Gutierrez v. Gaffers and Sattler Corp.

• Decision Date: 24 February 1970
• Citation: 84 Cal.Rptr. 571,4 Cal.App.3d 731
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 74 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2022 John GUTIERREZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GAFFERS AND SATTLER CORPORATION, a corporation, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 34288.

Page 571

84 Cal.Rptr. 571

4 Cal.App.3d 731, 74 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2022

John GUTIERREZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GAFFERS AND SATTLER CORPORATION, a corporation, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 34288.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Feb. 24, 1970.

Edward S. Cooper, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Tyre & Kamins, by Peter M. Appleton, Beverly Hills, for respondent.

FLEMING, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff Gutierrez brought this action for damages and declaratory relief against his former employer (Gaffers and Sattler) and his union (United Steel Workers of America, Local 2018). In his fourth amended complaint he pleaded three causes of action: the first for damages against Gaffers and Sattler for wrongful discharge in breach of a collective bargaining agreement; the second for damages against the union for failure to prosecute his grievance in good faith; the third for a declaration of rights against both defendants under the collective bargaining agreement. The trial court overruled the demurrer of the union but sustained without leave to amend the demurrer of Gaffers and Sattler to the fourth amended complaint and dismissed the action against it. Plaintiff appeals the judgment of dismissal.

According to the complaint, plaintiff was an appliance serviceman employed by Gaffers and Sattler and a beneficiary of the collective bargaining agreement between his employer and United Steel Workers of America, Local 2018. That agreement prohibited discrimination against any employee by the employer or by the union because of race, religion, creed, color, sex, or national origin. It also prohibited the discharge of an employee without good and sufficient cause. To resolve disputes under the agreement the parties established a four-step grievance procedure which culminated in arbitration.

On 17 February 1967 plaintiff left work for the day about 5:15 p.m. driving with permission his employer's truck, which he had previously reported in need of a brake adjustment. About 7:10 p.m. plaintiff got in a traffic accident with another vehicle. Plaintiff told the investigating officer for the California Highway Patrol he had drunk a pitcher of beer prior to the accident, an admission which later appeared in the accident report. Plaintiff was not charged with a crime, and he avers he was not drunk at the time of the accident.

On 8 March plaintiff's employment was terminated because of the accident. The following day he filed a written grievance under the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.

On 14 March a hearing on the grievance was held, and plaintiff contended his discharge violated his rights under the collective bargaining agreement because: (1) the company discriminated against him as a Mexican-American, and as evidence of such discrimination he cited two instances of past discrimination, one of which caused him to file a complaint with the California Fair Employment Practice Commission; (2) Richard Rollins, industrial relations manager of the company and the person who discharged plaintiff, discriminated against him, both because plaintiff was a Mexican-American and because Rollins wanted plaintiff's job for his son; (3) the accident did not constitute good cause for his discharge since no finding had been made that plaintiff was drunk and no charges had been filed against him. At the hearing Rollins, representing the company, told plaintiff he had no defense, that nothing plaintiff could say would change his (Rollins') mind, that if plaintiff applied for unemployment benefits anyone asking the company for references would be told that plaintiff had been discharged for drinking. Rollins then told plaintiff that if he agreed to quit and not apply for unemployment benefits the company would furnish him good references and would not reveal his discharge for drinking. Plaintiff was intimidated and coerced by such statements, and as a consequence he accepted the 'deal' and agreed to quit his job. Five months later on 16 August 1967 plaintiff demanded that the company and the union arbitrate his grievance under the collective bargaining agreement. Subsequently he filed this action against both company and union.

Plaintiff seeks to enforce a right under the collective bargaining agreement to be discharged only for cause. But to enforce rights under that agreement he must exhaust the remedies which the agreement provides. The same article of the agreement which restricts discharges to cause requires that 'grievances involving discharge shall be placed in arbitration or dropped if not settled within fifteen (15) working days from the date of discharge.' Here, the company relies on plaintiff's abandonment of his grievance and his failure to pursue it to arbitration within the 15-day period specified in the agreement. It thus invokes the defense of failure to exhaust contractual remedies, a defense described in Vaca v. Stipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967): '(I)f the wrongfully discharged employee * * * resorts to the courts before the grievance procedures have been fully exhausted, the employer may well defend on the ground that the exclusive remedies provided by such a contract have not been exhausted. Since the employee's claim is based upon breach of the collective bargaining agreement, he is bound by the terms of that agreement which govern the manner in which contractual rights may be enforced. For this reason, it is settled...