Gunsaulis v. Tingler

• Decision Date: 22 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. 56268,56268
• Citation: 218 N.W.2d 575
• Parties: Ricca GUNSAULIS, Individually, as surviving spouse of Fred H. Gunsaulis, and as Administrator of the Estate of Fred H. Gunsaulis, Deceased, Appellant, v. Harriett TINGLER, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 575

218 N.W.2d 575

Ricca GUNSAULIS, Individually, as surviving spouse of Fred H. Gunsaulis, and as Administrator of the Estate of Fred H. Gunsaulis, Deceased, Appellant, v. Harriett TINGLER, Appellee.

No. 56268.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 22, 1974.

Fuerste & Carew, Dubuque, for appellant.

Kintzinger, Kintzinger, Van Etten & Setter, Dubuque, for appellee.

Heard before MOORE, C.J., and LeGRAND, REES, UHLENHOPP and McCORMICK, JJ.

UHLENHOPP, Justice.

The question in this appeal is whether the plaintiff-widow is entitled to certificates of deposit and a balance in a pension fund formerly owned by her deceased husband.

Fred H. Gunsaulis, born in 1902, taught school during his adult life, mainly in Dubuque, Iowa. His first marriage ended in divorce. He never had children. His closest blood relative was his niece, Harriett Tingler.

Mr. Gunsaulis married a second time in 1943, to Ricca Powers. She was born in 1893. Her first husband, by whom she had four children, died in 1936. At the time she married Mr. Gunsaulis, her children were grown. She too taught school, mainly in Wisconsin near East Dubuque.

Fred and Ricca Gunsaulis lived in a rented house in Dubuque for a number of years. They kept their financial matters separate and did not communicate with each other about those matters. Each had a bank account, a car, and savings. Mr. Gunsaulis paid for the food and rent, and Mrs. Gunsaulis helped pay for furniture and various other items.

Mrs. Gunsaulis retired in 1969 and received social security and payments from the Wisconsin Teachers Retirement Fund. The evidence shows that since 1966, Mrs. Gunsaulis had a savings account in a bank in the names of 'Ricca Gunsaulis or Evelyn Yoder' (one of her daughters). In 1970 she opened another savings account in a bank in the names of 'Ricca Gunsaulis or Jean Collis' (another daughter). At time of trial both accounts still existed; the evidence does not show the balance at that time in the first account, but the balance in the second one was $5,062.93. The evidence does not show, either, what other assets Mrs. Gunsaulis has except for her car, such rights as she has under the Wisconsin retirement fund, and life insurance in an undisclosed amount.

Mr. Gunsaulis retired in 1970. His assets prior to his death consisted of a 1965 Chevrolet car worth about $600, personal effects of about $250, furniture worth about $500, a checking account containing about $1,600, seven joint-tenancy certificates of deposit of the total principal amount of $7,000, and rights under the Iowa Public Employees Retirement System (IPERS).

Mr. Gunsaulis formerly had six of the certificates of deposit in his name alone and the seventh in the names of himself and his niece, Mrs. Tingler. In 1970 he placed all seven of them in the names of 'Fred Gunsaulis and Mrs. Harriett Tingler as joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants in common.' He retained the certificates in his possession. Also, the formerly had Mrs. Gunsaulis as his beneficiary, following himself, under IPERS. When he retired in 1970, he elected to receive a reduced pension for life with the provision that if he died before withdrawing the contributions to the IPERS fund of himself and his employer, the balance would be paid in a lump sum to Harriett Tingler.

Mr. Gunsaulis died on July 25, 1971. Mrs. Tingler received $7,000 from the bank under the certificates of deposit and $6,660.21 as the balance from IPERS. From these funds, she paid $1,000 on Mr. Gunsaulis's funeral expense of $1,300 and $1,266 in Iowa inheritance tax. Mrs. Gunsaulis received Mr. Gunsaulis's other assets.

Mrs. Gunsaulis brought this action against Mrs. Tingler claiming $7,000 from the certificates of deposit and $6,660.21 from the IPERS fund. The trial court held for Mrs. Tingler, and Mrs. Gunsaulis appealed.

The evidence contains no proof of fraud, mistake, duress, or mental incapacity. The case presents two problems. First, apart from the rights of Mrs. Gunsaulis as surviving spouse, were the modes of transfer of the certificates and the IPERS balance legally efficacious? Second, if so, do the rights of Mrs. Gunsaulis as surviving spouse intervene to prevent transfer of the certificates and the IPERS balance to Harriett Tingler?

I. Effectiveness of Transfers. We first approach the problem of the effectiveness of the transfers as though Mrs. Gunsaulis were not in the picture. Were the placement of the certificates in joint tenancy and the designation of the IPERS beneficiary effective?

(a) The language of the certificates was about as clear in creating a joint tenancy as language can be: 'Fred Gunsaulis and Mrs. Harriett Tingler as joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants in common.' Under the decisions of this court, that language did as it purported to do; it constituted the two individuals joint tenants with the survivor taking the balance owing by the bank on the certificates. McCuen v. Hartsock, 159 N.W.2d 455 (Iowa); In re Estate of Martin, 261 Iowa 630, 155 N.W.2d 401; In re Estate of Stamets, 260 Iowa 93, 148 N.W.2d 468; Burns v. Nemo, 252 Iowa 306, 105 N.W.2d 217; In re Estate of Miller, 248 Iowa 19, 79 N.W.2d 315; Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920, 48 N.W.2d 870; McManis v. Keokuk Savings Bank & Trust Co., 239 Iowa 1105, 33 N.W.2d 410; O'Brien v. Biegger, 233 Iowa 1179, 11 N.W.2d 412; In re Estate of Winkler, 232 Iowa 930, 5 N.W.2d 153.

(b) The IPERS statute provides in § 97B.51(5), Code 1973:

A member may elect to receive a decreased retirement allowance during his lifetime with a death benefit after his retirement date equal to the excess, if any, of the accumulated contributions by the member and employer as of said date, over the total monthly retirement allowances received by him under the retirement system. Such death benefit shall be paid to his beneficiary.

Section 97B.44 authorizes a member to designate and to change his beneficiary:

Each member shall designate on a form to be furnished by the commission a beneficiary for any death benefits payable hereunder on the death of such member. Such designation may be changed from time to time by the member by filing a new designation with the commission.

Pursuant to these sections, Mr. Gunsaulis elected to take a reduced pension and designated Harriett Tingler to receive any balance as a death benefit.

Mr. Gunsaulis's acts were effective as to both the certificates and the IPERS balance--apart from any rights possessed by his surviving spouse as such.

II. Effectiveness As To Surviving Spouse. A surviving spouse is entitled to a share in the decedent's real and personal property under §§ 633.211 and 633.212 of the Code. See also § 633.240 (right to elect to occupy homestead in lieu of share of real property). The surviving spouse cannot be deprived of a share, or of the right to occupy the homestead, by the decedent's will. §§ 633.236, 633.238, 633.240. Moreover, apart from prenuptial contracts, during the lives of the spouses each spouse has an inchoate right in the other spouse's Real property which can be terminated only by judicial sale or voluntary relinquishment. §§ 633.212(1), 633.238(1). See also § 561.13 (no conveyance of a homestead valid unless the husband and wife 'join in the execution of the same joint instrument').

The situation is different, however, with Personal property. As stated in Samson v. Samson, 67 Iowa 253, 259--260, 25 N.W. 233, 236:

(I)t is in the personal property of which the husband dies seized that the law gives the widow a distributive share. Code (1873), § 2436. But during his life-time she has no inchoate right in such property, and he may make such disposition of it during his life-time as he sees fit. If he sells it, or makes any other disposition of it by which he is divested of the ownership, the wife has no claim upon it after his death. The law has placed no restriction or limitation on the power of the husband to make such disposition of his personal property during his life-time as he may elect. (Italics added.)

See also Lunning v. Lunning, 168 N.W. 140 (Iowa). This rule has been extended in Iowa to gifts causa mortis. Vosburg v. Mallory, 155 Iowa 165, 135 N.W. 577. The principle which allows a spouse 'to make such disposition of his personal property during his life-time as he may elect' permits him to create a valid joint tenancy in personalty between himself and a third person, under numerous decisions which we will presently cite.

The bank certificates and IPERS death benefit involved here were personal property. Harriett Tingler, as surviving joint tenant of the certificates, took full...