7, 1910, to September 14, 1937. The probate judge held that the claim for reimbursement, prior to August 28, 1923, was barred by the statute of limitations; the prosecuting attorney and not the attorney general was the proper officer to institute the proceeding, and the statute under which the reimbursement was sought was unconstitutional because the title thereof failed to indicate such right or purpose, and denied relief.

The auditor general appealed to the circuit court where it was held that the state was entitled to reimbursement from January 27, 1934, when the estate had funds with which to make payment, to June 30, 1937, the date of the petition for reimbursement.

The auditor general appeals from the limited reimbursement, and the estate from the allowance made.

The statute under which petitioner, hereinafter termed plaintiff, seeks reimbursement is Act No. 151, Pub.Acts 1923, as amended by Act No. 104, Pub.Acts 1937 (Stat.Ann. § 14.817).

Does the enactment comply with Art. 5, § 21, of the Constitution, commanding that: ‘No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title?'

The title to the act reads: ‘An Act to revise and consolidate the laws organizing hospitals for the insane, homes and schools for the feeble-minded and epileptic, institutions for the discovery and treatment of mental disorders; to regulate and provide for the care, management and use thereof; to provide for the licensing, visitation and supervision of privately owned hospitals, homes and institutions for the care and treatment of such mentally defective persons; to provide for the apprehension of persons believed to be insane, feeble-minded, mentally defective or epileptic, and their commitment, to provide for their care, custody, parole and discharge, to provide penalties and to repeal certain acts or parts of acts contrary to the provisions hereof.'

Does that title express the object embraced in § 17 of the act reading: ‘When such mentally diseased person has been admitted to any of the state institutions named in this act, as a patient, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the order for admission was made shall, if such person be possessed of any estate, or shall thereafter, while he shall remain such patient, become possessed thereof, petition the probate court of said county in his name as prosecuting attorney, * * * that said estate may be subjected to the payment to the state of the expenses paid and to be paid by it on behalf of said person as a patient. * * *’?

The title to an enactment is required to be expressive of the purpose and scope of the enactment. If the enactment comes fairly within and is reasonably a component part of the purpose expressed in the title it is not an interloper but a part thereof and so proper as to be expected therein.

The enactment, here questioned, being a revision and consolidation of laws organizing hospitals, the language of Mr. Justice North, in University of Michigan v. Pray, 264 Mich. 693, 251 N.W. 348, is particularly applicable. We quote [page 350]: ‘Being a codification, the statute necessarily embodied various and somewhat diversified provisions of the drain law. * * * Title to a codification statute can scarcely be expected to embody reference to every detail of the act.'

Reimbursement of expenses of hospitalization by patients having means is germane to the general object of the act and we do not find that the enactment offends the mandate of the Constitution.

The contention that the terms of the statute, authorizing the prosecuting attorney to institute proceedings for reimbursement of the state, excludes action by the attorney general, is without merit.

The act does not carry any such exclusion and, if anything is to be read into it on that subject it is § 176, Comp.Laws 1929 (Stat.Ann. § 3.181), and § 187, Comp.Laws 1929 (Stat.Ann. § 3.211), which permit the attorney general to intervene at any stage of proceedings, ‘when in his own judgment the interests of the state require it.'

While a distinction may be drawn between intervening in a proceeding and instituting a suit there is merger of purpose, by reason of public policy, when the interests of the state call for action by its chief law officer and there is no express legislative restriction to the contrary.

In Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich. 444, 450, 185 N.W. 877, 880, 20...