Gunnett v. State
| Decision Date | 27 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-150.,03-150. |
| Citation | 2005 WY 8,104 P.3d 775 |
| Parties | William Paul GUNNETT, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument presented by Mr. Roden.
Representing Appellee: Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General. Argument presented by Ms. Cooley.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ, and STEBNER, DJ.
[¶ 1] Appellant, William Paul Gunnett (Gunnett), contends that his conviction for aggravated assault and battery should be reversed because the district court allowed a juror to communicate with his wife, during the course of the jury's final deliberations, in order to assess whether that juror was suffering confusion as the result of his medical condition. We will affirm.
[¶ 2] Gunnett articulates this issue:
Whether the district court erred in the course of action it took in assessing and determining whether a juror was confused during deliberations, based upon a juror's baseless allegation, when it authorized and directed the alleged confused juror's wife to conduct the inquiry, to the prejudice of [Gunnett] and in violation of his rights to a fair and impartial jury.
The State reduces its statement of the issue to the query: "Whether [Gunnett] received a fair trial by an impartial jury?"
[¶ 3] The facts underlying Gunnett's crime are of very little significance. It suffices, for the sake of context, to note that Gunnett was involved in a drunken brawl. Gunnett got into a fight with a fellow inebriate and was attacked by him. During the fight, Gunnett stabbed him with a knife. It was a given that the victim was the aggressor in the fight, and the central issue was whether Gunnett was justified in employing deadly force under the circumstances. At his first trial, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. The events set out below occurred at his second trial.
[¶ 4] The facts pertinent to this appeal arose at 5:50 p.m., on April 3, 2003, at the very end of Gunnett's trial. The jury had reached a decision and was called into the courtroom to deliver its verdict. The presiding judge read aloud the verdict that the jury had found Gunnett guilty of the charged crime. Defense counsel asked that the jury be polled. The trial judge asked the clerk of court to poll the jury. When asked if that was her verdict, the first juror answered, "Yes." However, the second juror (Juror 2)1 answered "No." Each of the other ten jurors responded "Yes."
[¶ 5] The trial court then provided the jury this oral instruction:
As explained to you, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, before a Court can accept the verdict, it must be unanimous. There's indication that it may not be. I need to excuse you right now and confer with counsel about what type of instruction, if any, we may give you. So the Court will be in recess.
A brief conference was held between the trial court and counsel, and it was agreed that the jury should be instructed that it must be unanimous in its decision and should continue its deliberations. The oral instruction given the jury was this:
[¶ 6] At this point, Juror 2 spoke up and said: "I thought we reached a verdict." A fellow juror responded: The jury panel then left the courtroom and returned to its deliberations.
[¶ 7] At 6:14 p.m., court and counsel met outside the presence of the jury, and this discussion was had:
[¶ 8] The trial court decided that it would telephone Juror 2's wife to obtain information. The court was unable to resolve anything over the phone and asked the wife to come to the courthouse. Once she was en route to the courthouse, defense counsel requested a mistrial "on the basis that now we've got at least one person coming in to check on the juror while the juror is sick and confused." The prosecutor argued against the motion for mistrial and suggested that, since the hour was now late, the jury should retire for the night and resume its deliberations the following day. The trial court took the mistrial motion and the recommendation that the jury retire for the day under advisement, but decided to await the arrival of Juror 2's wife.
[¶ 9] At 6:43 p.m., the wife of Juror 2 arrived at the courthouse, and the district court gave her these directions:
[¶ 10] Juror 2's wife expressed her understanding of the trial court's directions, and she left the courtroom to speak with her husband. Defense counsel objected to that arrangement, i.e., the wife going to talk to her husband in the jury room. The district court explained that she was not going to be in the jury room, but in the hallway, and not in the presence of any other jurors. Defense counsel renewed his motion for a mistrial on the basis that there was no way to assess how long Juror 2 had been confused, and he might well have been confused throughout the trial.
[¶ 11] At 6:57 p.m., Juror 2's wife returned to the courtroom and related that she did not believe her husband was having an insulin reaction and that she did not perceive that he was confused. The trial court then made a decision to allow the jury to resume its deliberations. Defense counsel again renewed his motion for mistrial, this time on the basis that the remainder of the jury "may be putting heat on him and, in effect, twisting his arm to get him to agree with the rest of them." The district court again denied the motion for mistrial.
[¶ 12] At 7:10 p.m., the trial court, counsel, Gunnett, and the bailiff assembled in the courtroom. The bailiff reported to the court that the jury "should know in about ten minutes if they are going to make any headway." Defense counsel objected to "giving the jury ten minutes to make headway." He renewed his motion for mistrial based on all the proceedings that followed the polling of the jury, opining that: "It's fairly clear that he wasn't confused, that he knew what he was doing and that there was an attempt by this jury to, in effect, pull a fast one; and I object and ask for a mistrial." The trial court then made clear on the record that the jury was not in any way limited to ten minutes, rather that was their request, and the trial court intended to honor it.
[¶ 13] The jury continued its deliberations for about 15 minutes and indicated that it had reached a verdict. The verdict was read aloud by the court, and it again was a guilty verdict. The trial court again polled the jury. This time Juror 2 responded "Uh-huh — yes." Defense counsel then indicated that it would file a motion for mistrial or a motion for new trial. In response, the district court addressed Juror 2:
[Juror 2], you indicated at our previous polling that it was not your verdict; and I'm sure that counsel is concerned that you received some sort of undue pressure to change your mind. Is — I'm not trying to get into a big dialogue, but did you feel like you were pressured to reach this verdict?
Juror 2 responded, "Oh, heavens no." Court was adjourned and the jury left at 7:38 p.m. However, proceedings continued in chambers immediately thereafter, and defense counsel renewed his mistrial motion, as well as a motion for new trial. Defense counsel also indicated that he would formally file those motions in writing.
[¶ 14] On April 16, 2003, a motion for new trial was filed, based on "the best interests of justice and jury misconduct." It was set for hearing on May 9, 2003. At the hearing, defense counsel indicated he did not have any additional information for the trial court and that the motion had been "investigated," but he had been unable "to turn up anything further with respect to it." The State did not file a written response, although the prosecutor did make an oral argument reciting some pertinent authority. By order entered on May 28, 2003, the district court denied Gunnett's motion for a new trial.
[¶ 15] The question of whether to grant or deny a motion for new trial is a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial court. The trial court's decision will not...
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