Gushlaw v. Milner

• Decision Date: 10 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2009–376–Appeal.,2009–376–Appeal.
• Citation: 42 A.3d 1245
• Parties: Rebecca L. GUSHLAW et al. v. Matthew J. MILNER et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

42 A.3d 1245

Rebecca L. GUSHLAW et al.

v.Matthew J. MILNER et al.

No. 2009–376–Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 10, 2012.

Donna M. DiDonato, Esq., for Plaintiff.

Donna M. Lamontagne, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice INDEGLIA, for the Court.

The plaintiff's appeal ¹ in this case presents this Court with an issue of first impression—does the driver of a motor vehicle, who is an adult but underage drinker, have a duty to protect third parties from the tortious conduct of an intoxicated individual he or she has agreed to transport, who is likewise an adult but underage drinker, by preventing that individual from subsequently operating a motor vehicle? Though mindful of the tragic consequences that far too often result from an alcohol-impaired individual's decision to navigate the roadways, as was the case here, we hold that, under the factual circumstances at hand, no such duty to third parties existed on the part of the defendant-driver to prevent his intoxicated passenger from later operating his own motor vehicle. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Travel

The facts of this case are generally not in dispute. On the evening of August 12, 2005, defendant Joseph M. Clukey (Mr. Clukey) invited his friend Matthew J. Milner (Mr. Milner) to a party at the Hampton Inn in Warwick, Rhode Island. At the time, Mr. Clukey was nineteen years of age and a high school graduate; Mr. Milner was twenty years old and had graduated in 2003 from the same high school, a year before Mr. Clukey.² In preparation for the night's activities, Mr. Clukey and Mr. Milner agreed to meet at a local conveniencestore—a short distance from both of their Smithfield, Rhode Island, residences—at 8:45 p.m. in their respective vehicles. Upon arrival at the convenience store, the two men decided that Mr. Clukey would drive his car for the trip from Smithfield to the hotel party. En route, the pair stopped off at a liquor store, from which Mr. Milner was apparently able to purchase an “eighteen-pack” of beer.³ From there, they proceeded to the hotel, arriving sometime between 9:30 p.m. and 10 p.m.

The record reveals that the hotel party, hosted by a seventeen-year-old minor in a single hotel room, was attended by eight to fifteen guests, including Mr. Clukey and Mr. Milner. During their stay at the party, the two men each consumed seven to eight cans of beer. According to Mr. Clukey, Mr. Milner became “a lot louder and more obnoxious” as he continued to drink the beers. At some point during the party, the attendees decided to relocate to the pool area of the hotel. The plaintiff contends that while at the pool, the hostess of the party expressed to Mr. Milner that she “hope[d] [he was] not driving,” to which Mr. Clukey interposed that he would be doing the driving, not Mr. Milner.⁴ Soon thereafter, the two men departed in Mr. Clukey's vehicle with Mr. Clukey at the wheel and headed back to Smithfield to a friend's house “about two streets down” from Mr. Miner's residence. Upon arrival, Mr. Clukey and Mr. Milner joined a small group of guests, some of whom were “hanging out watching TV,” “outside smoking cigarettes,” or cooking on the barbeque. Neither Mr. Clukey nor Mr. Milner consumed any alcohol at the house, because the nineteen-year-old hostess made none available and requested that guests not bring alcoholic beverages.

Apparently, the pair's appearance at the gathering was short-lived—after less than an hour,⁵ the hostess asked Mr. Milner to leave for “joking around,” “yelling” and “being loud” in the yard. According to Mr. Clukey, he offered to “bring [Mr. Milner] home” and attempted to facilitate their departure over Mr. Miner's initial objections. After some convincing, Mr. Miner agreed to leave, and the two set off in M. Clukey's vehicle. Although M. Milner's residence was only “two streets over” from the gathering, Mr. Clukey drove Mr. Miner back to his vehicle parked at the convenience store, which was farther away. Pursuant to M. Clukey's deposition testimony, he did so “because that's where [Mr. Miner] wanted to go,” and because M. Clukey “was still drunk [him]self.” M. Clukey was admittedly aware that M. Miner was intoxicated at the time he brought him back to his vehicle. Assuming that Mr. Miner was either going home or to pick up some food, Mr. Clukey left the convenience store lot as Mr. Milner backed out of his parking spot. Mr. Clukey subsequently returned to the house gathering.⁶

Mr. Milner's itinerary after leaving the convenience store parking lot is unknown. What is known, however, is that shortly before 1:30 a.m., Mr. Milner, traveling at a high-rate of speed, crossed the center line along Plainfield Pike in the Town of Scituate, Rhode Island, and collided head-on with a vehicle operated by the plaintiff's decedent in this case, Eldrick L. Johnson (Mr. Johnson). Mr. Milner was pronounced dead at the scene of the collision. His autopsy report indicated a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.162 percent, which was just over twice the legal limit for operating a motor vehicle in this state.⁷ Mr. Johnson, although alive at the time police responded to the scene, did not survive the accident and was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital, leaving behind a wife and four minor children.

On August 26, 2005, plaintiff filed this wrongful-death action against Mr. Milner, his father William J. Milner (who owned the vehicle that Mr. Milner was driving), John Doe, and Allstate Insurance Company, the vehicle's insurer. ⁸ After the filing of two amended complaints, plaintiff filed a third amended complaint on August 7, 2008, naming Mr. Clukey and his parents as additional defendants in the action. Ultimately, all claims were resolved against Mr. Milner (deceased), William J. Milner, Allstate Insurance Company, John Doe, and Mr. Clukey's parents, leaving Mr. Clukey as the sole remaining defendant in this action.⁹ The one claim set forth against Mr. Clukey, sounding in negligence, was premised on plaintiff's allegations that Mr. Clukey “knew or had reason to know that [Mr. Milner] was in an intoxicated state and was not fit to drive a motor vehicle,” and therefore “owed a duty to all persons using the public highways, including [the] decedent * * * to exercise due and reasonable care.” The plaintiff further alleged that Mr. Clukey breached this purported duty “by deciding to bring [Mr.] Milner back to [his] vehicle as opposed to [his] home when he knew or should have known that [Mr.] Milner would drive in an intoxicated state and was not fit to drive a motor vehicle,” proximately causing the collision and resultant death of Mr. Johnson.¹⁰

On June 3, 2009, Mr. Clukey filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that plaintiff had failed to allege a duty recognized under either Rhode Island precedential case law or statutory pronouncement. Mr. Clukey argued that the duty alleged by plaintiff—one that places an affirmative obligation on an adult individualto prevent a third party from operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol—is not a duty that supports a cognizable claim under existing authority. In arguing the absence of duty, Mr. Clukey analogized the instant matter to those cases involving “social host liability,” which cases (discussed infra ) recognize a duty to a third party by a social host for injuries suffered at the hands of an intoxicated guest only when a “special relationship” exists between the host and the tortfeasor. Such a special relationship, Mr. Clukey contended, did not exist under the factual circumstances here. Thus, in his view, plaintiff was essentially urging the court to create a new cause of action, which would impose a new duty on the general public.

In opposing Mr. Clukey's summary judgment motion, plaintiff emphasized that she was not relying on a social-host-liability theory, but instead was grounding her contention on several alternate analyses by which the court could find a duty imposed upon Mr. Clukey. Primarily, plaintiff asked the hearing justice to perform the ad hoc approach set forth by this Court in Banks v. Bowen's Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222 (R.I.1987), to determine whether Mr. Clukey had a duty to take reasonable measures to control Mr. Miner's conduct. The plaintiff likewise asked the court to consider the alleged voluntary assumption of a duty by Mr. Clukey.

During the parties' oral arguments in Superior Court on August 11, 2009, the hearing justice expressed numerous concerns about imposing a duty upon Mr. Clukey based on the facts of the case. She commented particularly on the scope of the proposed duty, how such a duty would be performed to conclusion, and the extent to which a person in Mr. Clukey's position would be liable. She highlighted that both Mr. Clukey and Mr. Milner were adults, each of whom consumed alcohol that evening, albeit under the legal age to do so, and further noted that “Mr. Milner was the one in control of his actions, not Mr. Clukey.” Troubled as to how this alleged duty would be delineated, the hearing justice also questioned the parties' attorneys on how a jury would be instructed should the matter proceed to trial. She specifically struggled with the policy implications stemming from an imposition of the duty, observing that plaintiff was asking the court to declare “a designated driver's duty as a matter of law,” and stressing that “it should be the [L]egislature's duty to debate and to determine what the policy of the state needs to be.”

After considering the parties' oral arguments and supporting memoranda, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party, the hearing justice issued a bench decision on Mr. Clukey's motion. Declining to impose a duty of care as urged by plaintiff, the hearing justice emphasized the...