Guy v. Comm'rs Of Cumberland County

• Decision Date: 05 April 1898
• Citation: 29 S.E. 771,122 N.C. 471
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: GUY . v. COMMISSIONERS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY et al.

29 S.E. 771

122 N.C. 471

GUY .

v.COMMISSIONERS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 5, 1898.

Intoxicating Liquors — Dispensary Law—Constitutionality.

1. Laws 1897, c. 235, regulating the liquor traffic in Cumberland county, is not unconstitutional because local; the only limitation on the legislature being that the law must bear alike on all Within the designated locality.

2. There is no vested right acquired by those engaged in the liquor traffic which prevents its being forbidden as provided in Laws 1897, c. 235.

3. State control of liquor within a county, as established by Laws 1897, c 235, is not a prohibited monopoly.

Appeal from superior court, Cumberland county; Mclver, Judge.

Action by Samuel J. Guy, In behalf of himself and other taxpayers and residents of the county of Cumberland who may join in the action, against the board of commissioners of Cumberland county and others. From a judgment denying part of the relief asked for, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Geo. M. Rose, for appellant.

R. P. Buxton and N. A. Sinclair, for appellees.

CLARK, J. The general assembly of 1897 enacted a statute (chapter 235) to "regulate the sale of liquors in Cumberland county and to establish a dispensary." This action is brought by the plaintiff, in behalf of himself and all other taxpayers and residents of said county who may join in the action, to enjoin the county commissioners from paying out any money to aid in establishing or maintaining said dispensary, or pledging the faith and credit of the county for any debt contracted on behalf of the same, and also to enjoin the operation of the dispensary, on the ground that the act is unconstitutional and void. The defendants filed an answer that no county funds have been advanced, and the credit of the county has not been pledged (the only attempted help having been the loan of $100 in county scrip, which was returned unused to the county commissioners by the dispensary board); and the court enjoined the county commissioners from appropriating any money of the county, or pledging the faith and credit of the county, in aid of the dispensary. This order is not appealed from, and therefore it is unnecessary to consider its validity. The plaintiff has the relief he asked for in that regard.

It is not easy to perceive how, as a taxpayer, he can complain of the establishment of the dispensary, which has devolved, and, after the above injunction, can devolve, no expense upon the county, and which, upon the answer, appears to be bringing a considerable revenue into the county treasury, largely in excess of that formerly received from liquor licenses, besides reducing the volume of drunkenness, and the expense of criminal trials resulting therefrom. But upon the question of constitutionality no doubt can arise. The subject of the regulation of the traffic in liquors has been held uniformly to be within the police power of the state, both by the supreme courts of the United States and of this state. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462; Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 205, 5 Sup. Ct. 897; State v. Joyner, 81 N. C. 534. Nor is it essential that the regulation shall be uniform throughout the state. It is estimated by careful calculation that by virtue of local prohibitory statutes passed by the general assembly from time to time, and local prohibition adopted by popular vote under legislative authority for other localities, as to one-half of the area of the state there is a total prohibition of the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. In addition, in other localities the general assembly has authorized the high-license system, and in several others...