Guzenfield v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 March 1934
• Citation: 286 Mass. 133,190 N.E. 23
• Parties: GUZENFIELD v. LIBERTY MUT. INS. CO. et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

286 Mass. 133

190 N.E. 23

GUZENFIELD

v.LIBERTY MUT. INS. CO. et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

March 30, 1934.

Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Greenhalge, Judge.

Suit by Jennie Guzenfield against the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and others. Decree for plaintiff, and named defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

E. W. Sawyer, of Boston, for appellant Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.

L. Rosenthal and M. W. Rosenthal, both of Boston, for appellee.

WAIT, Justice.

This case was heard upon agreed facts which summarily stated, so far as material, are as follows: The plaintiff obtained judgment against one Meade for negligence in operating an automobile. The automobile was owned by the Metropolitan Furniture Company, which was insured by the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company under a policy of compulsory motor vehicle insurance. The automobile was furnished Meade by the Metropolitan Furniture Company to be used exclusively in its business; and by his contract Meade was not to permit or allow any person other than himself to use, operate, maintain or control it, nor to permit any person other than himself to ride in it. When the accident occurred, one Mary Holmes, admitted to the automobile by Meade as a passenger on a trip while the vehicle was being used in the owner's business, was driving it on a public highway with meade's permission and under Meade's supervision in teaching her to make a ‘left turn.’ The insurance policy ‘provided indemnity for or protection to the insured and any person responsible for the operation of the said automobile with the insured's expressed or implied consent, against loss * * * arising out of the ownership, operation, and maintenance, control or use upon the ways of the Commonwealth of said automobile.’ It was in force on the day of the accident. The plaintiff duly demanded that the defendant insurer pay the judgment. It refused, and this bill in equity followed. The judge found that Meade was responsible for the operation of the insured's automobile with its express or implied consent, within the terms of the policy; and ordered decree for the plaintiff.

The defendant contends that the facts, in law, do not sustain the finding that Meade was the person responsible for the operation of the motor vehicle with the express or implied consent of the owner within the meaning of the statute; that it is error to hold that within the meaning of the statute and the words of the policy issued to comply with it the motor vehicle here concerned can be found to have been operated by one responsible for such operation with the express or implied consent of the owner, when the conduct of the operator was in direct disobedience of the owner's orders. It relies upon decisions from other jurisdictions which have interpreted the language of policies of insurance resembling the words of the policy here in question, and have held the insurer not to be liable. Sauriolle v. O'Gorman, 86 N. H. 39, 163 A. 717;Johnson v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 131 Maine, 288, 161 A. 496;Heavilin v. Wendell, 214 Iowa, 844, 241 N. W. 654, 83 A. L. R. 872;Frederiksen v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. Ltd. (C. C. A.) 26 F. (2d) 76;Kazdan v. Stein, 118 Ohio St. 217, 160 N. E. 704;Trotter v. Union Indemnity Co. (C. C. A.) 35 F. (2d) 104. See, also, Dickinson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 101 Conn. 369, 125 A. 866, 41 A. L. R. 500;Stovall v. New York Indemnity Co., 157 Tenn. 301,8 S. W. (2d) 473,72 A. L. R. 1368;Peterson v. Maloney, 181 Minn. 437, 232 N. W. 790; note 72 A. L. R. 1375 to 1410.

Detailed discussion of these cases is unnecessary since in the case before us there is present an element, lacking in them, which we deem of supreme importance. The policy here in question was issued to meet the requirements of our statute of compulsory motor vehicle insurance. It is to be construed in connection with that statute and the public policy embodied therein. Our Motor Vehicle Insurance Law (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 90, in sections embodying St. 1925, c. 346, St. 1928, c. 381 and St. 1930, c. 340, the acts creating the compulsory liability features) requires as a condition of valid registration of a motor vehicle that the owner furnish indemnity to persons who may be injured by it. One method of furnishing indemnity is by taking out a policy of insurance which must provide ‘indemnity for or protection to the insured and any person responsible for the operation of the insured's motor vehicle with his express or implied consent [italics ours] against loss by reason of the liability to pay damages to others * * * arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, control or use upon the...