Gwin v. Gappa, C7-86-25
| Decision Date | 14 October 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. C7-86-25,C7-86-25 |
| Citation | 394 N.W.2d 530 |
| Parties | Delores A. GWIN, Appellant, v. Jean GAPPA, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
Where the evidence did not clearly show who the insured intended to designate as beneficiary on the change of beneficiary form, the trial court correctly concluded that the original beneficiary was entitled to the benefits.
Gary E. Leonard, Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., Austin, for appellant.
Bob A. Goldman, Tuveson, Goldman & Nelson, Albert Lea, for respondent.
Heard, considered and decided by HUSPENI, P.J., and PARKER and RANDALL, JJ.
Appellant, Delores Gwin, brought a declaratory judgment action to determine who was entitled to the benefits of Dale Gappa's life insurance policy. After a non-jury trial the court found that respondent, Jean Gappa, was the proper beneficiary. On appeal Gwin argues that the trial court erred in finding the designation of beneficiary form invalid; in requiring that Gwin prove the insured had not changed his mind since signing the change of beneficiary form, and in finding that the insured's intent was unclear and ambiguous. We affirm.
At the time of his death, Dale Gappa (the insured) was the holder of an insurance policy with a face value of $10,000. Immediately after his death, his ex-wife Jean Gappa attempted to claim the insurance benefits as the named beneficiary on the original insurance policy. At the same time Delores Gwin, a close friend of the insured's, claimed she was the beneficiary by operation of a change of beneficiary form the insured had executed. The insurance company, by stipulation, paid the proceeds to the court pending resolution of the conflicting claims.
All the parties agreed that the change of beneficiary form had been signed by the insured. The completed form designated Gwin as the primary beneficiary. However, there was conflicting testimony about whether the designated beneficiary portion of the form was in the insured's handwriting or another's.
Janice Brouwers, the insured's sister, initially suggested a change in beneficiary to the insured. Brouwers testified that she found her brother's insurance policy among their father's papers which she examined after their father's death on September 9, 1984. Brouwers stated that when she found the policy she took it to the insurance agent. The agent commented to her that the insured's ex-wife was still listed as the beneficiary, that this was somewhat unusual and that the insured might want to change the beneficiary. The agent gave Brouwers a change of beneficiary form for the insured.
Brouwers testified that when she discussed the policy with the insured he indicated surprise that the policy was still in effect because he had not paid the policy premiums for some time. (The premiums had been paid from the interest the policy had earned.) Brouwers testified that the insured told her he would change the beneficiary and mentioned Brouwers, their sister, his nephews and Gwin as possible beneficiaries. However, the insured did not indicate specifically to Brouwers whom he would designate as beneficiary. He then signed the form. Brouwers signed as a witness. At that time, the insured had not completed any part of the form. Brouwers did not see the form again until after the insured's death. She testified that the beneficiaries' names on the change form appeared to have been completed in the insured's handwriting.
Delores Gwin also testified that the designated beneficiary portion of the change form had been completed in the insured's own handwriting. She stated that the insured had shown her the form and told her that he had designated her as beneficiary and that he did not want his ex-wife and children to have the money from the insurance policy.
The day after the insured died Gwin went to his home to get some of her personal belongings. She stated that she found the change of beneficiary form in the house and that same day took the form to the insurance company to claim the proceeds.
Dale Gappa, Jr., the insured's son, testified that he and his two sisters had gone to the insurance office shortly after their father's death. They met with an insurance agent and asked to see the policy. The policy listed Jean Gappa as beneficiary. They then went ahead and made the necessary funeral arrangements with the understanding that the proceeds from the insurance policy would be available to cover the funeral expenses. That same afternoon the insurance agent called Dale and told him that someone else was also claiming the benefits.
The insured's son testified that the handwriting designating the beneficiaries on the change form could possibly be his father's. The insured's two daughters testified that the handwriting was not their father's. They also pointed out that their father had never been able to remember birthdays and yet the change form accurately noted the birth dates of the contingent beneficiaries which were his nephews and Craig Gwin.
The trial court found that the insured's intent was unclear and ambiguous and concluded that Jean Gappa was entitled to the proceeds from the insurance policy.
Did the trial court err when it concluded that there was not an effective change of beneficiary and therefore the original beneficiary was entitled to the proceeds of the insured's life insurance policy?
Gwin did not move for a new trial or amended findings. Therefore, this court's review is limited to determining whether the evidence in the record supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether those findings support the trial court's conclusions of law. Gruenhagen v. Larson, 310 Minn. 454, 458, 246 N.W.2d 565, 569 (1976). When reviewing a trial court's findings:
[W]e must be guided by the principle that, where an action is tried by the court without a jury, the findings of fact are entitled to the same weight as the verdict of a jury and will not be reversed on appeal unless they are manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence. This is so even though the reviewing court might itself have come to a different conclusion if it had been the fact-finding body.
Brown v. Agin, 260 Minn. 104, 109-10, 109 N.W.2d 147, 151 (1961).
The trial court found in part:
4. It has not been shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the beneficiaries named in [the change form] were written in by [the insured] or that he intended those named to be the new beneficiaries.
5. [The insured] failed to deliver, file or record [the change form] with [the insurer]. No evidence has been offered to show why he failed to do so. Such failure suggests that he intended not to effectuate a change in beneficiaries.
Gwin argues that the weight of the evidence showed that the insured had intended Gwin to be the beneficiary and had completed the change form to reflect that intent. Our review of the record shows that there was conflicting testimony about whether...
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