Gyamtso v. New Metro Trucking Corp.

• Decision Date: 20 May 2013
• Docket Number: Civil No. 11-3457 (DWF/JSM)
• Parties: Tsewang Gyamtso and Nawang Recho, Plaintiffs, v. New Metro Trucking Corporation, Wei Yi Lin, Weihen Lin, and Bihui Zheang a/k/a "Auntie," Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

Tsewang Gyamtso and Nawang Recho, Plaintiffs,

v.New Metro Trucking Corporation, Wei Yi Lin, Weihen Lin, and Bihui Zheang a/k/a "Auntie," Defendants.

Civil No. 11-3457 (DWF/JSM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Dated: May 20, 2013

MEMORANDUMOPINION AND ORDER

Brendan R. Tupa, Esq., and Kenneth U. Udoibok, Esq., Udoibok, Tupa & Hussey, PLLP, counsel for Plaintiffs.

Henry To, Esq., Henry To Law Firm, counsel for Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 38). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion.

BACKGROUND

Tsewang Gyamtso and Nawang Recho ("Plaintiffs") are former employees of Defendant New Metro Trucking Corporation ("New Metro"). (Doc. No. 32, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-9.) Wei Yi Lin, Weihen Lin, and Bihui Zheang ("Individual Defendants") areemployees, owners, or agents of New Metro. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs are Tibetan and claim to have been discriminated and retaliated against by Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 20-27.)

In a previous action filed in Hennepin County District Court, New Metro asserted claims of conversion and punitive damages against Plaintiffs. (Doc. No. 42, Ex. 1 § I.) Plaintiffs then counterclaimed for wrongful termination, failure to provide accurate earnings statements, and punitive damages. (Id.) In that lawsuit, New Metro alleged that Plaintiffs each stole approximately $16,000 from New Metro in the summer of 2011. (Id. § II.) On July 16, 2011, New Metro fired Plaintiffs. (Id.) Plaintiffs claimed, in that case, that "they were wrongfully terminated for repeatedly refusing New Metro's orders to perform actions that they believed violated state and federal laws, rules, and regulations." (Id.) Plaintiffs further alleged that New Metro failed to provide Plaintiffs with accurate earnings statements throughout their employment. (Id.) Following a bench trial, the court entered judgment in that matter on July 19, 2012. See http://pa.courts.state.mn.us/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=1614636177.

Plaintiffs recently filed an Amended Complaint in this case, which asserts the following claims: (1) Race Discrimination in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (2) Race Discrimination in Violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"); (3) Reprisalin Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (4) Reprisal in Violation of the MHRA; (5) Aiding and Abetting Discrimination in Violation of the MHRA; (6) Violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)—Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a); and (7) Punitive or Triple Damages. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28-37.) In particular, Counts I and II arise from Plaintiffs' assertion that Defendants discriminated against them because they are Tibetan Buddhists. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28-30.) Counts III, IV, and V arise from Plaintiffs' claim that they "were fired for complaining of unequal treatment in their working conditions." (Id. ¶¶ 30-32.) Count VI alleges that New Metro, through the Individual Defendants, assisted and encouraged the employment of illegal and undocumented alien workers. (Id. ¶ 33.)

Defendants now move for summary judgment on the basis of res judicata.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank of Mo., 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). However, as the Supreme Court has stated, "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored proceduralshortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enter. Bank, 92 F.3d at 747. The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).

II. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

"The doctrine of res judicata applies to repetitive suits involving the same cause of action." Lundquist v. Rice Mem'l Hosp., 238 F.3d 975, 977 (8th Cir. 2001). Res judicata specifically bars litigants from bringing claims on grounds that were raised or could have been raised when: (1) a court of competent jurisdiction rendered the prior judgment; (2) the prior judgment was a final judgment on the merits; and (3) both cases involved the same cause of action and the same parties or their privies. Banks v. Int'l Union Elec., Elec., Tech., Salaried & Machine Workers, 390 F.3d 1049, 1052 (8th Cir. 2004). A claim is barred by res judicata if it arises out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the prior claim. Id.

It is clear that the state court action involved the same parties (with the exception of the Individual Defendants named here, who are clearly privies of New Metro in all relevant respects), and that a final judgment was entered in that matter. The only legitimate dispute, therefore, is whether both suits involve the same causes of action or nucleus of operative facts. The Court separately addresses the claims at issue below.

A. Wrongful Termination

Counts III, IV, and V arise from Plaintiffs' claim that they "were fired for complaining of unequal treatment in their working conditions." (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30-32.) It appears that, through each of these Counts of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs are attempting to relitigate their claim (which was already rejected in state court) that they were wrongfully terminated by New Metro. See Ruple v. City of Vermillion, 714 F.2d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 1983). Any factual allegations with respect to retaliatory discharge were made, or could have been made, in the state court case. Additionally, the state court judge noted, at the summary judgment stage in that action, that Plaintiffs claimed "they were discharged for refusing to perform [New Metro's] orders which they believed violated state or federal law, rule or regulation" and that, alternatively, "they were discharged for making good faith reports of suspected violations of law." (Doc. No. 42, Ex. 1 § V(iv).) Because the state court already rendered judgment on Plaintiffs' claim of wrongful termination, and because the allegations in the Amended Complaint with respect to Plaintiffs' discharge could have been raised previously, the Court concludes that Counts III, IV, and V are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

B. Race and National Origin Discrimination

With respect to Plaintiffs' claims of systematic race and national origin discrimination, the Court declines to find that both suits involve the same cause of action.

Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint allege that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs on the basis of their Tibetan ethnicity throughout the course of their employment with New Metro.¹ To the extent Plaintiffs allege that they were subjected to an ongoing pattern and practice of discrimination by Defendants—separate from their termination—to wit: they received unequal treatment, pay, and benefits, such claims do not arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts as those claims previously litigated in state court. As such, they are not precluded on the basis of res judicata. See Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2010) ("Under Minnesota law, if the right to assert the second claim did not arise at the same time as the right to assert the first claim, then the claims cannot be considered the same cause of action.").

Defendants have not disputed that Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of discrimination;² nor have Defendants produced a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the disparate treatment of Plaintiffs vis-à-vis their similarly situated Chinesecounterparts.³ See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Grifith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736-37 (8th Cir. 2004). Contra Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 380 F.3d 459, 468-72 (8th Cir. 2004). The Court finds that questions of fact exist regarding whether Plaintiffs' receipt of unequal pay and benefits for equal work "was motivated by a discriminatory animus." See Hill v. City of Pine Bluff, 696 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 2012); see also Tenkku v. Normandy Bank, 348 F.3d 737, 741-42 (8th Cir. 2003) (addressing wage discrimination claim under Title VII and Equal Pay Act standards). As such, the Court concludes that genuine issues of material fact remain for the jury with respect to Plaintiffs' claims of race and national origin discrimination.

C. RICO Claim

Count VI of the Amended Complaint asserts a civil RICO claim against Defendants. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), it is unlawful "for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). RICO, however, does not provide a cause of action for all instances of wrongdoing; itsfocus, rather, is the eradication of "organized, long-term, habitual criminal activity." Crest Const. II, Inc. v. Doe, 660 F.3d 346, 353 (8th Cir. 2011), citing Gamboa v. Velez, 457 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 2006). To establish a federal...