Guns Save Life, Inc. v. Ali
| Decision Date | 21 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 126014 |
| Citation | 2021 IL 126014,190 N.E.3d 139,454 Ill.Dec. 539 |
| Parties | GUNS SAVE LIFE, INC., et al., Appellants, v. Zahra ALI, Director of the Department of Revenue of Cook County, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Christian D. Ambler, of Stone & Johnson, Chtrd., of Chicago, and David H. Thompson (pro hac vice) and Peter A. Patterson (pro hac vice), of Cooper & Kirk, PLLC, of Washington, D.C., for appellants.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Cathy McNeil Stein, Jessica M. Scheller, Martha-Victoria Jimenez, and Jennifer C. King, Assistant State's Attorneys, and Lauren E. Miller, Special Assistant State's Attorney, of counsel), for appellees.
¶ 1 This case involves a challenge to two tax ordinances imposed by Cook County on the retail purchase of firearms and firearm ammunition. The circuit and appellate courts upheld the taxes against challenges based on the second amendment to the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, and state preemption. 2020 IL App (1st) 181846, 447 Ill.Dec. 201, 173 N.E.3d 212. For the following reasons, we reverse, in part, the judgment of the appellate court.
¶ 3 In 2012, the Cook County Board of Commissioners (Board) enacted the Cook County Firearm Tax Ordinance. Cook County Ordinance No. 12-O-64 (adopted Nov. 9, 2012) . The Firearm Tax Ordinance imposed a $25 tax on the retail purchase of a firearm within Cook County. Cook County Code of Ordinances ch. 74, art. XX, § 74-668 (adopted Nov. 9, 2012).
¶ 4 Thereafter, in 2015, the Board passed an ordinance to amend the County Code to include a tax on the retail purchase of firearm ammunition at the rate of $0.05 per cartridge for centerfire ammunition and $0.01 per cartridge for rimfire ammunition. Cook County Ordinance No. 15-6469 (adopted Nov. 18, 2015), .1
¶ 5 Under the ordinances, the taxes levied on the retail purchaser are imposed in addition to all other taxes imposed by the County of Cook, the State of Illinois, or any municipal corporation or political subdivision. Cook County Code of Ordinances ch. 74, art. XX, § 74-668(c) (eff. June 1, 2016). The revenue generated from the tax on ammunition is directed to the Public Safety Fund for operations related to public safety. Id. § 74-677. By contrast, the revenue generated from the tax on firearms is not directed to any specified fund or program. Any person who fails to remit the taxes is subject to a $1000 fine for the first offense and a $2000 fine for subsequent offenses. Id. § 74-671.
¶ 6 Plaintiffs—Guns Save Life, Inc.; DPE Services, Inc., doing business as Maxon Shooter's Supplies and Indoor Range (Maxon); and Marilyn Smolenski, a resident of Cook County—sought declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants: Cook County; Zahra Ali, Director of the Department of Revenue of Cook County; and Thomas J. Dart, Cook County Sheriff. In plaintiffs’ second amended four-count complaint, they alleged that the firearm and ammunition taxes facially violate the second amendment to the United States Constitution ( U.S. Const., amend. II ); article I, section 22, of the Illinois Constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 22 ) (concerning the right to bear arms); and article IX, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 2 ) (the uniformity clause). Plaintiffs also alleged that the taxes are preempted by the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (FOID Card Act) ( 430 ILCS 65/13.1 (West 2020) ) and the Firearm Concealed Carry Act (Concealed Carry Act) ( 430 ILCS 66/90 (West 2020) ).
¶ 7 In response, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Cook County circuit court granted defendants’ motion, in part. It held that retailer Maxon and resident Smolenski lacked standing to bring their claims with respect to the firearm tax; however, the court ruled that the advocacy group, Guns Save Life, Inc., had associational standing to assert claims challenging both the firearm and ammunition tax.
¶ 8 The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the remaining claims. The circuit court denied plaintiffs’ motion and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Specifically, the court determined that the taxes did not infringe upon any federal or state constitutional right to bear arms because they (1) constituted a proper exercise of Cook County's home rule taxing powers and (2) did not meaningfully impede plaintiffs’ ability to exercise their right to bear arms. The court found that plaintiffs provided no evidence that the taxes would prevent ownership or possession of firearms or that the taxes would affect the ability of law-abiding individuals to retain firearms for self-defense.
¶ 9 The court further concluded that, even if the taxes burdened constitutionally protected conduct, they nonetheless were substantially related to the important governmental interest of public safety because they directed revenue to specific programs designed to combat gun violence. With respect to preemption, the circuit court held that neither the FOID Card Act nor the Concealed Carry Act's plain language preempted Cook County's taxing powers. Lastly, the court determined that plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of showing that the different rates of ammunition classification in the ammunition tax violated the uniformity clause.
¶ 10 The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part.
2020 IL App (1st) 181846, ¶ 85, 447 Ill.Dec. 201, 173 N.E.3d 212. The court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of Smolenski's claims for lack of standing, holding that she had no standing to challenge the firearms tax because she had not paid it. Id. ¶ 33. As to Maxon, the appellate court reversed the circuit court's holding that it had standing to challenge the ammunition tax and held that the retailer lacked standing to challenge either tax because the taxes were paid by the consumer, not the retailer. Id. ¶¶ 37-38.
¶ 11 The appellate court also affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, finding that the challenged taxes did not restrict plaintiffs’ ownership of firearms and ammunition, which was at the core of the second amendment. Rather, the court found the taxes were akin to other types of sales taxes imposed on the purchase of goods and services and were not more than a marginal restraint upon any protected right under the United States or Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 57-59. The court further held that the FOID Card Act and Concealed Carry Act did not preempt the ordinances; it determined that the Acts only preempted local authorities from exercising the power to regulate firearms, not the power to tax them. Id. ¶ 81. Additionally, the court affirmed the circuit court's determination that the taxes did not violate the uniformity clause, concluding that the classifications were valid and reasonably related to the objectives of the ordinances. Id. ¶ 70.
¶ 12 We allowed plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019).
¶ 14 Plaintiffs’ challenge to the firearm and ammunition taxes arises in the context of cross-motions for summary judgment where the circuit court entered a judgment in favor of defendants. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2018); Coleman v. East Joliet Fire Protection District , 2016 IL 117952, ¶ 20, 399 Ill.Dec. 422, 46 N.E.3d 741. A circuit court's order granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Cohen v. Chicago Park District , 2017 IL 121800, ¶ 17, 422 Ill.Dec. 869, 104 N.E.3d 436.
¶ 15 Before addressing the constitutionality of the ordinances, we consider a threshold question regarding the nature of the ordinances. The parties concede before this court that the ordinances do not regulate firearms or ammunition under the County's home rule police power authority but, rather, levy a tax under its home rule taxing authority. See Rozner v. Korshak , 55 Ill. 2d 430, 432, 303 N.E.2d 389 (1973) (). We agree that, under the plain language of the ordinances, this case does not involve any exercise of a home rule unit's regulatory powers.
¶ 16 In construing the nature of a municipal ordinance, we apply the same rules as those which govern the construction of statutes. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale , 229 Ill. 2d 296, 306, 322 Ill.Dec. 548, 891 N.E.2d 839 (2008). As with statutes, the best indicator of a municipality's intent is the language used in the ordinance, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Cooke v. Illinois State Board of Elections , 2021 IL 125386, ¶ 52, ––– Ill.Dec. ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––.
¶ 17 The ordinances are part of chapter 74 of the County Code, which is titled "Taxation." See Cook County Code of Ordinances ch. 74. The substance of the ordinances also plainly reveals that the purpose is to levy a tax to generate revenue. See, e.g. , Cook County Code of Ordinances ch. 74, art. XX, § 74-677 (eff. Nov. 18, 2015). Multiple sections pertain to the logistics of collecting and remitting the taxes. See id. §§ 74-669, 74-672, 74-673. Furthermore, the express language of the ordinances reveals that the taxes are imposed "in addition to all other taxes imposed" by the County. Id. § 74-668(c). Thus, we are confronted solely with a taxing measure and a type of tax that is in addition to any generally applicable sales tax on the retail purchase of goods...
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