Gustafson v. Arthur L. Roberts Hotel Co.

• Decision Date: 07 June 1935
• Docket Number: No. 30339.,30339.
• Citation: 194 Minn. 575,261 N.W. 447
• Parties: GUSTAFSON v. ARTHUR L. ROBERTS HOTEL CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

261 N.W. 447

194 Minn. 575

GUSTAFSON v. ARTHUR L. ROBERTS HOTEL CO.

No. 30339.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 7, 1935.

Appeal from District Court, Blue Earth County; Harry A. Johnson, Judge.

Action by Robert Gustafson against the Arthur L. Roberts Hotel Company. From an order denying its alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Wilson & Wilson, of Mankato, for appellant.

Wm. Stradtmann and John E. Regan, both of Mankato, for respondent.

STONE, Justice.

This action for personal injuries received by plaintiff while a guest in defendant's hotel resulted in a verdict for plaintiff for $6,000. Defendant appeals from the order denying its alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding or a new trial. About 8 o'clock in the evening of July 14, 1933, plaintiff, with several relatives, registered at the Saulpaugh Hotel in Mankato. After being shown their rooms, they went out and did not return until about 11:45. After reaching his room the second time, plaintiff went back into the hall to go to the toilet. He had to traverse a part of the hall which he had not previously used. Just outside and a few feet to the right of the door of his room there were three steps made necessary by a two-foot drop in floor level. The overhead, 24-hour light which ordinarily illuminated these steps had burned out. Plaintiff, stumbling down them in the dimly lighted corridor, suffered serious injury.

Defendant's liability is based upon negligence, as said by the complaint, in "permitting its premises to be in an unsafe and dangerous condition, * * *" failing "to keep the premises properly lighted," and "not properly warning guests of the dangerous condition of the premises." The assignments of error are directed at the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict; error in the charge to the jury; misconduct of counsel; and excessive damages.

1. We have a statute, 1 Mason's Minn. St. 1927, § 5907, declaring that: "Every hotel * * * shall be properly plumbed, lighted and ventilated, and shall be conducted in every department with strict regard to health, comfort and safety of the guest."

The charge was that defendant was liable for any injuries proximately caused by "violation of the statute in neglecting to properly light the premises and hallway in question." That may be considered but one of three theories upon which the case went to the jury. The second was that there could be recovery if the jury found that there had been lack of reasonable care to keep defendant's "premises in a condition of reasonable safety for the use of his guests," with a qualification that defendant was not the insurer of their personal safety. More precisely, the instruction on this theory was that, if the jury "should find that there was no failure on the part of the defendant to light the corridor in question by such methods and in such manner as the ordinary prudent person would exercise under all the surrounding circumstances and conditions, then (now we come to the more specific and third ground of liability submitted), before the plaintiff could recover you must be convinced by a fair preponderance of the evidence that those in charge of the defendant's business at the time of the accident had knowledge of the fact that the electric light bulb over the steps * * * had burned out or ceased to furnish light, or, in the absence of such actual knowledge that the circumstances were such as to form a reasonable inference that the light had been out so long that those in charge of the defendant's place of business should have, in the exercise of ordinary care, discovered that the light was out. Otherwise you must find for the defendant."

Without argument directed to the point, we do not consider how imperative was the statutory duty to light the steps. If the same rule is applicable as in cases under similar statutes intended for the safety of designated classes (e. g., employer's liability and factory acts), the charge was too favorable to defendant.

The old classification of degrees of care into great, ordinary, and slight has been discarded. What is required is a degree of care commensurate to the risk; i. e., that to be expected from an ordinarily prudent man in the same or similar circumstances. Peet v. Roth Hotel Co., 191 Minn. 151, 253 N. W. 546; Dunnell, Minn. Dig. (2d Ed.) 732. The danger, in the...