Guyer v. Saul
| Decision Date | 15 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-CV-01931 |
| Parties | KAREN MARIE GUYER, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(MUNLEY, J.)
(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)
Plaintiff Karen Marie Guyer brings this action under sections 205(g) and 1631(c) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by reference), for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") denying her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Act. The matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to prepare a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.
In April 2015, Guyer filed applications under Titles II and XVI, claiming disabilitybeginning May 1, 2014, due to bulging and herniated discs and fibromyalgia. (Doc. 6-2, at 16) (Doc. 6-3, at 2, 7) (Doc. 6-6, at 13). The Social Security Administration initially denied the applications in July 2015, prompting Guyer's request for a hearing, which Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Howard Kauffman held on June 2, 2017. (Doc. 6-2, at 16, 39) (Doc. 6-3, at 5, 10). In a September 2017 written decision, the ALJ determined that Guyer is not disabled and therefore not entitled to benefits or income under Titles II or XVI. (Doc. 6-2, at 16). The Appeals Council subsequently denied Guyer's request for review. (Doc. 6-2, at 2).
On October 4, 2018, Guyer commenced the instant action. (Doc. 1). The Commissioner responded in December 2018, providing the requisite transcripts from Guyer's disability proceedings. The parties then filed their respective briefs, with Guyer raising two principal bases for reversal or remand. (Doc. 7, at 6) (Doc. 8) (Doc. 11).
To receive benefits under Titles II or XVI of the Social Security Act, a claimant must demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 416.909. To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a).2 Additionally, to be eligible under TitleII, a claimant must have been insured for disability insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(a); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131.
In evaluating whether a claimant is disabled, the "Social Security Administration, working through ALJs, decides whether a claimant is disabled by following a now familiar five-step analysis." Hess v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 200-01 (3d Cir. 2019). The "burden of proof is on the claimant at all steps except step five, where the burden is on the Commissioner of Social Security." Hess, 931 F.3d at 201; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a)(1), 416.912(a)(1). Thus, if the claimant establishes an inability to do past relevant work at step four, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could perform consistent with his or her residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a)(1), 416.912(a)(1).
The Court's review of a determination denying an application for Title II benefits is limited "to considering whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence." Katz v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., No. 19-1268, 2019 WL 6998150, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 20, 2019) Substantial evidence "does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).The quantum of proof is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by such evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). In an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be "something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ's decision] from being supported by substantial evidence." Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether Guyer was disabled, but whether the Commissioner's determination that Guyer was not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (). "In determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole." Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). If "the ALJ's findings of fact . . . are supported by substantial evidence in the record," the Court is bound by those findings. Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).
In his written decision, the ALJ determined that Guyer "has not been under adisability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from May 1, 2014, through the date of this decision." (Doc. 6-2, at 26).3 The ALJ reached this conclusion after proceeding through the five-step sequential analysis provided in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) and 416.920(a).
At step one of the five-step analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If a claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity, the claimant is not disabled, regardless of age, education, or work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). Substantial gainful activity is defined as work activity requiring significant physical or mental activity and resulting in pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572, 416.972. The ALJ must consider only the earnings of the claimant. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1574(a)(2), 416.974. Here, the ALJ determined that Guyer "has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 1, 2014, the alleged onset date," and therefore proceeded to step two of the analysis. (Doc. 6-2, at 19).
At step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment—or a combination of impairments—that is severe and meets the 12-month duration requirement. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the ALJ determines that a claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits the claimant's "physical or mental ability to do basic work activities," the ALJ will find that the claimant does not have a severe impairment and is therefore notdisabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If, however, a claimant establishes a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the ALJ proceeds to consider step three. Here, ALJ concluded that Guyer's cervical degenerative disc disease is severe. (Doc. 6-2, at 19). While Guyer also alleged "disability secondary to carpal tunnel syndrome, lumbar degenerative disc disease, and fibromyalgia," the ALJ found these to be non-severe for lack of evidence that they caused more than minimal limitations. (Doc. 6-2, at 19-20). Likewise, though medically determinable, Guyer's depression was deemed non-severe based on the ALJ's finding that it "does not cause more than minimal limitation in [Guyer's] ability to perform basic mental work activities . . . ." (Doc. 6-2, at 20).
At step three, the ALJ must determine whether the severe impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals the medical equivalent of an impairment listed in the version of 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 that was in effect on the date of the ALJ's decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(a)(4)(iii), 416.925, 416.926. The sections in this appendix are commonly referred to as "listings." If the ALJ determines that the claimant's impairment or impairments meet a listing, then the claimant is considered disabled, otherwise the ALJ must proceed to and analyze the fourth step of the sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). Here, the ALJ determined that none of Guyer's impairments, considered individually or in combination, meets or equals the severity of a listed impairment. (Doc. 6-2, at 21). The ALJ specifically considered 1.04 (disorders of the spine). (Doc. 6-2, at 21); see 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.
Between steps three and four, the ALJ evaluates the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC), crafted upon consideration of all the evidence presented. At this intermediatestep, the ALJ...
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