Guttman v. Khalsa

• Decision Date: 15 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 03-463 LCS.,CIV. 03-463 LCS.
• Citation: 320 F.Supp.2d 1164
• Parties: Stuart T. GUTTMAN, M.D. Plaintiff, v. G.T.S. KHALSA, Livingston Parsons, and the State of New Mexico Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

320 F.Supp.2d 1164

Stuart T. GUTTMAN, M.D. Plaintiff, v. G.T.S. KHALSA, Livingston Parsons, and the State of New Mexico Defendants.

No. CIV. 03-463 LCS.

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

September 15, 2003.

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Ian D. McKelvy, Roswell, NM, for Plaintiff.

Timothy S. Hale, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SMITH, United States Magistrate Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on May 28, 2003. The Court, acting upon consent and designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, and having reviewed the Motion and considered the submissions of counsel, relevant authorities, and being otherwise fully advised, finds that this Motion is well-taken and should be GRANTED.

I. Background.

This case arises out of the revocation of Plaintiff's medical license by the New Mexico Board of Medical Examiners ("Board"). Plaintiff was granted a stipulated license to practice medicine in New Mexico on May 20, 1993. (Def.Ex. A.) The license was granted with stipulations due to Plaintiff's history of mental illness involving depression and post traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"). (Id.) The stipulations on Plaintiff's license were lifted by the Board on or about May 19, 1995. (Compl.¶ 9.) On December 28, 1999, the Board directed Plaintiff to meet with an Impaired Physician Examining Committee based on a number of complaints regarding Plaintiff. (Def.Ex. D). Plaintiff met with the examining committee on January 10, 2000 in Albuquerque, New Mexico. On or about March 7, 2000, Plaintiff received a Notice of Contemplated Action and an Order of Summary Suspension from the Board based on Plaintiff's mental illness, allegations of false statements to the Board and inappropriate behavior with patients and hospital staff. (Def.Ex. B, C). Plaintiff appeared with counsel at an administrative hearing before the Board from October 23-25, 2000. The purpose of this hearing was to determine whether Plaintiff's license to practice medicine in the State of New Mexico should be revoked. Defendant Parsons acted as administrative hearing officer at this hearing and Defendant Khalsa acted as administrative prosecutor for the Board. The Board ordered that Plaintiff's license to practice medicine be revoked on February 28, 2001 based on dishonest statements made to the Board by Plaintiff and on findings of abusive and disruptive behavior by Plaintiff towards colleagues, hospital staff and patients. (Def.Ex. D). The Board further found that Plaintiff had a history of major depression, PTSD, and an underlying mixed personality disorder, that prior therapeutic treatment and prior intervention by Plaintiff's employers had been ineffective in changing Plaintiff's behavior, and that Plaintiff could not be effectively monitored with respect to his disruptive behavior. (Id.).

Plaintiff filed an appeal of the Board's decision in the Seventh Judicial District Court of New Mexico alleging that the Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence, that the decision of the Board was not in accordance with applicable law, that the decision was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion and that the decision did not comport with the requirements of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") (Def.Ex. E).

On January 30, 2003, the State Court issued an Order affirming the Board's revocation of Plaintiff's license. The court found that the Board's decision was based on substantial evidence, was within the Board's authority and based upon the law, and was not arbitrary, capricious or fraudulent. (Def.Ex. F.) The court further found that, because Plaintiff had not raised the allegation of ADA violations before the Board, this issue was not preserved for appeal. (Id.) As such, Plaintiff's ADA claims were not considered by the court. (Def.Ex. F). Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration to the New Mexico Court of Appeals and petition for certiorari to the New Mexico Supreme Court were denied. (Def.Ex. G, H.) Plaintiff has exhausted all avenues available to him in state court pursuant to 28-1-13 NMSA 1978.

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has not stated a claim for violation of his Procedural Due Process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or for violations of Title II of the ADA and because jurisdiction is improper before this Court.

II. Standard

A motion for summary judgment may be granted only when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P 56(c). Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, as well as any affidavits "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Id. When applying this standard, the Court examines the record and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir.1999).

The movant bears the initial burden of establishing that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Electric indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)). The movant's initial burden may be discharged by showing there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. See Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the movant meets its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial on a material matter. See McGarry v. Pitkin Co., 175 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir.1999).

III. Analysis

Plaintiff brings this action under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants contend they are entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims and that the immunity of Defendants Khalsa and Parsons and the State of New Mexico is well established under Tenth Circuit law.

a. Rooker-Feldman as a Bar to Jurisdiction

Defendant contends that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.¹ Under Rooker-Feldman, a party who loses in a state court proceeding is barred "`from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights.'" Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1169 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994)). Federal review of state court judgments can be obtained only in the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine therefore prohibits a lower federal court from considering claims actually decided by a state court and claims "inextricably intertwined" with a prior state-court judgment. See Kenmen Engineering v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 473 (10th Cir.2002).

Plaintiff asserts that Rooker-Feldman does not apply to the present case because Plaintiff did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his ADA claims in the prior state proceeding. However, in Kenmen, the Tenth Circuit ruled that application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was appropriate despite the fact that the federal court plaintiff had no opportunity to litigate a particular claim in a state court proceeding. Id. at 478. Rooker-Feldman bars any suit seeking to undo a prior state court judgment, regardless of whether the state proceeding afforded Plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims. Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 544 (10th Cir.1991). The fact that the state court declined to hear Dr. Guttman's ADA claims does not provide this Court with jurisdiction to hear those claims.

Plaintiff also contends that, because the State court refused to hear Dr. Guttman's ADA claims, these claims are not "inextricably intertwined" with that court's judgment within the meaning of Rooker-Feldman and therefore can be raised by Plaintiff in this Court. This contention must be rejected. The Supreme Court has identified two categories of cases that fall outside of Rooker-Feldman's"inextricably intertwined" formula. First, a party may bring a general constitutional challenge to a state law, provided that: 1) the Party does not request that the federal court upset a prior state-court judgment applying that law against the party, District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). and 2) the prior state-court judgment did not actually decide that the state law at issue was facially constitutional. Kenmen at 476. (quoting Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923)). Second, a party may challenge state procedures for enforcement of a judgment where consideration of the underlying state-court decision is not required. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 26, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987).

The present action does not fall within either of these exceptions to the Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar. Although Plaintiff contends in his Surreply that he is not intending a review of the state court decision, Plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief and damages under the ADA which requires a review of the state court decision. It is clear that Plaintiff's injury resulted from the state-court judgment, that his...