Gusewelle v. City of Wood River
| Citation | 374 F.3d 569 |
| Decision Date | 08 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-2100.,03-2100. |
| Parties | Delmar GUSEWELLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF WOOD RIVER and Thomas Christie, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
Lee W. Barron (argued), Alton, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Curtis L. Blood (argued), Blood Law Office, Collinsville, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
Delmar Gusewelle filed this action claiming: (1) that his employment was terminated in violation of the Age Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA), and (2) that his property interest in his job created a right to a due process hearing which was not afforded prior to his termination. The district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on both counts. Our review is de novo. We construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Gusewelle was hired by the City of Wood River, Illinois, in 1981 as a golf course equipment mechanic. When hired, Gusewelle was living in the neighboring town of Edwardsville. The City of Wood River, however, maintains a residency requirement and Plaintiff was given one year to comply with the regulation. He initially tried to sell his Edwardsville home but was unwilling to do so on the offers he had received.
About one year after being hired, Gusewelle began staying at his aunt's house in Wood River two nights a week. Although he claims that this arrangement was "no secret," he did not specifically tell any city employee about his dual residency. When his aunt's house was sold, he "moved" to the family farm in Wood River. He had a 1/3 interest in the farm. He stayed there two nights a week also. Although his wife remained in Edwardsville, Plaintiff paid his state and federal income taxes, voted, and registered his car and driver's license using the Wood River address. This arrangement continued for a little under twenty years until he was terminated for violating the residency regulation. Prior to his termination, Plaintiff was considered to be an "excellent" and "outstanding" employee.
In his deposition, Gusewelle said that he had heard that Wood River Parks and Recreation Director Jeff Stassi said, "work him [Gusewelle] hard, keep him on his feet and don't let him sit down so he'll retire." This statement was made four years prior to Gusewelle's termination. Although Stassi denied making this statement, our standard of review requires that we accept Plaintiff's version. With that in mind, we continue the narrative.
In 1999 Stassi told the City Council that Gusewelle was proposing to retire at age 65 — which would mean that he would retire that very year. Actually, Plaintiff had indicated that he would retire when he could no longer perform his job. Also in 1999, Thomas Christie left his job in another town and was hired as Wood River's City Manager. The City Manager works for the City Council and is responsible for hiring and firing all employees not covered by the fire-and-police commission.
In January 2001, Stassi came to Christie with a "rumor" that Gusewelle was not abiding by the residency requirement. Stassi explained in his affidavit that, while he had no desire to "get rid of" Gusewelle, he felt that Christie was enforcing the City regulations equally and fairly. Christie sent a note to the Wood River Chief of Police to investigate the allegations. After conducting some surveillance of Gusewelle's home (presumably the Gusewelle family farm) and talking with Gusewelle's mail carrier, the chief of police sent Christie a note confirming the rumor of Plaintiff's dual residence. Christie sent Gusewelle a show-cause letter that raised the violation of the residency requirement. After Gusewelle received the show cause letter an administrative hearing was held.
At the hearing, Plaintiff admitted that he stayed in Wood River only two days a week and that he only paid 1/3 of the property taxes on the Wood River farm. Christie's report to the City Council on the administrative hearing also noted that Gusewelle had signed an acknowledgment form stating that he was aware of the Personnel Rules. Personnel Rule 12.3 details the residency requirement. Members of the City Council expressed some reservations about firing Gusewelle when "former City Managers and Parks and Recreation Directors [knew] of [Gusewelle's dual residency] for years." Nevertheless, the City Council authorized Christie to send a letter terminating Gusewelle's employment.
After being terminated, Gusewelle reapplied for the job promising to comply with whatever "the new or revised definition of residency" required. His offer was rejected. When Christie was asked why the City chose not to rehire Gusewelle, he said, "[b]ecause the violation had already occurred." When asked why the City did not give Gusewelle another opportunity to move into Wood River, Christie responded, Wood River eventually replaced Gusewelle with an employee about twenty-five years younger than Plaintiff.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. In it's March 24, 2004 Memorandum & Order, the lower court judge found that Gusewelle had failed to show a genuine issue of material fact "on the question of whether defendants' proffered reason for plaintiff's termination is pretextual." The court then ruled against Plaintiff's due process claims by finding: (1) Gusewelle was an at-will employee and therefore, had no protectable property interest in his job, (2) there was no evidence that the City changed its definition of "residency" without prior notice, (3) Gusewelle was afforded procedural due process in the form of a formal administrative hearing prior to termination, (4) the residency regulation was not unconstitutionally vague, and (5) the regulation was not arbitrary or unreasonable municipal action. The instant appeal followed.
A plaintiff with a potential age discrimination claim can avoid summary judgment in one of two ways. The direct method states facts that show that the employer's decision to take adverse employment action against the plaintiff was motivated by an impermissible factor such as age, race, or national origin. Such facts can be in the form of direct or circumstantial evidence. "Direct evidence essentially requires an admission by the decision-maker that his actions were based upon the prohibited animus." Rogers v. City of Chicago, 320 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir.2003). Circumstantial evidence must be sufficient to create a "convincing mosaic" that "allows a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decision-maker." Id.
The indirect method, on the other hand, requires the plaintiff to first make a prima facie showing of discrimination. Steinhauer v. DeGolier, 359 F.3d 481, 484 (7th Cir.2004). To do this, a plaintiff must show: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) a similarly situated employee not of the protected class was treated more favorably. Steinhauer, 359 F.3d at 484; Cerutti v. BASF Corp., 349 F.3d 1055, 1061 (7th Cir.2003). Once a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant-employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Steinhauer, 359 F.3d at 484. If the employer can do so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to present sufficient evidence to show that the employer's proffered reasons are merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.
The district court found that Gusewelle had introduced no evidence of discrimination sufficient to defeat summary judgment based upon the direct method. The parties make no argument otherwise and we find no error in this ruling.
Gusewelle was sixty-seven years old when he was fired, and age is a protected class. It is undisputed that he was qualified for the job; he was considered to be an "outstanding" or "excellent" employee. There is certainly no dispute that Gusewelle suffered an adverse employment action — he was fired. Finally, plaintiff was replaced by a man twenty five years his junior. Although there may be some question as to whether Gusewelle satisfied the "similarly situated" element, we will assume that these facts allowed Gusewelle to clear the first hurdle to prevent summary judgment and that they established a prima facie case of discrimination. With this showing, the burden then shifted to Defendants to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the termination.
Wood River claims that Gusewelle was fired for violating the residency requirements of his employer. This assertion was well-supported. Therefore, following the indirect method's outline, the burden shifted back to the plaintiff to introduce evidence to show that the employer's articulated reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. Koski v. Standex Int'l Corp., 307 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir.2002). To this, the plaintiff may show: "(1) the proffered reasons are factually baseless, (2) the proffered reasons were not the actual motivation for the discharge, or (3) the proffered reasons were insufficient to motivate the discharge." Id.
Gusewelle supports his pretextual argument by asserting that his dual residency was no secret and that "everybody knew about it." This argument really is that the...
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