Gurley v. Com.
| Decision Date | 10 May 1973 |
| Parties | Celine E. GURLEY et al. v. COMMONWEALTH. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Herbert Murphy, Springfield, for petitioners.
Robert L. Suprenant, Asst. Atty. Gen., (Brian T. O'Neill, Asst. Atty. Gen., with him), for the Commonwealth.
Before TAURO, C.J., and REARDON, QUIRICO, HENNESSEY and KAPLAN, JJ.
The petitioners filed their claim for compenation as dependents of a victim of a violent crime under G.L. c. 258A in the District Court of Springfield. After trial, the District Court judge found for the respondent. The petitioners claimed a report to the Appellate Division for the Western District based on the trial judge's denial of their requests for rulings concerning the proper construction and application of c. 258A to the facts of the instant case. The Appellate Division found 'no prejudicial error by the trial judge' and dismissed the report. The petitioners appeal this ruling.
All of the issues presented by this appeal concern the manner of computing damages recoverable by the victims (and their dependents) of violent crimes within the meaning of G.L. c. 258A. Section 5 of c. 258A, inserted by St.1967, c. 852, § 1, provides in pertinent part: Section 6 of c. 258A provides in part: 'Any compensation paid pursuant to this chapter shall be reduced by the amount of any payments received or to be received as a result of the injury (a) from or on behalf of the offender, (b) under insurance programs, or (c) from public funds.'
1. In their requests for rulings, the petitioners sought a construction of the statutory phrase 'compensation for loss of earnings or support' to include future loss of earnings and support. We believe that such an interpretation is required by both the language and purpose of this statute. The Commonwealth does not argue to the contrary. Clearly, the statute covers the loss of future support when a victim of a violent crime is disabled. We can see no logical reason why the victim's death should not be treated as a permanent loss of support to be computed on the basis of life expectancy evidence and actuarial tables in determining the victim's future loss of earnings capacity. See Cuddy v. L. & M Equip. Co., 352 Mass. 458, 225 N.E.2d 904; RODDY V. FLEISCHMAN DISTIL. SALES CORP., MASS., 277 N.E.2D 284.A We conclude that the judge erred in the denial of the petitioners' request for a ruling to this effect. However, the judge properly made a finding that the victim had a life expectancy of 38.19 years with an earning capacity of $324,961.76.
2. The petitioners requested the judge to rule that '(a)ny subtractions from the total amount of the compensation to which the claimants are entitled must be made from the total amount of compensation to which all claimants are entitled without regard to, and before, application of the ten thousand ($10,000.00) dollar maximum award specified in General Laws, Chapter 258A, Section 5.' The judge denied this request for ruling and instead granted the Commonwealth's request for ruling which computed damages by first applying a $10,000 limit to the actual loss sustained (which exceeded $10,000 in the instant case) and then subtracting all the benefits received as a result of the injury from the $10,000 figure. These two opposing theories of damage computation pose the central question for our decision and require a determination of legislative intent as to the import of the $10,000 limitation in the statute.
We think this question of statutory construction is resolved by the express language of § 5 which provides that '(a)ny compensation for loss of earnings or support shall be in an amount equal to the actual loss sustained; provided, however, that no award under this chapter shall exceed ten thousand dollars' (emphasis supplied). Where the language of a statute is plain, it must be interpreted in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words. 1 COMMONWEALTH V. THOMAS, MASS., 269 N.E.2D 277.B The unambiguous reference to 'no award under this chapter' indicates that the General Court intended the $10,000 figure to limit the final recovery under this statute. The use of the word 'award' and the reference to the entire 'chapter' lead us to conclude that the $10,000 provision is not a specific ceiling on the computation of the 'actual loss sustained' but a general limitation applying to the ultimate 'award' due under the statute.
Therefore, we hold that it was error for the judge to deny the petitioners' requests for rulings numbered 14 and 15.
The 'actual loss sustained' is determined by deducting the benefits received as a result of the injury from the total loss sustained by the petitioners. Since the actual loss sustained exceeds the maximum award recoverable under this chapter, the petitioners are entitled to an award of $10,000 minus the statutory deduction of $100. 2
3. The petitioners argue that the judge committed prejudicial error in denying their requests for rulings that no deductions should be made from the compensation to which they were entitled on account of life insurance benefits and welfare payments the petitioners were receiving as a result of the victim's death. Section 6 of c. 258A provides that 'compensation . . . shall be reduced by the amount of any payments received or to be received as a result of the injury . . . (b) under insurance programs, or (c) from public funds.' The judge correctly ruled that life insurance proceeds constitute benefits from an insurance program which are received by the petitioners as a result of the victim's injury, in this case a fatal one. Equally without merit is the petitioners' claim that welfare payments should not be deducted from the compensation due them. Welfare payments are clearly public funds which the petitioners are receiving as a result of the victim's death and therefore they are deductible under § 6.
4. Finally, the petitioners claim they are entitled to have interest added to the award at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of the victim's death to the date of payment of the award. The petitioners contend that the Legislature has generally allowed for interest payments...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Adams v. Adams
...Wellington partnership interest. See Commonwealth v. Rahim, 441 Mass. 273, 274, 805 N.E.2d 13 (2004), quoting Gurley v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 595, 598, 296 N.E.2d 477 (1973) (“Where the language of a statute is plain, it must be interpreted in accordance with the usual and natural meaning......
-
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez .
...of a statute is plain, it must be interpreted in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words.” Gurley v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 595, 598, 296 N.E.2d 477 (1973). Absent clear indication to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its “ordinary lexical meaning.” Surrey ......
-
DeRoche v. Com'n against Discrimination
...N.E.2d 619 (1992), and under the statute providing compensation to victims of violent crimes, G.L. c. 258A, see Gurley v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 595, 600, 296 N.E.2d 477 (1973), the Appeals Court held that interest could not permissibly be imposed on an award under G.L. c. 151B against a p......
-
Bennett v. City of Holyoke
...by statute." Broadhurst v. Dir. of Div. of Emp. Sec., 373 Mass. 720, 369 N.E.2d 1018, 1023 (1977) (quoting Gurley v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 595, 296 N.E.2d 477, 481 (1973)). That imperative, however, merely commemorates a background rule of construction. It does not make the sovereign bull......