Gutierrez–lines v. P.R. Electric

• Citation: 751 F.Supp.2d 327
• Decision Date: 17 November 2010
• Docket Number: Civil No. 07–2187 (DRD).
• Parties: Fernando GUTIERREZ–LINES, Plaintiff,v.PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC AND POWER AUTHORITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

751 F.Supp.2d 327

Fernando GUTIERREZ–LINES, Plaintiff,

v.PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC AND POWER AUTHORITY, Defendant.

Civil No. 07–2187 (DRD).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Nov. 17, 2010.

Carlos T. Gonzalez–Contreras, Jose F. Quetglas, Quetglas Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.Arturo Diaz–Angueira, Elizabeth Del Pilar Villagrasa–Flores, Cancio, Nadal, Rivera & Diaz, PSC, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

DANIEL R. DOMINGUEZ, District Judge.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 15, 2010, Defendant filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 50).¹ In that submission,² Defendant asserts that Plaintiff may not succeed on his constructive discharge theory of age discrimination as his working conditions were not sufficiently onerous, difficult or unpleasant to cause a reasonable person to resign. Defendant highlights Plaintiff's inability to show that Defendant's actions were undertaken with a discriminatory animus rather than because Plaintiff failed to perform his job adequately. Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff can not succeed on his hostile work environment theory ³ as any unpleasantness in the workplace was attributable to Plaintiff's failure to comply with the requirements of his position and that the complained-of behavior which Plaintiff cites was insufficient to meet the strictures of the test for a hostile work environment. At the conclusion of its motion, Defendant requests that the Court also dismiss Plaintiff's supplemental claims as the Court only exercised jurisdiction over those claims in tandem with its original federal question subject matter jurisdiction.

After two extensions of time, Plaintiff filed his opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 59) on June 1, 2010. Therein, Plaintiff alleges that he has produced evidence of sufficiently severe and pervasive conduct indicating age discrimination that a reasonable jury could find the existence of a hostile work environment in the instant case. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was the recipient of age-based remarks which ridiculed and humiliated him. Further, Plaintiff alleges that his supervisor altered the terms and conditions of his employment in other ways, thus harassing Plaintiff. Additionally, Plaintiff avers that the harassment which he suffered resulted in his constructive discharge. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he can prove a retaliation claim against Defendant as Defendant retaliated against him for complaining about the alleged discrimination to the Head Division Manager, when he sought pre-complaint counseling, when he lodged a complaint with the local Equal Employment Opportunity Office (“EEOO”) and when he filed charges of employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).

On June 15, 2010, Defendant filed its Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 65). In that filing, Defendant argues that Plaintiff relies upon assertions from a post-deposition unsworn statement ⁴ which contradicts his previous testimony provided under oath at his deposition without providing a satisfactory explanation for the change. Accordingly, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff's proffered evidence demonstrating that age discrimination was the exclusive motive for the adverse employment action taken against him is inadmissible as an opposition to the summary judgment request.

Finally, on July 2, 2010, Plaintiff filed a surreply (Docket No. 72). In that motion, Plaintiff alleges that the assertions provided in the unsworn statement are not contradictory to the testimony given at his deposition, but, rather, merely provide more detail regarding events alluded to in his deposition. Further, Plaintiff notes that he enunciated the proposed facts challenged by Defendant previously in his EEO complaint.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be entered where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324–325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Pursuant to the clear language of the rule, the moving party bears a two-fold burden: it must show that there is “no genuine issue as to any material facts[;]” as well as that it is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Vega–Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico, 110 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir.1997). A fact is “material” where it has the potential to change the outcome of the pending suit under governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is “genuine” where a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party based on the evidence. Id. Thus, it is well settled that “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” is insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Id.

After the moving party meets this burden, the onus shifts to the non-moving party to show that there still exists “a trial worthy issue as to some material facts.” Cortes–Irizarry v. Corporacion Insular, 111 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir.1997).

At the summary judgment stage, the trial court examines the record “in the light most flattering to the non-movant and indulges in all reasonable references in that party's favor. Only if the record, viewed in this manner and without regard to credibility determinations, reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact may the court enter summary judgment.” Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 959–60 (1st Cir.1997). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250–51, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Summary judgment is inappropriate where there are issues of motive and intent as related to material facts. See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 470, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962)(summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles”); see also Pullman–Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982)(“[F]indings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact.”); see also Dominguez–Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000)(finding that “determinations of motive and intent ... are questions better suited for the jury”). Conversely, summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party rests solely upon “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences and unsupported speculation.” Ayala–Gerena v. Bristol Myers–Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 95 (1st Cir.1996).

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

When analyzing a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, in this case favoring Plaintiff. See Vera v. McHugh, 622 F.3d 17, 25–27 (1st Cir.2010); see also Agusty–Reyes v. Dept. of Edu., 601 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir.2010); see also Cadle Co., 116 F.3d at 959–60. However, while the Court “draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to [the non-moving party] ... we will not draw unreasonable inferences or credit bald assertions, empty conclusions or rank conjecture.” Vera, 622 F.3d at 26 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Further, the Court will not consider hearsay statements nor allegations presented by parties that do not properly provide specific reference to the record. See L.Civ.R. 56(e)(“The [C]ourt may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material properly considered on summary judgment. The [C]ourt shall have no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced.”); see also Morales v. A.C. Orssleff's EFTF, 246 F.3d 32, 33 (1st Cir.2001) (finding that, where a party fails to buttress factual issues with proper record citations, judgment against that party may be appropriate); see also Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1990)(“Hearsay evidence, inadmissible at trial, cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment.”)

Prior to embarking upon the relevant narrative, the Court notes that large portions of Plaintiff's opposing statement of facts, spanning full paragraphs and, in one instance, multiple pages, fail to cite to any supporting evidence. Thus, the Court shall not accept these proposed facts and does not recite them below. See L.Civ.R. 56(e); see also Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris, USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2007)(“Given the vital purpose that [the Local Rules regarding summary judgment] serve, litigants ignore them at their peril.”) The Court has also found several assertions of fact ⁵ which are hyperbolic and only partially supported ⁶ by the cited evidentiary record; in these instances, the Court draws its reading of each such fact directly from the evidence proffered to support the assertion of fact, rather than from the overstated versions proffered by Plaintiff. Keeping these limitations firmly in mind, the Court proceeds to recite the following properly-supported facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff is a resident of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and a citizen of the United States of America. At all times relevant to the instant action, Plaintiff was employed by the Puerto Rico Power Authority (“PREPA”). PREPA is a public corporation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, created by law as a separate legal entity from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and is capable of both suing and...