Guttag v. Shatzkin

• Decision Date: 08 March 1921
• Citation: 230 N.Y. 647,130 N.E. 929
• Parties: GUTTAG v. SHATZKIN.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

230 N.Y. 647

130 N.E. 929

GUTTAG

v.SHATZKIN.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 8, 1921.

Action by Jacob L. Guttag against Hyman Shatzkin. An order denying plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings was reversed by the Appellate Division (194 App. Div. 509,186 N. Y. Supp. 47), which held chapter 947 of the Laws 1920 invalid, and defendant appeals.

Reversed, and order of the Special Term affirmed.

The following questions were certified: (1) Are the facts set forth in the complaint sufficient to constitute a cause of action? (2) Is chapter 947 of the Laws of 1920 constitutional? (3) Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction of the cause of action attempted to be set up in the complaint?

McLaughlin, J., dissenting.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First department.

G. R. Hawes, Julius D. Tobias, David L. Podell, Martin C. Ansorge, Benjamin S. Kirsh, and J. J. Podell, all of New York City, for appellant.

Bernard S. Deutsch, of New York City (Francis M. Scott, I. Maurice Wormser, and Julius H. Zieser, all of New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Order of Appellate Division reversed, and that of Special Term affirmed, with costs in this court and in Appellate Division, on opinion of Pound, J., in People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601, questions certified answered as follows: Nos. 1 and 3, in the negative; No. 2, in the affirmative.

CRANE, J.

I agree with much that has been said by Pound, J., in People ex rel. Durham Realty Corporation v. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601, and in his result, but desire to add the following reasons for my own conclusion.

The late war caused the difficulty which the New York state Legislature, by these laws, has sought to ameliorate in so far as applicable to the city of New York. In the exercise of the war powers the railroad facilities of the country were taken over by the federal government. Shipments of all material were restricted or prohibited, and the labor market was depleted by the withdrawal of mechanics and laborers for government work or service in the army and navy. In consequence no building of any account was done in the city of New York, and the housing facilities at the close of the war were entirely inadequate to accommodate the people. The Legislature had before it reports of investigating committees showing that rents had become exorbitant through unscrupulous and profiteering landlords, that as many as 100,000 families were threatened with eviction on the 1st day of October, 1920, with no place to go, and that families had become scattered. Apparently an emergency was created which called for immediate relief, not merely for comfort, but for the actual necessaries and decencies of life. The lawmakers had reason to believe that the homes, health, and morals of about 500,000 people were at stake, and that immediate action was required. No power to meet such an emergency existed unless it was possessed by the New York state Legislature. Our government was not so effecte as to be barren of relief. It suspended for a time the right to dispossess tenants; it proscribed exorbitant rentals.

If 100,000 families were suddenly on the streets of the great metropolis without shelter, the state, in the exercise of its reserve power, could compel their housing at a reasonable rental to be paid by themselves or by the state. Private property could for the emergency be commandeered. The Legislature by the laws in question has simply prevented such a catastrophe by requiring landlords at reasonable rental to keep tenants until normal building conditions have returned.

The war brought into use powers not before so extensively used, but nevertheless always existing. The war power of Congress and the police power of the state are wellknown functions of government. It is only their application to new difficulties which ever causes comment. As nations grow, powers must expand. Thus the war power suspended many things and regulated, not merely the fighting forces, but nearly all economic activities. The railroads and telegraphs were taken over and intrastate rates established. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135, 39 Sup. Ct. 502, 63 L. Ed. 897;Dakota Central Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 163, 39 Sup. Ct. 507, 63 L. Ed. 910,4 A. L. R. 1923. The maximum price of coal was fixed and the sale and distribution of food products controlled. U. S. v. Penn. Central Coal Co. (D. C.) 256 Fed. 703. No surprise was shown when buildings were taken for government war agencies at a reasonable price, which of necessity meant the price the government was willing to pay. Necessity commandeered buildings for a fair return. The complete and undivided character of the war power of the United States is not disputable (Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, supra), and is not confined to actual hostilities, for it carries with it inherently the power to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict, or to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress (Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & W. Co., 251 U. S. 146, 161, 40 Sup. Ct. 106, 64 L. Ed. 194).

The provision of the Federal Control Act (40 Stat. 458, § 14 [U. S. Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 3115...