Guth v. Freeland

• Decision Date: 31 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. 22539.,22539.
• Citation: 96 Haw. 147,28 P.3d 982
• Parties: Naomi M.L.K. GUTH, Malcolm Akiona, Lawrence Akiona, Darryl Akiona, Dennis Akiona, Matthew Akiona, and Alberta Alphin, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Haines Burt FREELAND, dba Special Services and Accommodation; Howard Tagomori, As Maui County Chief of Police and As Coroner for Maui County; County of Maui; Maui Memorial Hospital; Clinical Laboratories of Hawaii, Inc., Defendants-Appellees, and John Does 1-10; Jane Does 1-10; Doe Partnerships 1-10; Doe Corporations 1-10 and Doe Governmental Entities 1-10, Defendants.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

28 P.3d 982

96 Haw. 147

Naomi M.L.K. GUTH, Malcolm Akiona, Lawrence Akiona, Darryl Akiona, Dennis Akiona, Matthew Akiona, and Alberta Alphin, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Haines Burt FREELAND, dba Special Services and Accommodation; Howard Tagomori, As Maui County Chief of Police and As Coroner for Maui County; County of Maui; Maui Memorial Hospital; Clinical Laboratories of Hawaii, Inc., Defendants-Appellees, and John Does 1-10; Jane Does 1-10; Doe Partnerships 1-10; Doe Corporations 1-10 and Doe Governmental Entities 1-10, Defendants.

No. 22539.

Supreme Court of Hawai`i.

July 31, 2001.

Greg H. Takase, on the briefs, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Victoria J. Takayesu, Deputy Corporation Counsel, on the briefs, for defendants-appellees Howard Tagomori and County of Maui.

Joel E. August, Wailuku, of Lowenthal & August on the joinder, on the briefs, for defendant-appellee Haines Burt Freeland.

Laurie E. Keeno, Honolulu, on the briefs, for defendant appellee Maui Memorial Hospital.

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, and RAMIL, JJ. and ACOBA, J., Concurring in part and Dissenting in part.

Opinion of the Court by NAKAYAMA, J.

Plaintiffs-appellants Naomi Guth, Malcolm Akiona, Lawrence Akiona, Darryl Akiona, Dennis Akiona, Matthew Akiona, and Alberta Alphin (collectively, Plaintiffs) appeal from the final judgment of the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, the Honorable Shackley Raffetto presiding, entered pursuant to an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees Haines Freeland, dba Special Services and Accommodation (Freeland), the County of Maui, and Maui Memorial Hospital (MMH) (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiffs' suit arose from Defendants' allegedly negligent handling of the body of Plaintiffs' deceased mother, Barbara Akiona (Akiona). The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiffs' negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claim because it was barred by Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 663-8.9 (1993). On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants because HRS § 663-8.9 does not apply to NIED claims arising from the negligent mishandling of a corpse. In the alternative, Plaintiffs argue that this court should adopt the rule stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 868 (1979). We hold that HRS § 663-8.9 does not apply to an NIED claim arising from the negligent mishandling of a corpse. Therefore, we vacate the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants and the judgment entered pursuant thereto and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Akiona was admitted to MMH on September 22, 1995. The next day, she passed away, and Freeland transported her body to the morgue for refrigeration pending testing and a possible autopsy. The morgue is located in MMH. Akiona was considered a coroner's case and was therefore in the custody and control of Maui County. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants negligently failed to refrigerate Akiona's body, causing it to decompose.

Prior to her death, Akiona entered into a contract with Maui Funeral Plan, Inc., which provided for the removal of her body from the hospital, professional embalming, a casket, use of the funeral home facilities, a car and driver to the cemetery, and funeral arrangements by the funeral director and staff. The plan utilized Nakamura Mortuary. In addition, Akiona told Plaintiffs that she wished to be interred according to the wishes of her family. Plaintiffs, some of whom had not seen their mother for some time, desired an open casket funeral.

Anthony Vierra, an employee of Nakamura Mortuary, went to the morgue on the morning of September 25, 1995 to retrieve Akiona's remains. When he arrived, no one was staffing the morgue; a security guard let him in. Vierra discovered Akiona's body outside the refrigeration unit. The body was bloated and partially decomposed. The face was bloated and purple, the eyes were bulging, and the tongue was swollen and partially protruding. Akiona's body was also discolored, and the veins appeared black. Alvin Nakamura, the owner of the mortuary, stated in a deposition that the foregoing indicated an "advanced stage of decay." Nakamura also stated that there was "a lot of skin slip, a lot of edema in the tissues, it smelled real bad. It was a hazzard to health." Nakamura ordered the body immediately embalmed for safety reasons.

Arthur Souza performed the embalming. The embalming did not alter the appearance of Aikona's body but delayed further decomposition and prevented any odor. He spoke with Plaintiffs and informed them that the funeral could not be open casket because of the condition of the body. When the Plaintiffs did not understand what he meant, Souza asked if they would like to see the body. Two of the Plaintiffs, Clarence and Malcolm Akiona, went with him to see the body. Plaintiffs claim that the news of what happened to Akiona's body caused them serious emotional distress.¹ None of the Plaintiffs claim that they suffered physical injury as a result of the incident or that their emotional distress was manifested in a physical injury or illness.

On September 22, 1997, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants and Clinical Laboratories of Hawaii, Inc. (CLHI),² alleging negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, the tort of outrage, abuse of a corpse, and trespass.³ On January 27, 1998, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that alleged the same six counts as the original complaint. Defendant MMH moved for summary judgment on all counts on October 8, 1998. Defendants Freeland, County of Maui, and CLHI joined in MMH's motion. At the hearing on the motion, the circuit court ruled that there was no factual basis to support Plaintiffs' claims, except for those sounding in negligence. Although the court stated that it did not "have any doubt [Plaintiffs] experienced emotional distress[,]" the court agreed with Defendants' argument that HRS § 663-8.9 barred recovery in this case and that existing Hawai`i law did not recognize a separate claim for relief for negligent mishandling of corpse.

On March 9, 1999, the court entered an order stating that "no genuine issues of material fact exist and Defendants ... are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as to all claims made by Plaintiffs herein." A judgment pursuant thereto was entered on April 15, 1999. Plaintiffs timely appealed.

On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that HRS § 663-8.9 does not apply to a claim of NIED for the negligent mishandling of a corpse and, therefore, that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to the NIED claim. In the alternative, Plaintiffs argue that this court should adopt the rule articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 868, establishing the independent tort of interference with dead bodies. We agree that HRS § 663-8.9 does not apply to a claim of NIED arising from the negligent mishandling of a corpse and that, therefore, the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Because we hold that HRS § 663-8.9 does not apply, we need not address Plaintiffs' argument that interference with dead bodies should be adopted as an independent tort.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of review

A circuit court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo under the same standard applied by the circuit court. Dairy Road Partners v. Island Ins. Co., Ltd., 92 Hawai`i 398, 411, 992 P.2d 93, 106 (2000) (quoting Bronster v. United Public Workers, 90 Hawai`i 9, 13, 975 P.2d 766, 770 (1999)) (some citations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Hawai`i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 56(c).

Whether HRS § 663-8.9 applies to a claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from the negligent mutilation of a corpse is a question of statutory interpretation. Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law to be reviewed de novo under the right/wrong standard. Flor v. Holguin, 94 Hawai`i 70, 77, 9 P.3d 382, 389 (2000) (quoting State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai`i 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999)) (some citations omitted).

Our statutory construction is guided by the following well established principles:

our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. And we must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.

When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists....

In construing an ambiguous statute, "[t]he meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning." HRS § 1-15(1) [(1993)]. Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent. One avenue is the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool.

Gray [v. Administrative Dir. of the Court], 84 Hawai`i [138,] 148, 931 P.2d [580,] 590 [(1997) ] (quoting State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawai`i 8, 18-19, 904 P.2d 893, 903-04 (1995)) (brackets and ellipsis points in original) (footnote omitted). This court may also consider "[t]he reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it ... to discover its true meaning." HRS § 1-15(2) (1993). . . .

In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai`i 97, 121, 9 P.3d 409, 456 (2000) (quoting Barnett v. State, 91...