Sunnyside Elgin Apartments, LLC v. Miller
| Docket Number | 2-20-0614 |
| Decision Date | 29 June 2021 |
| Citation | 2021 IL App (2d) 200614,196 N.E.3d 418,458 Ill.Dec. 114 |
| Parties | SUNNYSIDE ELGIN APARTMENTS, LLC, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Glenda MILLER, in Her Official Capacity as McHenry County Treasurer and ex officio McHenry County Collector, Defendant-Appellee (The Board of Education of Riley Community Consolidated School District No. 18, Intervenor-Appellee) |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Timothy P. Dwyer, of Chicago, for appellants.
Kevin B. Gordon, of Kriha Boucek, LLC, of Oakbrook Terrace, for appellee Board of Education of Riley Community Consolidated School District No. 18.
No brief filed for other appellees.
¶ 1 At issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss, based on lack of standing, that was filed by intervenor, Board of Education of Riley Community Consolidated School District No. 18 (Riley School). More specifically, we consider whether one of the plaintiffs, Brookside Meadows Condominium Association, Inc. (Brookside), has standing to object to the property taxes levied against individual condominium owners of Brookside. For the reasons that follow, we determine that Brookside has standing. Thus, we reverse the judgment granting Riley School's motion to dismiss and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 3 Plaintiffs—Sunnyside Elgin Apartments, LLC, Brookside, and others—are condominium associations, townhome associations, and homeowner associations. For several years, plaintiffs have filed complaints against defendant, Glenda Miller, in her official capacity as McHenry County Treasurer and ex-officio McHenry County Collector, and other public officials and entities. See 35 ILCS 200/23-15(a) (West 2018). These suits, filed on behalf of individual homeowners, sought relief from property taxes levied against the homeowners. Plaintiffs alleged excess accumulation claims. At issue in some of these prior suits was whether condominium associations, townhome associations, and homeowner associations have standing to sue on behalf of individual homeowners. In at least three cases, the trial courts have found that these associations lacked standing.1 In one case, the trial court concluded that these associations had associational standing.2
¶ 4 In November 2018, as in prior years, plaintiffs filed a tax-objection complaint against defendant under sections 23-10 and 23-15 of the Property Tax Code (Code) ( id. §§ 23-10, 23-15 ). Plaintiffs alleged: (1) "[each] of the Associations named herein are authorized by statute and its By-Laws or Declaration to petition for tax relief on behalf of the Association constituents"; (2) "[each] of the Associations named herein have, by its Board of Managers under a 2/3 affirmative vote, authorized the named Associations to participate in this Tax Objection complaint on behalf of its constituents"; and (3) "[each] of [the] Associations herein have, in accordance with state law, recorded a Declaration which allows the Association to petition for tax relief, in a representative capacity, based upon state law." Plaintiffs also alleged that "all of the 2017 real estate taxes (payable in 2018) for each parcel listed in exhibit B were paid in full by Plaintiff or Plaintiffs’ agents." Exhibit B listed the individual parcel numbers (PIN) for each individual homeowner. Plaintiffs argued that the individual homeowners were entitled to a refund with accrued interest for the 2018 property taxes levied against the individual homeowners.
¶ 5 One of the plaintiffs, Brookside, objected to the 2018 property taxes levied against 22 individual condominium owners of Brookside. Although these individuals were identified by PIN numbers in exhibit B, they were not individually named and did not sue in their individual capacities. A cursory examination of exhibit B reflects that the value of each condominium of Brookside ranged from $54,894 to $69,465, with the amount of property taxes owed being between $5124.30 and $7673.52. Although plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that Brookside or its agent paid the property taxes for the individual condominium owners, Brookside made clear at oral argument that was "obviously" not true.
¶ 6 One of the public entities that plaintiffs identified in their complaint was Riley School, whose district covers, among others, residents of Brookside. Plaintiffs alleged that Riley School had an excess accumulation in the (1) education fund (count XIV), (2) transportation fund (count XVI), (3) operations and maintenance fund (count XVII), and (4) liability and insurance fund (count XVIII).
¶ 7 After plaintiffs filed the complaint, Riley School moved to intervene, claiming that defendant could not adequately represent Riley School's interests. The trial court granted that motion, and Riley School moved to dismiss the counts brought against it. See 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2018). Riley School alleged, among other things, that Brookside did not have standing to sue. See id. § 2-619(a)(9). More specifically, Riley School asserted that, under section 23-15 of the Code, only the person who pays the property tax may file a tax-objection complaint. Because Brookside did not pay the property taxes on behalf of the individual condominium owners, Riley School claimed that Brookside lacked standing to sue on behalf of the individual condominium owners. Riley School noted that the Code prohibits class action tax-objection suits. See 35 ILCS 200/23-15(a) (West 2018).
¶ 8 Brookside responded. It noted that, although the Code might provide that only a "person" may file a tax-objection complaint, sections 1-125 and 23-5 of the Code (id. §§ 1-125, 23-5) recognize that a "person" can be a condominium association. Thus, Brookside claimed that it could file a tax-objection complaint on behalf of individual condominium owners. Moreover, Brookside argued that section 10(c) of the Condominium Property Act (Act) ( 765 ILCS 605/10(c) (West 2018)) allows condominium associations to act on behalf of condominium owners in seeking relief from tax assessments and levies. Finally, Brookside asserted that, in Deerpath Consolidated Neighborhood Ass'n v. Lake County Board of Review , 2018 IL App (2d) 180244-U, 2018 WL 6720019, this court recognized that a condominium association has associational standing to sue in tax cases.
¶ 9 Riley School replied, noting that Deerpath cannot be relied on because it is an unpublished opinion from 2018. Moreover, Riley School observed that, although the Code may consider an association a "person," only the "person" who pays the taxes has standing to file a tax-objection complaint. Riley School reiterated that Brookside lacked standing to sue because it did not pay the property taxes for the individual condominium owners. Regarding Brookside's claim that it had standing under section 10(c) of the Act, Riley School noted that the Act allows an association to seek tax relief on behalf of individual unit owners only when that tax relief concerns common-interest property. In contrast, the tax relief that Brookside sought concerned individual condominium owners’ property taxes, not taxes imposed on common-interest property. Moreover, Riley School argued that the Act does not apply, as our supreme court has determined that tax-objection complaints are governed by the Code. See Madison Two Associates v. Pappas , 227 Ill. 2d 474, 495, 318 Ill.Dec. 587, 884 N.E.2d 142 (2008).
¶ 10 The trial court granted Riley School's motion to dismiss. In doing so, the court found, under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016), that "there [was] no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal, or both." This timely appeal followed.
¶ 12 At issue in this appeal is whether Riley School's motion to dismiss, based on a lack of standing, was properly granted. Illinois Road & Transportation Builders Ass'n v. County of Cook , 2021 IL App (1st) 190396, ¶ 15, 451 Ill.Dec. 491, 183 N.E.3d 948. "A complaint need not allege facts establishing standing." Id. ¶ 16. Rather, "lack of standing is an affirmative defense, placing the burden on the [party moving to dismiss] to ‘plead and prove lack of standing.’ " Id. (quoting International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 148 v. Illinois Department of Employment Security , 215 Ill. 2d 37, 45, 293 Ill.Dec. 606, 828 N.E.2d 1104 (2005) ). We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for lack of standing. Id.
¶ 13 Riley School claims that the court properly granted its motion to dismiss because, under the Code, only the person paying the property taxes has standing to file a tax-objection complaint. Because Brookside never paid the individual condominium owner's property taxes, Riley School argues that Brookside lacks standing. Brookside argues that the court should have denied the motion because the Act allows an association to challenge property taxes levied against individual homeowners.
¶ 14 Resolving the propriety of the ruling on the motion to dismiss requires us to examine various sections of the Code and Act. In doing so, we follow well-settled rules of statutory interpretation. "When interpreting a statute, a court's primary concern is ascertaining the legislature's intent." Centrue Bank v. Voga , 2020 IL App (2d) 190108, ¶ 39, 442 Ill.Dec. 365, 159 N.E.3d 544. "A statute's language, given its plain and ordinary meaning, is the best indicator of that intent." Id. "[C]ourts should avoid interpretations that render a statute meaningless or that lead to absurd results." Id. Moreover, " ‘court[s] may not supply omissions, remedy defects, annex new provisions, substitute different provisions, add exceptions, limitations, or conditions, or otherwise change the law’ " if doing so would depart from the plain language of ...
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