Guthrie v. Hall

• Decision Date: 19 November 2018
• Docket Number: Case No.: CIV-16-1148-D
• Parties: OTIS ANDRE GUTHRIE, Plaintiff, v. CPL DANIEL T. HALL, BADGE 342, individually, and CITY OF MUSTANG, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

OTIS ANDRE GUTHRIE, Plaintiff, v. CPL DANIEL T. HALL, BADGE 342, individually,and CITY OF MUSTANG, Defendants.

Case No.: CIV-16-1148-D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

November 19, 2018

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants CPL Daniel T. Hall ("CPL Hall") and City of Mustang's ("Mustang") Motion for Summary Judgement [Doc. No. 37]. Plaintiff Otis Andre Guthrie ("Guthrie") has filed his Response [Doc. No. 51] and Defendants have Replied [Doc. No. 54].¹ The matter is fully briefed and at issue.

This lawsuit arises from a traffic stop of Guthrie by CPL Hall. Guthrie received tickets for speeding and an expired tag and was arrested for driving under the influence. Guthrie alleges that CPL Hall violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in that: (1) CPL Hall did not have reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop; (2) there was no probable cause for the arrest; (3) CPL Hall discriminated against him based on his race; and (4) CPL Hall subjected him to malicious prosecution. Complaint [Doc. No. 1] at 7, 8, 10-13. Guthrie alleges that Mustang violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Complaint at 13-14. Guthrie brings his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant CPL Hall asserts he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on qualified immunity, and Defendant Mustang moves for summary judgment. The following material facts are undisputed and, along with all reasonable inferences, are viewed in the light most favorable to Guthrie.

UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

CPL Hall observed Guthrie driving his pickup truck traveling eastbound in the area of the 2200 block of E. S.H. 152 in the City of Mustang on October 4, 2014. CPL Hall estimated Guthrie's speed as 53 mph in a 45 mph zone. When CPL Hall's RADAR indicated Guthrie's speed was 56 mph, he initiated a traffic stop. During the traffic stop, Hall noticed the smell of alcohol and observed Guthrie to have slurred speech and bloodshot, watery eyes. Based on these observations, CPL Hall asked Guthrie if he had consumed any alcohol and Guthrie answered in the affirmative.

CPL Hall then conducted various field sobriety tests. First, he administered the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus ("HGN") test and observed Nystagmus in both eyes. Next, CPL Hall started to administer a walk and turn test but stopped when Guthrie informed him of his medical condition and vertigo. Guthrie was then asked to perform the one-leg stand test and CPL Hall determined that he did not successfully complete the test. Guthrie admits in his deposition that he did not complete the one-leg test as directed. Based on Guthrie's admission of having consumed alcohol, the odor of alcohol, Guthrie's slurred speech and bloodshot watery eyes, and Guthrie's performance during the field sobriety tests, CPL Hall determined that Guthrie was intoxicated. CPL Hall arrested Guthrie for driving under the influence of alcohol, excessive speed, and an expired license tag.

At the time of the traffic stop, Guthrie had a passenger, Michael Eugene Young ("Young"), a white male. Guthrie indicated it would be acceptable for CPL Hall to allow Young to drive his truck from the scene. Before he was allowed to do so, Young was asked if he had consumed any alcohol and answered that he had had four beers. CPL Hall administered the HGN test and observed no Nystagmus. Based on the HGN test and the lack of strong odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, or slurred speech, CPL Hall determined that Young was not intoxicated and released Guthrie's vehicle to Young.

Guthrie was then transported to the Mustang City Jail, booked and offered a Intoxilyzer test which he refused to take. On October 5, 2014, Guthrie was released from the Mustang City Jail. Guthrie demanded a jury trial in the municipal court and on April 9, 2015, the Mustang Municipal Court dismissed Guthrie's case and transferred it to the Canadian County District Court for prosecution. On June 1, 2015, an Information was filed in Canadian County, Oklahoma District Court charging Guthrie with driving under the influence, speeding, and driving with an expired tag. On February 10, 2016, the charges were dismissed.

STANDARD OF DECISION

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Winton, 818 F. 3d 1103, 1105 (10th Cir. 2016). "An issue is 'genuine' if there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way" and "[a]n issue of fact is 'material' if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim." Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). If the movant carries the burden of demonstrating an absence of a dispute as to material fact, "the nonmovant must then go beyond the pleadings and "set forth specific facts" that would be admissible in evidence and that show a genuine issue for trial." Martin v. City of Oklahoma City, 180 F. Supp. 3d 978, 983 (W.D. Okla. 2016) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir.1998).)

The Court's inquiry must be whether the evidence, when viewed "through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, "presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52. Although the Court views all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party at the summary judgement stage, "there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Id. at 249 (citations omitted).

"[I]n opposing a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party 'cannot rest on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on suspicion.'" Bird v. W. Valley City, 832 F.3d 1188, 1199 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 1988)). The nonmoving party "must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. This is true even where the evidence is likely to be within the possession of the defendant, as long as the plaintiff has had a full opportunity to conduct discovery." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.

DISCUSSION

Guthrie brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 9183 based on violations of his Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. Specifically, Guthrie alleges that CPL Hall violated his Fourth Amendment rights to freedom from unreasonable seizure, warrantless arrest without probable cause, and malicious prosecution. Complaint [Doc. No. 1] at ¶ 58, 60 and 62. He alleges violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law on the grounds that he was treated differently than his white passenger. Complaint at ¶ 60. Guthrie further alleges that Mustang violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Complaint at ¶ 66.

I. Qualified Immunity

The purpose of qualified immunity is "to insulate public officials 'from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.'" Swanson v. Town of Mountain View, Colo., 577 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Qualified immunity is intended to "protect 'government officials performing discretionary functions' and shield[] them from 'liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Id. (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). "The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official's error is 'a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.'" Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), for the proposition that qualified immunity covers "mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law")).

CPL Hall asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity as to Guthrie's Constitutional claims against him. In order to establish a §1983 claim against an individual defendant asserting a qualified immunity defense, Guthrie bears the burden of demonstrating facts that: (1) "make out a violation of a constitutional right" and (2) "the right at issue was 'clearly established' at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S. Ct. 808, 816, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009); see Martin v. City of Oklahoma City, 180 F. Supp. 3d 978, 986 (W.D. Okla. 2016).

The pertinent question is whether "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" Koch v. City of Del City, CIV-07-371-D, 2010 WL 1329819, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 29, 2010), aff'd, Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). Although the evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the "record must clearly demonstrate the plaintiff has satisfied his heavy two-part burden; otherwise, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity." Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir.2001). Summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate if the law did not put the "officer on notice that his conduct...