Gutierrez v. De Lara

• Decision Date: 30 January 1987
• Docket Number: No. F006058,F006058
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Isadora GUTIERREZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Rose Marie De LARA et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 158

234 Cal.Rptr. 158

188 Cal.App.3d 1575

Isadora GUTIERREZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Rose Marie De LARA et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. F006058.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Jan. 30, 1987.

Buckholtz, Sparagna & Cha, Francis A. Sparagna and Jill S. Breslau, Encino, for plaintiff and appellant

John W. Morris, Mushines, Baradat & Van Doren, Fresno, for defendants and respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

FRANSON, Acting Presiding Justice.

On August 16, 1983, plaintiffs filed a personal injury action against respondents, Rose Marie De Lara and Allied Electric, based on an automobile collision which occurred November 28, 1982. Plaintiffs, Maurillio Gutierrez and Isadora Gutierrez, the owners of the vehicle in which the plaintiffs were riding, were uninsured.

The jury returned special verdicts in favor of plaintiffs on May 29, 1985. At a posttrial hearing, the trial court granted respondents a setoff from the judgments obtained by Maurillio Gutierrez and Isadora Gutierrez for the sum of money paid in uninsured motorist benefits to respondent, Rose Marie De Lara, pursuant to Vehicle Code section 17200. Since the amount of the uninsured motorist benefits paid to Ms. De Lara was greater than the judgments obtained by Maurillio Gutierrez and Isadora Gutierrez, their judgments were reduced to zero.

Vehicle Code section 17200 became effective January 1, 1984 (Stats.1983, ch. 1252, § 10, pp. 4942-4943), over 13 months after the accident occurred. Nevertheless, the trial court believed the date of the judgment or settlement determined the applicability of the statute. We hold the trial court erred by giving a retroactive effect to the statute. We reverse the judgment.

DISCUSSION

The trial court erroneously applied Vehicle Code section 17200 retroactively to an accident occurring before the effective date of the statute.

Appellant contends the trial court improperly applied Vehicle Code section 17200 retroactively to reduce her judgment. This section provides that

"Where an uninsured owner or operator has obtained a judgment against or agreed to a settlement with the owner or operator of an insured motor vehicle based on the negligence of the insured owner or operator, the amount of the judgment or settlement payable by the insured or his or her insurer shall be reduced by the amount paid or payable to the insured owner or operator ... from coverage provided by an uninsured motorist endorsement where the claim of the insured ... and the uninsured motorist arise out of the same accident...."

A retroactivity question such as this may require a two-step analysis. First, the court must determine whether the statute was applied retroactively. If not, the analysis ends. However, if there is a retroactive application, the court must then decide if the Legislature intended that the statute be so applied. (Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 388, 391-396, 182 P.2d 159.)

Unless prohibited by state or federal constitutional provisions in respect to ex post facto laws, impairment of contractual or property rights, or the protection of vested rights, the Legislature may give a statute a retroactive application. (58 Cal.Jur.3d, Statutes, § 23, p. 336.)

" 'A retrospective law is one which affects rights, obligations, acts, transactions and conditions which are performed or exist prior to the adoption of the statute.' [Citations.]" (Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com., supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 391, 182 P.2d 159.) Analyses of statutory retroactivity frequently distinguish between "substantive" and "procedural" statutes, reasoning that procedural statutes become operative only when the procedure or remedy is invoked. Thus, if the trial postdates the enactment, the statute operates regardless of when the cause of action arose. (Id. at p. 394, 182 P.2d 159.) However, as pointed out by the Aetna court, this distinction is a misdirection. The distinction relates not to the form of the statute but to its effect. If the application of the statute will change the legal effect of past events, its operation on existing rights is retroactive, even if the statute might ordinarily be classified as procedural. Therefore, the statute will be construed to operate only in the future unless the legislative intent to the contrary clearly appears. (Ibid.) However, if the statute can have no effect on substantive rights or liabilities but affects only modes of procedure to be followed in future proceedings, it is not in fact retroactive. (Ibid.) Similarly, the enactment of a statute for the purpose of clarifying existing law is not considered a change in the law and thus is not retroactive. (City of Redlands v. Sorensen (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 202, 211, 221 Cal.Rptr. 728.)

Here, the application of Vehicle Code section 17200 changed the legal effect of a past event. At the time of the accident, appellant's status as an uninsured motorist was inconsequential insofar as her right to recover compensation for her injuries caused by the fault of another party. However, the application of section 17200 abrogated appellant's right to collect her judgment due to this status. Further, this statute provides a novel penalty for being uninsured and thus is not a clarification of existing law. Therefore, section 17200 was applied retroactively.

Respondents argue that a statute which affects only the measure of damages is not retroactive. Respondents cite language in American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital (1984) 36 Cal.3d 359, 204 Cal.Rptr. 671, 683 P.2d 670, that "a plaintiff has no vested property right in a particular measure of damages, and ... the Legislature possesses broad authority to modify the scope and nature of such damages." (Id. at p. 368, 204 Cal.Rptr. 671, 683 P.2d 670.) However, American Bank & Trust was concerned with a claim that the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act violated due process. Since the cause of action in American Bank & Trust arose after the effective date of the statute, the court did not discuss retroactivity. Thus, that case does not support respondents' position. Further, both this court and the Second District Court of Appeal, Division Two, have refused to apply a damage provision enacted as part of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act retroactively in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary. (Bolen v. Woo (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 944, 158 Cal.Rptr. 454; Robinson v. Pediatric Affiliates Medical Group, Inc. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 907, 159 Cal.Rptr. 791.) We conclude, therefore, the fact section 17200 only affects damages does not alter its retroactive effect on existing rights.

As a general rule of construction, and subject to constitutional prohibitions, a statute...