Gutierrez v. Dall. Cnty. Municipalities & Entities

• Docket Number: 3:23-CV-0244-L-BH
• Decision Date: 28 November 2023
• Parties: JULIAN P. GUTIERREZ, III, #2063017, Plaintiff, v. DALLAS COUNTY MUNICIPALITIES AND ENTITIES, ET AL., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

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JULIAN P. GUTIERREZ, III, #2063017, Plaintiff, v. DALLAS COUNTY MUNICIPALITIES AND ENTITIES, ET AL., Defendants.

No. 3:23-CV-0244-L-BH

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

November 28, 2023

Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge^[1]

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the plaintiff's official capacity claims against the judge and prosecutors should be DISMISSED without prejudice based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, and his remaining claims should be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim or as barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

I. BACKGROUND

Julian P. Gutierrez, III (Plaintiff), a Texas state prisoner, sues former Dallas County Criminal District Court Judge Jeanine Howard (Judge), several Dallas County prosecutors^[2] (Prosecutors), his defense attorney (Defense Attorney), three members of the Dallas Police Department (Officers), the victim of the state crime for which he was convicted (Victim), the City of Dallas (City) and the County of Dallas (County) (Defendants).^[3] (See generally docs. 3; 10.)

On November 11, 2014, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. (doc. 3 at 4.)^[4] On that date, one of the Officers observed a man riding down a public road on the hood of a pickup truck. (doc. 10 at 21.) She pursued the pickup truck until it collided with a telephone pole in a parking lot adjacent to an apartment complex. (Id.) An unidentified individual flagged the officer down and informed her that two individuals had run behind the apartment building. (Id.) The officer ran in that direction and saw Plaintiff and Victim engaged in a physical fight. (Id.) The officer held Plaintiff and Victim at gunpoint until additional officers^[5]arrived and arrested both of them. (Id.) Victim informed the officers that his pickup truck had been stolen while he was airing up the tires at a nearby gas station. (Id.) According to him, when Plaintiff began to drive away in Victim's truck, Victim jumped on the hood of the truck in an attempt to stop the theft, and Plaintiff swerved in an attempt to force Victim off of the hood and crashed into a telephone pole. (Id. at 21-22.) Plaintiff attempted to flee on foot and Victim chased after him and physically restrained him which is what started the altercation between them. (Id.) Based on this statement from Victim, the officers arrested Plaintiff. (Id.) According to Dallas County public records, Plaintiff was indicted on December 4, 2014. The indictment also alleged that Plaintiff had previously been convicted of two felony offenses; as a result, he was designated a habitual offender who could be sentenced to life in prison. (See doc. 10 at 10.) Dallas County public records show that on April 20, 2016, Plaintiff was convicted by a jury and sentenced to twenty years in prison, and he is currently serving that sentence. (See doc. 3 at 1.)

Plaintiff alleges that he is innocent and that the criminal case against him is based solely on a case of mistaken identity. (doc. 3 at 8.) He claims that he was simply visiting someone who lived at the apartment complex on the day of the car-jacking and happened to be wearing similar clothes to the actual thief. (Id. at 4, 8.) He alleges that Victim mistakenly thought that Plaintiff was the thief, and that the officers took Victim's word for it without conducting a proper investigation. (Id. at 8.) He notes that Victim did not successfully identify him as the thief in open court and instead identified a third party sitting in the courtroom during the trial. (doc. 10 at 16.) Plaintiff alleges that his flawed state criminal trial ultimately resulted in an invalid and unconstitutional conviction and sentence, and that Defendants circumvented several of his rights under the United States and Texas Constitutions and violated various state laws. (See generally docs. 3; 10.)

Plaintiff seeks damages, an acquittal or pardon, a public apology broadcast on television news stations, and for several of the Defendants to be disbarred or removed from their official positions. (See generally doc. 10.) He also asks for “establish[ed] provisions of code of conduct and ethics procedures to be enforced” and requests “penal punishment” in the “court['s] discretion.” (See, e.g., doc. 10 at 2, 8.)

II. PRELIMINARY SCREENING

Plaintiff is a prisoner who has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. (doc. 5.) As a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, Plaintiff's complaint is subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, his complaint is also subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) provide for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

III. HABEAS RELIEF

Plaintiff challenges his conviction and seeks acquittal under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See doc. 3 at 18.)

Section 1983 “provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). Habeas relief is an inappropriate remedy in a § 1983 action. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 (1974). A plaintiff cannot challenge the fact or duration of confinement in a § 1983 action. Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973)). He may only do so within the exclusive scope of habeas corpus. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487. Plaintiff's claims for habeas relief should be dismissed.

IV. REMOVAL OF STATE OFFICIALS

Plaintiff asks this court to remove one of the Prosecutors, Judge, and all three Officers from their positions. (doc. 10 at 8, 15, 18, 24, 25.) However, “federal courts have no authority to ... fire state employees[.]” Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds by Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978). This relief cannot be granted, and Plaintiff's claims for this relief should be dismissed.

V. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

Plaintiff appears to sue both City and County under § 1983. (doc. 10 at 3, 5.)

Municipalities, including counties and cities, may be held liable under § 1983. Hampton Co. Nat'l Sur., LLC v. Tunica Cnty., 543 F.3d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 2008). A municipality may be liable under § 1983 if the execution of one of its customs or policies deprives a plaintiff of his or her constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); Jones v. City of Hurst, No. 4:05-CV-798-A, 2006 WL 522127, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2006) (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997)). It is well-settled that a municipality cannot be liable under a theory of respondeat superior, however. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing cases). “Under the decisions of the Supreme Court and [the Fifth Circuit], municipal liability under section 1983 . requires proof of three elements: a policy maker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force' is the policy or custom.” Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); see also Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541-42 (5th Cir. 2010); Cox v. City of Dall., 430 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 2005); Jones, 2006 WL 522127, at *3 (citing Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 532-33 (5th Cir. 1996)).

“Official policy” is defined as:

1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality's lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority; or

2. A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an official to whom that body had delegated policy-making authority. Actions of officers or employees of a municipality do not render the municipality liable under § 1983 unless they execute official policy as above defined.

Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); accord Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002). Where a policy is facially constitutional, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it was promulgated with deliberate indifference to known or obvious consequences that constitutional violations would result. Piotrowski 237 F.3d at 579-80 & n.22; accord Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 849-50 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 827 (2010). “Deliberate indifference of this sort is a stringent test, and ‘a showing of simple or even heightened negligence...