Gunn v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.
| Decision Date | 22 June 1898 |
| Parties | GUNN v. NEW YORK, N.H. & H.R. CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Shepard, Stebbins & Storer, for plaintiff.
Benton & Choate, for defendant.
The plaintiff filed interrogatories to the president of the defendant corporation, under Pub.St. c. 167, § 49 et seq. He answered three of them, but refused to answer the others which related to various matters pertaining to the accident on the ground that he had no knowledge (meaning no personal knowledge) about the subjects of inquiry. The first question for consideration is whether he should have been ordered to answer the interrogatories which he refused to answer. The defendant contends that the president could be required to answer only as to those matters of which he had personal knowledge. It is not contended that the interrogatories were otherwise objectionable. "The main purpose of these provisions of the practice act," says the court in Wilson v. Webber, 2 Gray, 558, 561, referring to those provisions of St.1852, c. 312, which are now incorporated in Pub.St. c. 167, § 49 et seq., "was to substitute in place of the tedious, expensive, and complex process of a bill of discovery, on the equity side of the court, an easy, cheap, and simple mode of interrogating an adverse party, as incident to and part of the proceedings in the cause in which the discovery was sought." To facilitate this object, the statute provides that, if a corporation is a party to a suit, "the opposite party may examine the president, treasurer, clerk, or any director or other officer thereof, in the same manner as if he were a party to the suit." Pub.St. c. 167, § 53. This, no doubt, grew out of, and was suggested by, the practice which prevailed in equity of making an officer a party in a case where discovery was sought from a corporation. Post v. Railroad Co., 144 Mass. 341, 345, 11 N.E. 540; Wilson v. Church, 9 Ch.Div. 555, 556. The effect of the statute is to give to the opposite party the same right of interrogating an officer as if he were a party; that is, the corporation itself. Under the English practice in chancery it is settled that a party may be compelled to answer, not only as to those matters which are within his own personal knowledge, but also as to those respecting which there is information by means of inquiries from his servants, agents, or attorneys fairly within his reach. Glengall v. Frazer, 2 Hare, 99; Anderson v. Bank, 2 Ch.Div. 644, 659; Bolckow v. Fisher, 10 Q.B.Div. 161; 1 Pom.Eq.Jur. (2d Ed.) § 204; Adams, Eq. (4th Am.Ed.) 12. Such information is regarded as being in a sense information possessed by him. Under rule 5, order 31, of R.S.C.1883, adopted by authority conferred by the judicature act (see Bray, Disc. 637), which differs from Pub.St. c. 167, § 49, only in not allowing interrogatories to be filed as of right, it has been said that "directors of a company, in answering interrogatories, must not only answer as to their individual knowledge, but, in answering for the company, they must get such information as they can from other servants of the company who presumably have conducted the transaction in question." Water Co. v. Quick, 3 Q.B.Div. 321, per Cotton, L.J.
The object of discovery is to obtain information material to the merits of the case of the party seeking it which is within the control or possession of the opposite party, or to compel admissions in respect to material matters. Bray, Disc. 1, 2. It tends to avoid expense and delay, and we see no good reason for holding that, when it is sought through interrogatories filed under the statute, it should be granted less freely than in equity, or even that it should be limited to cases in which it would be granted in equity. The statute imposes no such limitation. The fact that the information may be obtained through witnesses does not take away the right of discovery through interrogatories. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 6 Gray, 362. It may be more conveniently obtained by means of interrogatories. In the case of an officer of a corporation the information must be official; that is derived through his connection with the corporation. Hancock v. Insurance Co., 107 Mass. 113. In any case where the answers are upon information and belief, it may be so stated. But an admission is none the less binding because made upon information and belief; and for that reason the party interrogating properly may insist that the party interrogated shall make reasonable inquiries of his servants, agents, and attorneys who were engaged as such in the transaction in question, for the purpose of ascertaining the facts in relation thereto, and answering accordingly. The president of a corporation occupies a position superior in authority to the other officers and to the employés, and, generally speaking, has a right to require from them information in regard to matters arising in and connected with the discharge of their duties. In a sense, he sustains towards them the relation of employer to employé, or of principal and agent. We do not mean to intimate that the duty of inquiry obliges him to seek information from those who have left the service of the corporation, or that he is to be subjected to unreasonable trouble and...
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