Steinhauer v. Degolier

• Decision Date: 24 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-1142.,03-1142.
• Citation: 359 F.3d 481
• Parties: Robert STEINHAUER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Laura DEGOLIER and State of Wisconsin, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

359 F.3d 481

Robert STEINHAUER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Laura DEGOLIER and State of Wisconsin, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 03-1142.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued September 4, 2003.

Decided February 24, 2004.

Robert J. Gingras (argued), Gingras, Cates & Luebke, Madison, WI, for plaintiff-appellant.

John R. Sweeney (argued), Office of the Atty. Gen., WI Dept. of Justice, Madison, WI, for defendants-appellees.

Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and MANION, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge.

After Laura DeGolier, the executive director of the Wisconsin Conservation Corps, fired Robert Steinhauer, he sued DeGolier under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the State of Wisconsin under Title VII for sex discrimination. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, concluding that Steinhauer failed to present sufficient evidence of sex discrimination under either the direct or indirect method. Steinhauer appeals. We affirm.

I.

In 1983, the Wisconsin State Legislature created the Wisconsin Conservation Corps ("WCC"). The WCC's mission is to employ young adults in projects involving resource conservation. In February 1999, then-Governor Tommy Thompson appointed Laura DeGolier to head the WCC as its executive director. DeGolier later hired Eileen Stevens to serve as the human resources coordinator. In turn, Stevens recommended that DeGolier hire Robert Steinhauer. DeGolier accepted Stevens' recommendation and, on June 12, 2000, hired Steinhauer as a personnel assistant. Steinhauer's primary duties were to assist with the employment and supervision of WCC enrollees and to provide enrollee support and training.

After he was hired, Steinhauer apparently did not mesh well with Stevens and DeGolier. He was not the only one to butt heads with the two: It seems that DeGolier's approach to management was far different from that of her predecessor. DeGolier exerted more authority and took a much more hands-on approach, and she often belittled staff members and criticized the way they had done things in the past. Stevens' support of DeGolier also rubbed the WCC staff the wrong way, and over the next year or so several WCC staffers left or were terminated. Steinhauer was one of the staff members who were fired; DeGolier fired him the day before his probationary period ended, claiming that she did so after Stevens complained that she could no longer work with Steinhauer. After he was fired, Steinhauer sued DeGolier under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the State under Title VII for sex discrimination.

Following extensive discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Steinhauer argued that he presented sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence of sex discrimination under the direct method to withstand summary judgment. Specifically, Steinhauer pointed to various comments allegedly made by Stevens and DeGolier evincing an anti-male bias; two cartoons published in a weekly news-letter which made fun of men; allegations of incidents where Steinhauer's duties were altered; conversations Stevens and DeGolier had with another WCC staffer concerning their divorces; the fact that five men left during DeGolier's tenure at the WCC; and DeGolier's alleged comments that she wanted to replace the male project team leaders.

The district court reviewed this referenced evidence and concluded that it failed to create a reasonable inference of sex bias and thus did not support a claim of sex discrimination under the direct method. The district court also rejected Steinhauer's attempt to establish discrimination under the indirect McDonnell-Douglas method because the WCC replaced Steinhauer with a man, and therefore he could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Accordingly, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. Steinhauer appeals.

II.

On appeal, Steinhauer argues that the district court erred in granting the defendants summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Our review of a decision on summary judgment is de novo. Haugerud v. Amery Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 678, 689 (7th Cir.2001).

To avoid summary judgment on his sex discrimination claims, Steinhauer must present facts from which a reasonable juror could find that the defendants terminated him because of his sex. Markel v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 276 F.3d 906, 910 (7th Cir.2002). This applies under both Title VII and Section 1983. Friedel v. City of Madison, 832 F.2d 965 (7th Cir.1987) ("When the plaintiff alleges intentional discrimination ... it is clear that the same standards in general govern liability under sections 1981, 1983, and Title VII."). There are two methods of proof available to Steinhauer — the indirect method and the direct method. Rogers v. City of Chicago, 320 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir.2003). Steinhauer relies on both, which we consider in turn below.

A. Indirect Method

Steinhauer contends that he presented sufficient evidence under the indirect method to avoid summary judgment. Under the McDonnell Douglas indirect method, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its employment action. At this point, the employer is entitled to summary judgment unless the claimant can present sufficient evidence that the employer's proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. See Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir.1999).

To establish a prima facie case, Steinhauer must show (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was fired; and (4) he was replaced by a woman, or that a similarly situated woman was treated more favorably. See Mills, 171 F.3d at 454. The first element is really a non-issue because everyone is male or female. The third element is also clear as Steinhauer was terminated from his employment. The defendants, however, claim that Steinhauer was not qualified for the position (the second element) and that he failed to establish that he was replaced by a woman or that a similarly situated woman was treated more favorably (the fourth element). Because, as discussed below, Steinhauer's case clearly falters on the fourth element, we need not decide whether he was sufficiently qualified for the position.

In this case, DeGolier replaced Steinhauer with another man, Chan Voeltz. Therefore Steinhauer cannot establish the final element of the prima facie case by establishing that he was replaced by a woman.¹ Steinhauer also attempts to establish the fourth element of the prima facie case by pointing to allegedly disparate treatment involving a female co-worker, Michelle Purifoy. In this regard, Steinhauer claims that he was fired for having a private conversation with Purifoy, but the fact that she was not terminated establishes the fourth prong of the prima facie case. DeGolier admits that she decided to fire Steinhauer in part because he had met with Purifoy. The defendants also admit that Purifoy was not fired as a result of that meeting.² However, Purifoy and Steinhauer were not similarly situated because Steinhauer was still on probation while Purifoy was not. See Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int'l-Indiana, Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir.2000) (holding that comparable employees must be similarly situated "in all respects") (internal citation omitted); Bogren v. Minnesota, 236 F.3d 399, 405 (8th Cir.2000) (probationary state trooper not similarly situated to non-probationary state trooper); McKenna v. Weinberger, 729 F.2d 783, 789 (D.C.Cir.1984) (female probationary employee not similarly situated to male permanent employee). Thus, Steinhauer cannot establish the fourth element by pointing to Purifoy's continued employment, and his case fails under the indirect McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach.³

B. Direct Method

Steinhauer also attempts to establish sex discrimination under the direct method. To avoid summary judgment under the direct method, Steinhauer must present sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence to create a reasonable inference that he was fired because of his sex. Volovsek v. Wisconsin Dept. of Agr., Trade & Consumer Prot., 344 F.3d 680, 689 (7th Cir.2003). In this case, Steinhauer points to numerous facts and comments which he believes constitute direct and circumstantial evidence of sex discrimination. However, as discussed below, the record does not support Steinhauer's position.

First, many of the facts Steinhauer points to provide no insight as to DeGolier's motivation at all, much less indicate that she discriminated against him because of his sex. For instance, Steinhauer claims that DeGolier's hiring of someone else to make a presentation at a crew leader workshop, removing him from recruiting trips, and requiring him to make his own travel arrangements constitutes circumstantial evidence of sex discrimination. But to say that this is evidence of sex discrimination begs the question of why DeGolier altered Steinhauer's job responsibilities; the change by itself provides no evidence of motivation, much less evidence that DeGolier terminated Steinhauer because of his sex.⁴ And for Steinhauer to claim that DeGolier made these decisions because of his sex is mere speculation which cannot defeat summary judgment. See, e.g., Mills v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Belvidere, 83 F.3d 833, 841-42 (7th Cir.1996).

Similarly misplaced is Steinhauer's reliance on the fact that DeGolier made negative comments about certain male employees, calling one a "little Hitler"; that she raised her voice at certain male employees; that she continually put down several male employees; and that five males left the WCC or were terminated. Again, this evidence begs the question of why she criticized and put down the men, and why they left WCC....