Gwynne v. Vance

Decision Date08 March 1966
Docket NumberNo. 51996,51996
Citation258 Iowa 875,140 N.W.2d 917
PartiesClaim of Nina B. GWYNNE, Appellant, v. George VANCE, as Executor of the Estate of Cyrus S. Vance, Deceased, Appellee.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Carl H. Pesch, of Zimmerman, Zimmerman & Pesch, Waterloo, and David F. McCann, of Dippel & McCann, Council Bluffs, for appellant.

John H. Holley, of Blake & Holley, Shell Rock, and Zastrow, Noah & Smith, Charles City, for appellee.

THORNTON, Justice.

This is a claim in probate. The hearing in the trial court was limited to the question of peculiar circumstances sufficient to allow claimant equitable relief for late filing of her claim. The claimant appeals from an adverse ruling. Claimant urges we should consider the case de novo as the case was tried in equity. She states her other errors or propositions for reversal in the alternative in the event we conclude the case is at law. These are that she has established diligence or an excuse for the lack of diligence, she has established peculiar circumstances sufficient to entitle her to equitable relief in that she was misled as to the time in which to file the claim.

Claimant is a daughter of decedent and a resident of Omaha. Decedent died September 13, 1963, his will was admitted to probate and the notice of appointment of the executor published on the 17th, 24th and 31st of October, 1963. Claimant knew of her father's death. It is stipulated she did not know he died testate until March 11, 1964, and did not receive a copy of the will until April 6, 1964. It was also stipulated that thereafter claimant called Judge L. E. Plummer of the 12th Judicial District concerning the will and was advised by him to write a letter setting forth the nature of her concern about the will which she did on April 23, 1964. The letter was addressed to the 'Judge of the Probate Court' at Allison. Judge C. H. Wild answered her letter on April 25th, wherein after advising her it was usually necessary to obtain an attorney, he stated:

'You apparently feel that the wills executed by your parents do not express their true desires with respect to their property. Unless you present evidence to the court that this is true, the court is required to accept the will as the lawful wills of your parents. Any person interested in the estate has one year from the time the will is admitted to probate to file such a claim. I cannot advise you further.'

On June 8th claimant consulted an Omaha lawyer who referred her to Iowa counsel. On July 31, 1964, her claim was filed. Resistance was filed and claimant demanded a jury. The executor filed an application for the adjudication of law points under rule 105, Rules of Civil Procedure. Claimant filed a resistance thereto urging a fact question was raised. There was no ruling on this resistance. Claimant withdrew her demand for a jury as follows, '* * * of the fact issue of peculiar circumstances only, and respectfully requests that such issue be tried to the court.' A stipulation as indicated was entered into and counsel agreed to taking the testimony of claimant bearing on peculiar circumstances.

I. Thus we have a hearing on the fact issue of peculiar circumstances tried separately. The claim was still in probate, nothing that was done indicates the case was tried in equity. The claim here as alleged was for services rendered by claimant to decedent for which decedent agreed to compensate her in his will but did not. Such a claim in probate is triable at law, either to a jury or the court. Our review is for the correction of errors and not de novo. Edler v. Fick, 252 Iowa 1367, 1372, 110 N.W.2d 665. The fact one issue, peculiar circumstances, was tried separately to the court does not change this. Rindfleisch v. Mundt Estate, 247 Iowa 1124, 1130, 77 N.W. 2d 643, and citations; and In re Estate of Smith, 248 Iowa 857, 863, 82 N.W.2d 737.

II. The trial court held the proceedings were governed by section 635.68 of the 1962 Code and not section 633.410 of the new probate code. This ruling is not questioned here.

In this state of the record, where the trial court has held claimant has not shown diligence or an excuse for the lack thereof and that the letter of Judge Wild is not such a peculiar circumstance as to entitle claimant to equitable relief, to reverse we must hold as a matter of law a showing of diligence or excuse was made and the circumstances are such as entitle claimant to file her claim late.

Claimant's evidence by stipulation shows she knew of her father's death, presumably on or about the time of death, September 13, 1963, but it does not show she did anything to determine whether she had been compensated in the will or not. She knew of the will March 11, 1964, but did not learn of its contents until April 6th. There is no showing she did anything between those dates. The time of her phone call to Judge Plummer does not appear. This is not a case where claimant was prevented by some circumstance beyond her control from knowing all she needed to know to file her claim. Each of the cases under section 635.68 rest on their own facts both as to diligence and peculiar circumstances, of these none has been called to our attention which holds a failure to take any steps to file a known claim constitutes diligence. In fact it is a failure of proof. Rindfleisch v. Mundt Estate, 247 Iowa 1124, 77 N.W.2d 643, and citations; and Gross v. Hocker, 243 Iowa 291, 51 N.W.2d 466.

In Brewster v. Kendrick, 17 Iowa 479, 481, we said, 'The creditor should be diligent, and the amount of his diligence is always to be measured by the circumstances surrounding him, * * *.'

In Ball v. James, 176 Iowa 647, 659, 158 N.W. 684, 688, we said:

'Such a case as will warrant relief in equity is not contemplated. What is contemplated is that the delay beyond the period fixed by statute for filing claims be so excused and explained as that, when considered in connection with the claim asserted and...

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6 cases
  • Dunlavey v. Economy Fire and Cas. Co.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 18 Enero 1995
    ...together with the other disclosed facts and circumstances, and then to accept or reject the opinion. Id. (citing Gwynne v. Vance, 258 Iowa 875, 879, 140 N.W.2d 917, 919 (1966)). Our review of such a determination by the commissioner is limited to whether the commissioner's finding is suppor......
  • Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 5 Septiembre 1969
    ...totally disregard evidence, but it has the duty to weigh the evidence and determine credibility of witnesses. Re Claim of Gwynne v. Vance, 258 Iowa 875, 879, 140 N.W.2d 917, 919. Stated otherwise, the court and jury are not bound to accept testimony as true because it is not contradicted. J......
  • Henschel v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 23 Junio 1970
    ...most favorable to plaintiff but only to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses. Re Claim of gwynne v. Vance, 258 Iowa 875, 879, 140 N.W.2d 917, 919; Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc., 170 N.W.2d 632, 643 (Iowa 1969). II. We next determine whether the trial cour......
  • Deaver v. Armstrong Rubber Co.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 5 Septiembre 1969
    ...totally disregard evidence, but he has the duty to weigh the evidence and determine credibility of witnesses. Re Claim of Gwynne v. Vance, 258 Iowa 875, 879, 140 N.W.2d 917, 919. IV. In support of the district court's finding there was no expert testimony the accident of July 22, 1963, coul......
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