Gurley v. Armstead

• Decision Date: 03 January 1889
• Citation: 19 N.E. 389,148 Mass. 267
• Parties: GURLEY v. ARMSTEAD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

148 Mass. 267

19 N.E. 389

GURLEY v. ARMSTEAD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

January 3, 1889

January 3, 1889

HEADNOTES

COUNSEL

J.P. &

B.B. Jones, for plaintiff.

Moody & Bartlett, for defendant.

OPINION

DEVENS J.

The defendant, who was a job teamster, removed the goods, alleged to have been by him converted, from a room in Whittier's house to the store of one Davis, and there delivered them to Whittier, by whose direction he had acted. Although the goods were in the house of Whittier, they were in a room hired by the plaintiff from him. The contract between them was one for rent, and not of storage, Whittier reserving no control over the room. It was, however, neither locked nor fastened although no goods were in it except those of the plaintiff. In all that he did the defendant acted in good faith, without any intention of depriving the rightful owner of her property, and in ignorance of the fact that plaintiff was such owner, neither asserting title in himself, nor denying title to any other, nor exercising any act of ownership except by the removal above stated. The legal possession of the goods was under these circumstances undoubtedly in the plaintiff, and, as they were in the room hired by her, the actual possession was also hers. The apparent control of them was, however, in Whittier, as they were in his house, and he had further the present capacity to take actual physical possession, as the room in which they were, was neither locked nor fastened.

It is conceded that whoever receives goods from one in actual though illegal, possession thereof, and who restores the goods to such person, is not liable for a conversion by reason of having transported them. Strickland v. Barrett, 20 Pick. 415; Leonard v Tidd, 3 Metc. 6. And this would be so, apparently, even if the goods thus received were restored to the wrongful possessor after notice of the claim of the true owner. Loring v. Mulcahy, 3 Allen, 575; Metcalf v. McLaughlin, 122 Mass. 84.

Upon the precise question raised we have found no direct authority, nor was any cited in the argument, but the principle on which the decisions above cited rest is not unreasonably extended when it is applied to the circumstances of the case at bar. The act of removing goods by direction of the wrongful possessor of them is an act in derogation of the title of the rightful owner, but the party doing this honestly is protected because from such actual possession he is justified in believing the possessor to be the true owner. He does no more than such possessor might himself have done by virtue of his wrongful...