Gustafson v. Taber, 9020
| Decision Date | 11 July 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 9020,9020 |
| Citation | 125 Mont. 225,234 P.2d 471 |
| Parties | GUSTAFSON et al. v. TABER et al. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Taylor & McKenna, Hamilton, for appellant C. J. Taber.
Edward T. Dussault, Missoula, for respondents.
Suit by plaintiffs against defendants for the price of a carload of lumber sold, shipped and received by defendants. Upon verdict and judgment for plaintiffs, defendant C. J. Taber appeals.
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict of the jury, that the jury disregarded the law as given by the court and that the court erred in refusing to give one of the instructions offered by defendants.
The Facts. In August 1947 John Taber, a brother of C. J. Taber, and Delmar Coombs, a son-in-law of John Taber, were engaged in buying and selling lumber; they needed capital in the firm which they were operating under the firm name of 'Hamilton Lumber Sales Company.' John Taber and C. J. Taber obtained a loan from the Ravalli County Bank at Hamilton, by which the firm was financed; the note to the bank was signed by John Taber and C. J. Taber. Under the arrangements made with the bank at the time this loan was made, the checks on the account could be drawn by either John Taber or C. J. Taber.
In August 1947, John Taber and Delmar Coombs contacted the Grizzly Bear Lumber Company through Jim Gustafson, a member of that firm, and wanted lumber furnished to the Hamilton Lumber Sales Company. Not knowing the parties associated therewith, Gustafson obtained a credit rating of the Hamilton Lumber Sales Company and the members constituting that firm through the Western Montana Bank of Missoula. From such credit rating report plaintiffs ascertained that the defendants named in the complaint, i. e., John Taber, C. J. Taber and Delmar Coombs, were doing business as Hamilton Lumber Sales Company. Thereupon the Grizzly Bear Lumber Company proceeded to ship lumber to them. The first carload was shipped the early part of September 1947, and was followed by four other carloads of lumber, all shipped via Northern Pacific Railway Company, uniform bill of lading, all of which were paid for by checks which were signed by one or more of the defendants. The sixth carload of lumber sold and shipped by plaintiffs to defendants on November 1, 1947, was under uniform bill of lading, Northern Pacific Railway Company, car initial PRR, Car No. 505061. The bill of lading accompanying this car of lumber, like all other cars of lumber shipped to defendants by plaintiffs, had attached thereto a tally sheet prepared by plaintiffs showing to whom shipped, the number of boards of each dimension, the board feet and the total price; the original bill of lading and tally sheet was retained by the railway company, one copy to the consignee and one copy to the consignor. The sale price of this sixth car of lumber was $1,732.83. No part thereof has been paid to plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs, prior to and at the time this action was commenced, were a co-partnership, composed of Frank Gustafson, Jim Gustafson, Ted Gustafson, and George Hutchings (George Hutchings since the action was started has retired from the firm), doing business under the firm name and style of Grizzly Bear Lumber Company, located in Missoula county, and were engaged in logging, sawmill operations and manufacturing and selling lumber.
There is no dispute that the plaintiffs shipped the designated car of lumber to, and the same was received by, the Hamilton Lumber Sales Company, and that no payment therefor has been made to plaintiffs.
The question here presented is--was defendant C. J. Taber, under the facts, evidence and applicable law, one of the individuals composing the firm or ostensible partnership which was doing business under the firm name and style of Hamilton Lumber Sales Company, and thereby liable as the jury found.
The Uniform Partnership Act, R.C.M.1947, Sec. 63-104, in part provides:
'(1) The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed shall have no application to this act.
'(2) The law of estoppel shall apply under this act.
'(3) The law of agency shall apply under this act.'
R.C.M1947, Sec. 63-208, provides:
'(a) When a partnership liability results, he is liable as though he were an actual member of the partnership. * * *'
Here we have the formation of a firm to be known as the Hamilton Lumber Sales Company for the purpose of buying and selling lumber, C. J. Taber furnishing the working capital for the firm by executing a note to the Ravalli County Bank with John Taber as a co-signer. At first the money of the firm was to be drawn only by John Taber or C. J. Taber.
Delmar Coombs and John Taber in person contacted the Grizzly Bear Lumber Company to arrange to have that company ship limber to their firm, the Hamilton Lumber Sales Company. They gave their phone number and the phone number of C. J. Taber and directed that when the cars were loaded to call either number at Hamilton for directions as to shipping. The first car of lumber was so shipped by plaintiffs to defendants and was paid for by check dated September 8, 1947, in favor of plaintiffs drawn on Ravalli County Bank, in the sum of $1,301.55, marked (lumber) signed by John Taber. The second car of lumber was paid by check on Ravalli County Bank, dated September 22, 1947, in favor of plaintiffs in the sum of $1,296.80 (For Car N. P. 1250) signed by C. J. Taber.
In October 1947 an account was opened in the Ravalli County Bank in the name of Hamilton Lumber Sales. This firm then had the said bank provide it with printed business or firm checks. Arrangements with the bank required a signature card for the firm account showing who was authorized to draw checks on said account. Under said arrangements and the signature card, the signatures of two members of the firm were necessary, i. e., defendant Delmar Coombs countersigned by C. J. Taber. C. H. Raymond, witness for defendants, testified that this firm account was carried by the bank until the new corporation was formed, having the same name that took it over; that the only time John Taber appeared was on the firm note with C. J. Taber.
Thereafter defendants ordered the third car of lumber from plaintiffs. This car was shipped to and paid for by defendants by check as follows:
'By Endorsement this Check when Paid is Accepted in Full Payment of the Following Account
Pine-Larch-Fir
Hamilton, Montana
October 3, 1947
Date 10/3
Amount $1,044.75
For C/L Lumber
Car No. C&NW47867
Total of Invoices
Less ___% By Discount
Less
Total Deductions
Amount of Check
$1,044.75
To Ravalli County Bank
Hamilton, Montana
93-82'
921
Pay To The Order Of Grizzly Bear Lumber Co.
$1,044.75
One Thousand Forty Four and 75/100 ... Dollars
Delmar Coombs
Signed
C. J. Taber
The fourth and fifth cars of lumber were ordered by defendants from plaintiffs and paid for by check as follows:
'By Endorsement this Check when Paid is Accepted in Full Payment of the Following Account
Pine-Larch-Fir
Hamilton, Montana
October 21, 1947
Date 10/21
Amount $1915.45
NP 62091
MP 8043
Total Invoices
Less ___% Discount
Less _____
Total Deductions _____
Amount of Check $1,915.45
To Ravalli County Bank
Hamilton, Montana
93-82'
921
Pay To The Order Of Grizzly Bear Lumber Co.
Nineteen Hundred & Fifteen & 45/100 * * * Dollars
Signed
C. J. Taber
Countersigned Thereafter defendants ordered the sixth car of lumber from plaintiffs, which plaintiffs shipped to defendants November 1, 1947, under uniform bill of lading, Northern Pacific Railway, car initial Penn 505061, being in the amount of $1,732.83. There is no question but that the Hamilton Lumber Sales Company received this car of lumber, nor is there any controversy as to the amount due the plaintiffs therefor.
Although defendant C. J. Taber denied that he had ever held himself out to plaintiffs as a partner or associate in any manner with the Hamilton Lumber Sales Company, or authorized anyone to do so, or was a partner therein, yet he testified on direct examination as follows:
* * *
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